ChiangHai Mag

The Biggest Tree in ChiangRai?

2012-02-17T22:55:00.000-08:00

My wife said it is, but she was just trying to get me interested. I didn’t find out what kind it is, besides “giant” (yak, yaksa – ยักษ์ ). But it’s big enough to be interesting, and in an interesting area with lots of tribal villages, terraced rice paddies, river views, hot springs, waterfalls, shrines and hill-top temples. Much of that is covered at www.chiangraiprovince.com/guide, recommended at guest houses, and so easy to find that quite a good number of tourists here do.
Big on the backpacker hit-list are Doi Klong Khai Rice-box Hill, Huay Mak Liam Hotsprings and the suspension motorcycle bridge, all in the area. Not so well-known is the huge tree. It’s even an easy bike ride out – only 14 km. from the Den Ha intersection where SanKhong Noi and RatchYotha cross. 7.2 km. from Don’s Café, with Western food from noon on. At a large picture of the King under a red corrugated roof, with two red pillars to the front, turn left: there are blue signs to the “Ton Ngoon” and Huai Kaeo Waterfall on botyh sides of the road just south of the Kok river (following along it from not far past Hang Dong). Start watching after the tree (with tree shrine) in the middle of the road, it’s about 1.5 km. past that, at Ban Huai Pu Patana.
The tree, I’m guessing, is at least 150 feet tall, 30 foot wide at the base, and when the trunk becomes round, it’s circumference might be 18 feet.
Although most trees here have some leaves in February, this one won’t until maybe May. But that means you can see the many huge bee hives attached to branches. The Ruesi hermit statue between trunk ridges is also pretty cool, especially as there’s a clay water-pot with wood nam-boui dipper by it, in old traditional fashion. Quite nearby is a Karen village (Mu 8) with lots of black pigs, a mountain stream and lots of hints as to what life around here used to be like before things got so accessible.

Southeast Asia has several folk beliefs about what a woman should do after giving birth; here’s one from Chiangrai’s hill people:
Sometimes after giving birth, a woman will become “pit duan” - thin and weak with yellow, itchy skin. To avoid this condition, a restricted diet is recommended: no beef, pork or regular chicken, only Kai Dam black chicken. Some kinds of fruit, vegetables and fish are OK, others not. Some chickens have all black meat and black bones, some have white bones and meat (like KFC or 5 Star), and there are gradations in between. Kai Dam is good, Kai Khao (white) OK, but yellow meat is regarded as distinctly bad. It makes new mothers weak, and to avoid that, many people are glad to pay extra (i.e. B150 as opposed to B120 per kilo) for the black meat on black bones, preferably from free-range chickens. That is thought best, for at least a month!
In fact, Gai Dam do have better protein, more amino acids, less fat and cholesterol, and other health benefits.

Another chicken belief involves the Kai Khon Fu, fluffy, kinda scary-looking chicken (see photo). Raise that kind, and ghosts won’t bother you, won’t enter your house. Especially if someone has died there, this is seen as important. The fluffy feathers somehow close the door to the spirit’s return. Without the guardian chicken, the ghost might enter the body of some animal, and wreak who knows what havoc…

A new travel opportunity

2012-02-14T01:08:00.000-08:00

There is now bus service from ChiangRai to LuangPrabang Laos – only B950, leaving daily at 1 p.m.! One is even given enough time to arrange a “visa on arrival” (good for two weeks) at the border.
On 19 Jan. 2012, bus service began from from ChiangMai to LuangPrabang began, reportedly leaving CM daily at 1 p.m, routing through ChiangRai. By the 23rd, the price was said to have dropped from B950 to B735. When I asked about that at the bus station, however, they disclaimed any knowledge about it.
From Chiang Rai the 2nd class, air-conditioned, 44 seat bus goes to Chiang Khong. Before this service opened, one had to make separate arrangements to the border, and once over the border you could get a Lao bus north to LuangNamTha, then on to UdomXai and LuangPrabang; this sometimes took three days.
Now the “999” bus office in ChiangKhong allows passengers holding tickets by 3:00 p.m. to be taken by tuk-tuk to Thai Immigration, ferried across the Mekong, and then, once again by tuk-tuk, taken on to the bus station a few kilometers out, for 5 p.m. departure. The ferry and tuk-tuk both sides are included in the price (whether B950 or B735). The ChiangKhong “Boh-Koh-Soh 999” bus station office is scheduled to be to be open from 6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. I didn’t check the new Amphoe ChiangRai station hours, but they are at least that.
Total distance by road ChiangRai to LuangPrabang 610km. It’s over 200 km. from HuayXai to the Chinese border, which this route almost reaches (just over 190 km to LuangNamTha). About 80% of the road is good, but it’s often narrow; HuayXai to Boten (at the China border) is wide and being upgraded. It’s believed that this will become an active highway, but that remains to be seen.
On the internet I found mention of a VIP bus, but again, the agents at the ChiangRai central bus station disclaimed any knowledge. They did say that the trip takes 12 to 13 hours; on the Net the VIP Bus is reported as 12 -15 hours, and the 2nd class bus as taking 18 hours, which would have one arriving in LuangPrabang at a more reasonable hour. Should one arrive an hour after midnight, prior arrangements for accommodations would be a good thing indeed! The Lao VIP bus might be something which can be arranged in ChiangRai at the new bus station, as claimed on www.thaivisa.com Chiangrai forum, but perhaps only at the tour agency offices. One report of the VIP bus mentions only 25 seats, but no aircon, no reclining seats, no service, and not enough seats for everybody. It was “very noisy, dirty, cold and we could only sit straight. There was 1 stop of 15 minutes, and a very short toilet stop. The total trip took more than 12 hours. Our clothes and personal belongings got very dirty and many people were coughing or having problems to breathe. Even though we were very tired, we could not sleep, since probably due to the bad suspension of the bus we were shaken in all directions, and several times and had to hold on to the chair in front”…
Plans to construct a bridge from ChiangKhong to HuayXai by late 1997 were derailed by the economic crash but it should be completed soon, perhaps this year. On one’s own, you present your passport at Thai Immigration by the river (open from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.); they put an exit stamp in, give you a white departure card and then take your picture (normally done in about five minutes). You walk twenty meters to the river and take a small ferry boat across to the Laos Immigration, directly across the river: B30 for you and B10 for your baggage. This also takes about five minutes.
At HuaiXai one can get a Visa on Arrival, usually for US$35 (or B1500; the visa cost ranges between $30-$42 US, depending on your nationality. For Swiss, Japanese and South Koreans it’s free. The cost in Euros tends to be the same as the dollar cost, with Lao authorities ignoring exchange rate differentials). It’s a dollar extra on weekends. You only need to complete their form, and present one passport-size picture (or a photocopy of your passport information page) with your passport. There are money changers on the Thai side, so you don’t need to pay in baht (which can save you a reasonable bit). The Laos Visa on Arrival is Single Entry.
Upon exiting Laos Immigration, one can catch a tuk-tuk out to where the bus station is, 7 km south of town, and catch the regular Laos VIP bus - which leaves at 5:00 p.m. everyday. This VIP Bus has been running from HuayXai to LuangPrabang for over a year.
A warning: on arriving in Houay Xai, you might be approached by touts asking about your next destination. If you answer Luang Prabang, you may be pressured to reserve a ticket on a VIP bus, because the bus is invariably “sold out”. The ticket offered will be priced at something ridiculously high, perhaps 210,000-260,000 kip. Upon arriving at the bus station, you’ll be handed a ticket with the actual price, 145,000 kip, on it! At the bus station you can get a ticket all the way to Vientiane for 210,000 kip.
The local bus to Luang Prabang is about US$12 (110000 kip) at the station itself, a couple bucks more when arranged at a guesthouse or through an agent. They’ll claim the trip is 10 hours, but often turns out to be 15. The bus station is 7km from the town. However, if you buy the ticket at the bus station rather than through your guesthouse or agent then the price is lower (perhaps 145,000 kip, around US $14.50). You are told the journey is 10 hours but it can turn out to be 15 hours or more, so be prepared. Local buses leave 9 a.m. and either 12:30 or 2 p.m., and cost 60,000 kip at the station. From a guest house you might choose to pay 95,000 kip (about 350 baht) for a “package” including the 10 minute tuk-tuk ride to the bus station (usually only about 10,000 kip). There’s also the option of going by songthaew to LuangNamTha - they leave when filled, from early morning to after midnight, and cost about US$7. The hotels in Luang Namtha said to be clean and cheap.
The local buses have a lunch stop along the way. The road (Hwy. 3) has been completely sealed, but some big sections in the middle have been churned up by trucks, which adds time to the trip. From LuangNamTha, it’s about 300 km. further to LuangPrabang (on Hwy. 13). From LuangNamtha to UdomXai the road has recently been resurfaced, but work is still being done on the verges. From UdomXai to PakBeng, only about 80 km., the road is bad, and that section often takes about three hours. Various obstacles may occur elsewhere, but there haven’t been any reports of Farang getting killed by bandits for several years now.
The area traversed is scenic, rural, and mountainous. The scenery is reportedly much better than the LuangPrabang - Vientienne route, but some areas are just rubber plantations, and about half the bus trip (or more) takes place at night. On one’s own, one can make stops, for instance, at “Gibbon Experience” in Don Chai, Bokeo Province, where you can stay in tree-houses and glide along zip-lines to view some of the last black-cheeked gibbons in Laos. There are also many tribal peoples, from about 30 ethnicities, including Khmu, Hmong, Lao Loum, Lahu, Akha, Pu Tai, Phou Noy, and Tai Lue. Driving on one’s own can be arranged, but as driving is on the right (as opposed to the left in Thailand), and you need to make local insurance arrangements, that’s of questionable advisability (much better for large parties than small).
For cycling, it depends on how well the hard-top has weathered, since it was last re-surfaced. It can be done, but there’s a lot of dust, and LuangNamTha to OudomXai can be quite bad.
HouayXai’s tiny airport has service to and from Luang Prabang and also Vientiane (about US$ 46 and $88, respectively). There’s also Lao Aviation service at LuangNamTha.
Arriving back to Thailand overland can mean that you will be given only a tourist visa, valid for just fourteen days.

Why Opening Myanmar to the West is Bad.

2012-01-16T18:14:00.000-08:00

In a word – Monsanto. Here in ChiangRai, we still have bees and butterflies, pollinators. We, and everyone everywhere, need them. In China, they’re now often pollinating by hand. Without a large pool of poorly paid and desperate people, that would make the price of fruit (among other things) exorbitant.
The root (and trunk) of the problem is that the “scientists” (engineers) producing genetically modified seed have neglected to consider important interface mechanisms of the natural world. Just as genes function through mechanisms in their genetic sheaths (which have yet to be modified), nothing stands alone or operates alone. It’s like the “domino effect” – change one piece, and a long chain of subsequent activity becomes affected. Much as we digest with the aid of bacteria, plants propagate themselves with the aid of non-plant life-forms (insects, birds, worms). And corporate greed has been blind to these realities.
And corporate greed is the reason the opening of Myanmar may prove even worse than the horrific genocidal activity of the military regime there. Even with human mine detectors, rampant poverty and extensive fighting, the village community has thrived throughout what once was well-known as Burma. People there look out for each other, co-operate in their work and celebrations, and have loving families.
With the coming of “development” there is usually increased social alienation, and curtailing of extended social connectivity. People become in competition with each other: individualized units for production and consumers subject to the manipulations of advertising.
“Western multinational corporations, and American empire, are desperate to continue on a course of expansion, despite that there remains hardly any potential remaining for that. This is also a “domino effect” – which needs to be stopped before all of our dominos have fallen. The less humanity retains connection to its past, the less future it has.

750 Years of ChiangRai, the Heart of Lanna

2012-01-08T00:28:00.000-08:00

750 Years of ChiangRai, the Heart of Lanna
by Joel J. Barlow

Although people lived here before that, there’s good reason to celebrate ChiangRai as 750 years old this year. 750 years ago a new polity came into being, one without which the greater polity of Thailand might never have arisen. 750 years ago, a kind of teak and bamboo curtain was established (a bit like the much later “Iron Curtain” dividing East and West Germany), and that divide prevented the Mongols “hordes” from absorbing into their Yuan Empire the plains area drained by the MaeNam ChaoPraya.
The new polity became known as Lanna; its capitol was ChiangMai, but ChiangMai was more a business and administrative than cultural center. Its kings often preferred to retire to ChiangRai, which more epitomized their cultural heritage from Sipsongpanna (Xishuangbanna), Yonok, Dali and the Sipsong Chu Tai (12 Tai Names). ChiangMai was much more influenced by Mon, and even Khmer, cultures. It was essential as a trading center - engrossed in business with areas more to the south than to the north, where an intimidating threat remained. ChiangRai, however, was able to remain tight with municipalities in bordering Shan and Lao areas (well, tight in the sense that, although they sometimes fought, they were very much of the same cultural family).
The founder of Lanna, Paw Khun Mengrai (“Good Father King Rai”; King Mangrai, though frequently used, is a redundancy) laid the basis for the long-enduring Thai political independence by creating a reliable alliance of T’ai and related, neighboring, peoples, in the Christian Era’s13th century. His alliances and strategies enabled him to resist aggression by the Mongols, who were conquering elsewhere pretty much as they pleased. A contemporary, neighboring king Paw Khun Ramkamhaeng, is officially acknowledged as the first Thai king for his promulgation of Thai written language and of Theravada Buddhism with king as the top defender and advocate. Unlike Mengrai, though, Ramkamhaeng was nominally a vassal of others, both of the Mongol empire (which he visited twice), under Kublai Khan, and also of the Angkor Khom, his antecedents.
After Mongol horsemen attacked and defeated NanChao in 1253 CE, with Shan aid they then defeated the Burmese (1277). The power of the Mongols and their Yuan Dynasty Chinese Empire were a clear threat to all peoples of the entire region. From the Pacific Ocean to Eastern Europe and Persia, Mongol horsemen were going where they willed. Mengrai couldn’t have maintained his position as king without moving his court (and people) to a less vulnerable position. Realizing he had to avoid direct confrontation between his army and the stronger Mongols, Mangrai took his people south across buffering waters (the Mekong, the Kok and the Chiang Saen Lake), away from his patrimonial JingHong in the semi-mythical Ngoen Yang, and matrimonial Chiang Rung (both in southern Yunnan). His people made a new capital and named it after him: ChiangRai. The ChiangSaen Lake, lying between NgoenYang and ChiangRai, was quite large then, as a big earthquake (about 800, or perhaps 1015 CE) had released lots of water down from the KengTung area of present Shan State. Most of the lowlands between the Mekong and Kok rivers had become jungle swamp difficult to cross except along thin pathways, where steep, thickly vegetated hills met the wetlands. This kind of area can still be seen at the Doi NangNohn lagoon just southwest of the international border at Mae Sai.
1296 is the accepted date for the establishment of Lanna, as that’s the founding date of ChiangMai - but our modern concept of a country didn’t yet exist. There was empire, with greater and lesser rulers. Only with a significant center of business could Mangrai be seen as a great king; for 34 years, Mangrai hadn’t been King of Lanna, but of ChiangRai - if indeed that name was yet well established. It took him three years of attacking and defeating other towns (Muang Mop, Muang Lai, Chiang Kham and Chiang Chang) before he founded ChiangRai. By then, he already had a son (Khun Kruang), the mother of whom receives no mention in the ChiangMai Chronicle.
Impressed with the hills of Doi JomTong (on the south bank of the Kok River, with a village called Pantu Nakorn), which he likened to the three mountains NgoenYang, he built a fortified city there, and named it after himself. Three years later, he had another son, Jao Khun Khram. It’s said that, when settled into ChiangRai, Mangrai met Princess Eua Ming Wiang Chai, of ChiangSaen (Yonok, or whatever it was called then – the name ChiangSaen came later). Wanting to marry her, he promised to forgo other women for that privilege - also not mentioned in the Chronicles.
Six years before Mengrai’s ascendancy, the Mongols took Yunnan’s northern neighbor, Nanchao; with Mengrai’s leaving, they had all of Yunnan. In 1279, all China was theirs. By 1290 Kublai Khan had annexed past the Volga to the Danube; Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, most of northern Burma and coastal northern Vietnam were included in his Empire. Kublai Khan sent armies south of the Kok, but Mengrai’s successful harassment tactics, which disrupted supply lines, persuaded them to leave. The Mongols conquered the similar Irrawaddy region (taking Pagan in 1297), but in Lanna found no established urban center to lay siege to, as Mengrai had stayed fairly mobile, transplanting his capital from place to place, unpredictably, for decades. Unable to take a major city or establish any permanent base in Lanna, the Mongols never approached the Chao Phraya River basin. Thus the soon much greater kingdom, then empire, of Ayudhaya was able to prosper, and grow into Siam.
By the time of Mengrai, T’ai people were spread over an area in excess of a quarter million square kilometers, living in co-operative, communalistic style. The village was the main political unit; we’ve no record of any complex social hierarchies. The name of Mengrai’s lineage, Luajakarat or Lawajakarat, as well as his actions, denotes intermingling among indigenous peoples (Lua, Lawa), and access to various ancient political ideas. Young Mengrai clearly saw a united political and military front with loosely-associated peoples as the only way to maintain his position and prestige; he had the sophistication to effectively use ideas as advanced as those put forth much, much earlier by Sun Tzu in his book, The Art of War (although Mangrai may well never have known of the book, or even Sun Tzu’s name).

When Mangrai came to ChiangRai, there had long been a predominantly Buddhist culture for several centuries (at least). Wat Boran in Wiang Nua, just northwest of WiangChai, may hold the oldest remnants of this by-gone society to be found in northern Thailand. Just how old the Buddha effigy there is isn’t clear, but bricks and mortar from a jedi (pagoda), wall or gate, dug up in 1972, are from the early Chiang Saen era (before the city was called that), about 1200 years ago. ChiangSaen, or Yonok, or whatever it might have been called then, closer to the Mekong River (perhaps ruins lie under the river’s course, no-one knows), had existed for quite awhile, and there were temples at Doi Khao Quai and Doi Jom Tong. Haripunchai (now Lamphun) had Mon rulers, but locals hereabouts were Leu, Lawa and forest peoples. There are about 15 groups with names including the term “Tai” here now, but exactly who was here then we don’t know. None of this area’s municipalities in any way rivaled Asia’s contemporaneous real metropolises (like southern Thailand’s Nakorn Sri Thammarat), which were larger than anything then in Europe. Those places were mentioned in accounts by people from elsewhere. For early Lanna, though, not many documents have been found, so there’s not a lot to refer to.

Between Amphoe Wiang Chai and the Kok River is Amphoe Wiang Nua, where life is about as it ought to be. Instead of malls, pollution and traffic, there’s rice and corn fields, with pumpkins, coconut, banana and other fruit, and tobacco, all growing in profusion. Tourists are few - in fact, almost non-existent. The pace of life is slow, people are friendly, reliable and honest, and passing fads of fashion must seem to many locals as but crazy fairy-tales from far away.
As everywhere in Thailand, there are many temples. One, Wat Boran, isn’t much, except perhaps in significance. It may hold the oldest remnants of by-gone Buddhist society to be found in northern Thailand. Just how old the Buddha effigy is isn’t clear, but bricks and mortar from a jedi (pagoda), wall or gate, dug up in 1972, are from the early Chiang Saen era (before the city of that area was called that), about 1200 years ago.
East of the “Ha-Yaek” at the Mengrai Monument south of the Kok River bridge on Highway 1 about 10 kilometers past the Sports Stadium, is Wat Panalai Kasem, in Ban Panalai, about 4 kilometers from Wiang Chai. At nearby Ban Wiang Nua old style clothing and architecture remains common, and at Ban Rat Jalern aren many ‘galae’ roof horns, raised houses and even polished teak ones. Wat RatJalern has fancy embossed temple doors and gorgeously colorful front wall paintings of Mae Toranee and Taewadah angels. The next small town is Ban Sansalit; Wat Sansalit is just before Wat Boran, in Ban Wiang Doem (or Derm, given the Thai predilection for transliterations using silent r’s with no counterpart in corresponding Thai script). Atthe back of Wat Boran a new temple structure is being finished. Small houses for spirits of the newly deceased stand between it and the ‘bot’ (sala si-ri tamon pracha-nuson) for chanting and services. Lots of birds fly around inside the bot; others are caged (some ‘talk’). The ancient things are in a fancier temple building, just to the right after a small pavilion at the gate. Nothing is in English… and often no-one is around. But there one can get a hint about what was here before Mangrai.

Front of Wat Sansalit

Image unearthed at Wat Boran

Another fascinating historical temple is just a few kilometers further on. Pass the turns to the interestingly named Ban Ta-bandai (water-stairs, or perhaps, “waiting for stairs” place. If it seems I should explain why sometimes I’m not sure of a translation, I’ll be getting to that presently! First let’s get to our next old temple).
Wat Bang Trai-gaeo, at Ban Trai-gaeo, is a bit down at the heels, but not a century old, I’m sure. Just past it, take a clearly marked (in English even) left turn, to Wat Ku-na (the sign in Thai calls it Boran Satan Prajao Ku-na). After about a kilometer and a half, turn right and go the same distance to Ban Ku-na (no real village) and pass the little rest stop for weary drivers (I think the only one I’ve seen in Thailand). Then turn left at the lake.
This is an amazing place. Built first by Lanna’s animist king while he was still a Buddhist, over 630 years ago, the setting charming, ambience delightful and surprises amazing. I particularly like the little “ti-pak ron jai” (place to stay for hot hearts) tiny jail.

More noticeable, in fact, impossible to miss, is a roofed over fallen tree. A sign in Thai explains that it was a rubber tree (ton yang) over 100 years old, over 29 meters tall and 4.1 meters around, found in the river early in 2004. But a caretaker there told me it was a “Ton sai” tree, and not only do I clearly remember the tree being there, and not with a new roof, either, before that, I have pictures from my first visit – over a year before that! So, I’m reluctant to trust everything I read or hear…
By the roofed tree’s roots are gifts: women’s cloths and zip up wardrobe, make-up equipment and a donation box. Clearly a spirit is believed to be in residence.

There’s no resident monk at Wat Ku-na, just a caretaker who sweeps up and sells fish food, incense and candles. Often one simply puts money in a bowl and helps oneself. The bowl is on a table in a “sala” between the small lake and a sturdier sala with a large Buddha statue. That is the main bot – with no walls.
People tend to ignore the bot, and place their offerings before a huge 5 or 600 year old Ton sai tree (well, the caretaker told me that’s what it is, I thought maybe a Bo tree… but it’s another kind of fiscus, the banyan; and, apologies to the caretaker, rubber is a kind of fiscus, too!) which often has images of royals among its roots. High up in its branches are over 20 bee hives, easily visible. The largest appears to be over a meter in length. Locally, bees building a nest is regarded as a token of great good fortune.
Extending over the lake is a small wood sala, with benches, placed above a cement walk around it, with protective railing, used for feeding the many fish – many fairly big for such a small lake. There are pla duk catfish, pla ja-la met butterfish, pla tah pien and long pla chon fighting fish, I was told by visitors feeding them.
West of the big tree, near the river, is something like bleachers for images given to the tree, and the riverside is where the Loi Kratong parade from Wiang Nua ends and people launch their kratongs.
It’s all quite lovely, with the air cooled by breezes passing above the river and lots of vegetation, including plenty of trees. Well worth a visit, especially if one wants to see a bit of unspoiled northern life.

When I started compiling ChiangRai tourist information a decade ago, WiangChai was off the tourist track, and few people there spoke anything but northern &/or central Thai. Although with a primarily rice-based economy, due to proximity to Amphoe Muang, good soil (a legacy from when the ChiangSaen Lake was huge), and plentiful water, WiangChai is more prosperous than PhrayaMengrai, Theung or other outlying areas of ChiangRai. Santiburi Golf has helped too, as has land speculation. Grounds preparation for another golf-based community, “Happy City”, is well underway, and already there are Farang faces to be seen around and about. There are internet cafes, modern homes aplenty, and other signs of development; with that, though, has come removal of some mountains (over towards otherwise beautiful Bung Luang and charmingly slow PrayaMengrai), for materials. Soon the area will be ‘discovered’ – and much busier. Global economic problems will surely affect this development, and perhaps the success of Happy City, but ChiangRai is sure to replace ChiangMai in the hearts of many. We should regard ourselves as fortunate to still be able to enjoy the unspoiled charm in Wiang Chai. One of its nicest places is just north of town on 1173, 2.5 km along PhaNgio (spelled Pha Giew on signs) Road from Ban DonRuang, 3 km. past the turn to ChaingRung and ChiangKhong.

WangChang

The-elephant-rest-canal

a-most-rikkety-bridge

WanChang's-biggest-weir

Thai Linguistic Complications

2012-01-03T00:27:00.000-08:00

Lack of tense and plurals, and less utilization of prepositions present real challenges, as do tones and the Thai alphabet, and some Western words (i.e. a syllogism, logic, earn, perspective, hypocrisy, a bump) just don’t have directly corresponding terms in Thai. But these matters present much less difficulty than do some others.
Thai classifiers require learning which scholars of by-gone eras would have found less strange than most of us, unaccustomed to the formality essential to much of Thai language, do. Similarly, not too long ago thou was used to express intimacy, amity and sometimes disrespect (although also used when speaking to God), while you (the oblique/objective form of ye) was used mostly in formal circumstances to imply respect. Early Quakers refused to use what they considered the fancier term, instead addressing high-ranking persons with thee and thou. Those terms later disappeared from normal English usage (in French, Quakers used tu to address even those who by common convention would be addressed with the more formal vous). Thai yet retains characteristics now archaic to English; it also varies greatly between spoken and written forms. I once bought books of pithy Thai proverbs to help me absorb the language – but they proved far too difficult!
Thai (a Lao, or Tai, language) includes Central Thai (Siamese) and a dozen or so variants used within Thailand; it’s absorbed many foreign words. “Loanwords” come from both ancient and modern Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese and other dialects, especially Teochew), and from Malay. Also from the closely related Mon and Cambodian languages, 16th-century Portuguese, and English. Overlays of polysyllabic words added to common speech most often come from Pali (related to Sanskrit) and Old Khmer. Despite that the linguistic forms of Sanskrit and Pali differ greatly from Tai languages, elegant religious and literary terms come from them; occasionally new words are coined from Sanskrit roots.
Sanskrit, as ancient a language as almost any still in use, flourished from about 500 BCE to 1000 CE, but now is hardly ever (if ever at all) a mother tongue. Its grammar is similar to Latin and Greek. A cultured and sophisticated language used for religious and learned discourse, it’s related to Old Persian (as was Khom, the language of Angkor royalty, which had great influence upon Siamese royalty and language).
Pali, a literary language of rather mixed vernacular origins, was used for the Theravada Buddhist canon (and thus is thus regarded as sacred). Gautama Buddha preferred vernacular dialects and opposed the use of Sanskrit as a learned (so less natural) language. But Pali use declined about 400 CE, as Sanskrit use rose (and Buddhism’s popularity in the subcontinent declined); it died as a literary language of India in the 14th-century, and survived elsewhere only into the 18th.

Thai uses a variety of speech levels (called ‘registers’: colloquial, formal, literary and poetic); similarly, a century ago German had low, middle and high, each with its appropriate usages. The best example is “eat”: kin (กิน; common), kah-ma (ขมำ; to gobble in indecent manner), daek (แดก; vulgar, what a dog does), yat (ยัด; also vulgar), boriphok (บริโภค; formal), taan khao (ทานข้าว; polite), rapprathan ahaan (รับประทาน อาหาร; very formal), chan (ฉัน; religious) or sawoei (เสวย; royal). Words for blood (leuat เลือดม, formally lo-heet โลหิต), family relationships and hygienic or sexual terms vary similarly (although not as muchas with the terms for eat). In speech “dog” is usually ma (rising toe; หมา), while in writing, it’s sunak (สุนัข).
Thai registers, for different social contexts, include:
• Street or common speech (ภาษาพูด, spoken language): informal, used between close relatives and friends
• Market vernacular (ภาษาตลาด market language): casual, unceremonious but not intimate
• Formal Thai (ภาษาเขียน, written Thai): the official version, with respectful terms of address (used in simplified form for newspapers)
• Rhetorical Thai: for public speaking
• Religious Thai: used to discuss Buddhism or address monks, and
• Royal Thai (ราชาศัพท์): to address members of the royal family or describe their activities.
Educated Thais are familiar with all of these; those less educated have less familiarity. As situations grow more formal, so do honorifics and other terminology -as when one speaks differently with a doctor than with an intimate friend… Even in English, we have legal language, journalistic language and many others, but the Quaker influence which led to the opposite of the terminology they chose coming into general use (still, though, simplifying things) hasn’t occurred in Southeast Asia (unless perhaps communism is producing something like that effect in Vietnam, where I’ve never been and of whose language I know only that there are seven, two more, tones).

Half a book might be made on Thai pronouns alone, but simply, Phom or Dichan are snobbily polite, Chan (sometimes pronounced Shan) is the best informal 1st person pronoun, except in formal documents where one becomes a Slave of God (Ka-prajao ข้าพระเจ้า). 1st person pronouns include: ผม, เรา, ฉัน, ดิฉัน, ชั้น, หนู, กู, ข้า, กระผม, ข้าพเจ้า, กระหม่อม, อาตมา, กัน, ข้าน้อย, ข้าพระพุทธเจ้า, อั๊ว, & เค้า… Each expresses gender, age, politeness, status, or relationship between speaker and listener.
2nd person uses Khun (คุณ; good, virtue, value, quality) normally, Thaan (falling tone, ท่าน) to be even more respectful (it can be 3rd person too). Meung and Kae need to be understood when heard, but not used. Thuh (Ter, or, alternatively, Thoe… written in Thai, เธอ) is used informally, sometimes offensively, sometimes intimately, sometimes to show displeasure with children… Rao, or puak rao (เรา, or พวกเรา, the group of us) is usually “we”, but can also be a casual form of I/me or even you.
For 3rd person, khao (เขา; rising tone, sometimes puak khao - พวกเขา) is fine, Kae or Mahn (it, มัน) are OK but somewhat rude - or, as it is with 1st and 2nd person, a given or nickname can be used. Them, they = puak khao or kao thang lai (for only two people, khao tang song, or, if you will, r)khao h)thang r) sawng)…
The reflexive pronoun is tua eng (ตัวเอง); it can mean any of: myself, yourself, ourselves, himself, herself, themselves. This can be mixed with another pronoun to create an intensive pronoun like tua phom (ตัวผมเอง meaning I myself) or tua khun (ตัวคุณเอง - you yourself). Tua eng is Me, thuh eng (เธอเอง)You… Khon ni (คนนี่): Me; Khon nan (คนนั่น): That One… There’s also Nai (นาย master, 2nd, 3rd person). Again, Rao (เรา, or puak rao พวกเรา) can be first person (I), second person (you), or both (we), depending on the context.
And there’s even Khun Nu, if you want to be both sycophantically obnoxious and patronizing simultaneously…
A person might refer to themselves by nickname, but in northern “Lao” areas, to refer to another person they add “I” as a prefix (I’m called “I-Jo” or sometimes “Eye-John”); in the Central Plains that’s considered insulting and khun (คุณ means “good”) must be used. For a Chinese, “Ah” is often preferred (for a man), Jae for a woman (Ah is always followed by a name; Jae need not be).
Pii and nong indicate relative relation, not only about who is older and who younger, but who is more influential. Pii (พี่) may mean older brother or older sister, but is also used for older acquaintances), and nong (น้อง) younger brother or sister (but also used for younger acquaintances); luk pii and luk nong refer to first cousins, luk lahn to nieces and nephews and grandchildren.
Thai has no possessive pronouns; instead possession is indicated by the particle khong (ของ). For example, “my mother” is mae khong phom (แม่ของผม, mother of I). This particle is often implicit, as in mae phom (แม่ผม).
When speaking to someone older, nu (หนู) is a feminine first person (I); when speaking to someone younger, it’s a gender-less second person (you).
The second person pronoun thoe (เธอ, meaning you) is semi-feminine, used when the speaker or the listener (or both) are female. Males usually don’t address each other with it, except in the case of a father expressing intimacy with small children. “Khun thuh” (คุณเธอ) is a feminine derogative third person, but I’ll note here that inflammatory Thai speech is usually not taught, for good reason.
Instead of a second person pronoun such as khun (คุณ, you), it’s much more common for unrelated strangers to call each other พี่, น้อง, ลุง, ป้า, น้า, อา, ตา, or ยาย (brother, sister, uncle, aunt, grandpa, granny), but this is often inappropriate for foreigners, especially when the relationship has not been at all defined. Typically, one starts with faen (แฟน), or, “Faen, ja”… !!!
To express deference, the second person pronoun is sometimes replaced by a profession, similar to how, in English, presiding judges are always addressed as “your honor” rather than “you”. In Thai, students always address their teachers by kru (ครู), Khun kru (คุณครู), or ahjaan (อาจารย์ - each means teacher, อาจารย์ ranking higher than ครู) rather than คุณ (you). Doctors are addressed as Khun Moh (คุณหมอ); in print นาย แพทย์ (Nai Peht).
A monk, and even a novice monk, is not a khon, but a dohn: pra dohn neung = one monk. Pra ong neung = a Buddha image. Pra ong nohn = that particular Buddha image. Neither can be mahn (it) as a pra ong is NEVER just a thing. Members of the royal family also require specialized terminology, as also some high officials.

It all requires some getting used to! Perhaps it’s just an urban legend, perhaps not, but it’s said that a young man in India somehow got hold of a Thai transliterative dictionary, and learned the language by himself. Some amazed Thai academics came to observe this phenomenal person, and reported that he could indeed speak Thai – in a rather strange way… As it’s unlikely to have been in his dictionary, I wonder what term that guy would’ve chosen to refer to speed bumps, and how close he might have gotten to whatever road-building contractors here call them!

a few more Chiangrai recommendations

2011-12-27T22:11:00.000-08:00

Jong's family with mine

Chiang Rai Trekking And Guiding Service (see www.chiangraitreks.com)
Trekking – day trips or longer, to visit mountain-top hill-tribe villages, waterfalls and the unspoiled nature of the Thai province with the most national park area – has long been a favorite tourist activity here. And Ah-Jong has long been one of ChiangRai’s best guides.
Jong is what friends call Sompong Laophong, a Government-licensed professional trekking and jungle guide based in ChiangRai City of in Northern Thailand. The forests, jungles and mountain areas of the Golden Triangle area there are world renowned for their unique cultural and biological diversity. Jong can show you the wonders of this special region, scheduled to your particular interests, abilities and needs, whether as a tourist, professional scientist or naturalist, as an experienced mountaineer or just as a day tripper. For those interested in the cultural offerings, history, temples and monuments of Lanna, as we call our region, a variety of specialized tours to satisfy your curiosity and enliven your stay in Chiang Rai are available. Jong is multilingual, fluent in Thai, Mandarin Chinese and Akha, and also speaking English and Lahu. He’s especially knowledgeable of the natural resources of the area, ranging from the identification of medicinal and edible plants to indigenous birds, mammals and insects... and is well-known in many traditional villages.
Contact: Tel: (66) 081-111-2733, e-mail: chiangraiguide.jong@gmail.com

Orn’s Bookstore, at 1051/61 JetYod Soi 1, Chiangrai 57000, tel. 081-0220818 (English) or 086-0624080 (Thai), offers the best book-exchange deals in Thailand. The manager, Peter (Orn is his wife), an Asia old-hand (like myself, 20 years here), hails from a small village in the Black Forest of Bavaria, but speaks fluent Thai. He lived in Malaysia then ran ChiangMai’s Supreme Guest House for a decade, amassing a large collection of books left behind by tenants. Return and exchange deals are more than fair, tea can be purchased, and there are lots of friendly cats – when in Chiang Rai, be sure to pay a visit!

Chalong Pintsuwan’s Tai Yuan Art Gallery, 250 Mu 15, Rajyotha Road Soi 3, Chiangrai 57000 (call in advance for appointment, 053-712137 or 089-631-9438, e-mail Taiyuan_artgallery@hotmail.com) is my candidate for Chiangrai’s best gallery. Many artists are represented, including most of the area’s significant ones, and upstairs, in his studio, is a fine collection of fascinating local artifacts.

Aphirak Punmoonsilp, impressionistic painter of flowers in outdoor spaces, lives and works at 79 Mu 10, Ban Mai Pattana, Tambon Pasang, Amphoe Mae Chan, Chiangrai 57110. To visit, make an appointment by calling 081-603-2758 or ew-mail art!punmoonsilp.com. See also www.aphirak-punmoonsilp.com

Naris Rattanawimol carves stone into gracious Buddha images, at Naris Sculpture House, 119 Mu 4, Tambon Wiang Pangcome, Amphoe Mae Sai, Chiangrai 57130

Although Taksin’s absurdly misguided OTOP (One Tambon One Product) policy did much to degrade the quality of Thai crafts (having made my living at the time through crafts export from here, I have some expertise on the matter), there remain a variety of interesting artistic forms on sale in ChiangRai. Weavings, basketry, silverwork, jade, wooden frames, wood carvings, pottery and tea pots, amulets, effigies and other talismans can all be found at the night Bazaar, along Tanalai Road, Highway 1, and at Wat Jedi Luang (next to the National Museum) in Chiang Saen. The Silver Birch shop on Pahonyothin Road by the soi to Wat Jet Yod is by far ChiangRai’s best general crafts store, with some truly amusing items. Don’t forget, Buddha images usually require an export permit.

Banana Plantation Tips

2011-12-22T04:10:00.000-08:00

The short, stubby bananas common here in ChiangRai (gluai nam-wá, the fatter, shorter, firmer, less sweet kind) are much healthier for you than the long, Chiquita-type ones (Gluai hohm ‘fragrant’ Cavendish commercial bananas), and are often tasty too. There’s little better than fresh fruit taken immediately from where it was growing, and bananas are easy.
There are about 30 Thai banana varieties, including “egg” (gluay kai), “100 bunches” (roy wee), “fragrant gold’ (hohm tong) and “sandalwood” (jun); they change in color over time, but when ripe some are red, purple, orange or a very light green.

Plantains, cooking bananas, are drier, more starchy, and used like potatoes (they taste similar). Thais use almost every part of the banana tree in addition to the fruits. Pigs and chickens like the fruit, and the leaves, large, flexible, and waterproof, are often used as ecologically friendly, disposable food containers (“ serving plates”), or for food wrappers, roofing material, ceremonial lanterns and even to polish floors. The leaves are also used as steamer cups for ho mok pla, a spicy paté made with fish and coconut milk. They can be fed to horses, cows and other grazers (even ducks, which especially like the new shoots or sprouts, known as suckers, which grow from a big underground rhizome called the corm – in English, anyway). Banana flowers are used in Thai salads, or minced and deep-fried into patties. Grilled “barbecued bananas” are often sold on the streets, the fruits are simply peeled and roasted over hot coals. Banana breads, cakes and that backpacker standard, the banana pancake, are also popular.
Banana inflorescence, the banana heart, from which the fruit develops (in a hanging cluster made up of tiers known in English as hands, in Thai as a wii), have up to 20 fruit to a tier; bunch applies to parts of a tier with 3 to10 adjacent fruits. Edible banana flowers that are popular in Southeast Asian cuisine, but if you try to eat a flower from an unsuitable variety, it’s quite unpleasant.

One of the world’s oldest cultivated fruits, bananas may have originated in southern, peninsular Thailand. More likely, it occurs to me, they developed in the Sunda Shelf area, when the oceans were lower, but perhaps in Borneo. Technically not a tree (they’ve no bark), but an overgrown herb (gingers and bird-of-paradise flowers are banana relatives); banana trunks are leaf stalks wrapped around each other. New leaves start growing inside, below the ground; they push up through the middle. So does the flower, which finally turns into a bunch of bananas, which can be yellow, purple or red. The banana plant flowers after 9 to 12 months, depending on the climate; most bananas require at least 20 months to fruit.
The banana is the largest herbaceous flowering plant; tall, sturdy and often called a tree, their main stem, or “pseudostem”, grows 6 to over 7 meters (to almost 25 feet). Each “tree” produces but one bunch of bananas. Then it dies, but usually offshoots (corm) develop at the base of the plant. Locals will often cut the stem down, and use it to fertilize other banana plants.
Sometimes the plant needs support to not topple over.

Bananas aren’t as closely related to grass as is bamboo, but there’s similarity. For reasons unclear to modern man, they stopped sexual reproduction about a century ago. If you’ve got a few banana trees, and want more, want to learn to care for them well, best not to look to me – better to find a local! But, as local agriculturalists often prefer to use only Kham Muang or their tribal language, I’ll clue in to the little I’ve picked up.
First - banana tree water (often from condensation, which sits where leaves join the stem, absorbing sap). Avoid it. Won’t hurt your skin or anything, but it will permanently stain your clothes with dark spots. Bleach, vinegar, lemon-juice, hot water and soap – nothing. No results at all. Even sunshine doesn’t fade the stains. You can try an immediate rinse, and sun drying, and get some success, but once the stain is there, it’s permanently there. Be advised: wear old clothes before cutting any part of the banana plant!
Second – what should you try to do? Well, get rid of the yellowing leaves. Green leaves can be sold, yellow leaves can be put between banana trees (but be careful not to cover the young ones that, while still above, they were preventing sunlight from reaching). To do this, you need a curved rice-harvesting knife, and a long PVC pole. Duct tape (amazingly, not intended to be used for sealing ductwork; it can, however, be used as a bandage...) might help to attach the two, but a long piece of wide, stretchable rubber will do better. String, wire… might as well try WD-40.

Third – in the dry season, water them. Avoid over-watering, which results in rot. Just get the bottoms of the trees wet on an irregular basis and you’ll be fine. Mulch them by piling on lots of organic matter, let them shelter each other instead of standing alone and exposed, and hope for moderate weather with no extremes like flooding or string winds.
Fourth – don’t worry too much about the central Thai superstition of ghosts haunting banana plantations: here in the north we don’t have that problem! Bananas are, though, slightly radioactive; they’re high in potassium, and all naturally occurring potassium contains small amounts of radioactive potassium-40.

Taxes Imposed on Expatriates in Thailand

2011-11-09T23:26:00.001-08:00

1. Are expatriates subject to taxation in Thailand?

A: Yes, expatriates are subject to taxation in Thailand since Thai laws impose taxes on both residents and non-residents. Therefore, as long as the expatriate resides in Thailand for a period of at least 180 calendar days in a year, then he is liable to pay taxes.

2. What kind of income is taxable from expatriates in Thailand?

A: Personal income derived from sources within Thailand, regardless of the actual place where the payment was made.

3. What are examples of assessable income on the part of expatriates?

A: Below are few examples of the assessable income from expatriates:
Income derived from hire of services such as services rendered in an employer-employee relationship
Income derived from the hire of work such as services rendered as an officer or as a person holding a position in the company
Income derived from intellectual property rights such as goodwill and copyright as well as from annuities
Income derived form the lease of properties
Income derived from services rendered by liberal professionals
Income derived from construction contracts and services rendered where tools and materials are supplied
Income derived from business, commerce, or industry not enumerated in the preceding numbers
4. Are there classes of income derived by expatriates that are exempt from tax? If yes, what are examples of those?

A: Yes, there are certain classes of income derived by expatriates that are exempt from tax. Below are examples of such:
Income obtained from the sale of an immovable property given to the expatriate either as a gift or a donation;
Income obtained from the sale of a residential building which was subsequently spent for acquiring a new residential building within 1 year before or after the sale;
Income obtained from the sale of shares listed in the Thailand Stock Exchange;
Income obtained from interest that has already been withheld at the rate of 15% at source
Income obtained from dividends or profit shares from a Thai registered company or a mutual fund, provided that 10% of such dividends have already been withheld at source
This article was provided by Siam Legal, an international law firm with offices in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Hua Hin, Pattaya, Phuket, and Samui. Siam Legal publishes guides to dealing with tax in Thailand on its website.

Siam Legal International
Interchange 21 Building, 23rd Floor, 399 Sukhumvit Road
North Klongtoey, Wattana, Bangkok 10110

Some interesting tidbits about Thailand and its cultural development

2011-08-19T16:45:00.001-07:00

Some interesting tidbits about Thailand and its cultural development:

Thai boxing (Muay Thai) began to develop before Thais came to Thailand. Perhaps 2000 years ago, T’ai tribes, harassed and attacked by Han Chinese and others in areas of southern China they then inhabited, responded by developing a strongly militant attitude, with a military code called the Chupasaht. It called on all able bodied men to be prepared to come to the aid of their leaders with swords, spears, axes, bows and, when those weren’t available, various parts of the human body to be used as weapons (muay boran: Muay Thai is a modern integration of traditional regional muays, including Muay Chaiya, Muay Korat, Muay Tarsao, Muay Jearng and other forms of “ancient boxing”). Warriors developed sophisticated skills, specializing in combining deployment of sabers, clubs, swords and lances with use of elbows, knees, feet, fists and heads. With these skills, they were able to survive. Migrations from southern China to Southeast Asia may have occurred in the 6th and 7th centuries; while that remains unclear, that many moved away from China isn’t; some stayed and became the Zhuang, the largest (12 million) ethnic minority of modern China. Those who left became Shan, Thai, Laotians and Vietnamese.
Muay Thai, Thailand’s national sport, is also its oldest. But there’re no records, and little evidence, of when Muay Thai originated. It’s certainly been around longer than the nation! Its importance to Thailand’s identity no other nation can even imitate. Unique among other kinds of fighting disciplines in its approach to close quarters fighting, it’s been the country’s most popular spectator sport for hundreds of years. Fighters use a greater variety of body parts more effectively than in any other martial art (Thai boxing is aggressive, most martial arts are defensive). For the sport, bare-fisted fighters wore lengths of hemp rope around their hands and forearms. For warfare, special skills were taught among those of noble status, then down to high-ranking military individuals and on to foot-soldiers. Since Buddhism became the religion of T’ais, Muay Thai has been taught by Buddhist monks, and a bond between Buddhism and Muay Thai developed. Before Thai boxing matches begin, each Muay Thai artist performs a pre-match ritual, with sacred cotton bands worn around arm and over the head. Each contender solemnly says a prayer then performs a sacred dance routine to commemorate his master who teaches and trains him for the fight.

Elephants have been used in war for thousands of years, but their history in Southeast Asia is as murkily unclear as is that of the local martial arts of boxing. T’ais leaving the area of modern China for parts south didn’t have elephants, which weren’t yet available to them. But they did have horses, bulls, and water-buffalo, which not only provided some military utility, but paved the way for elephant utilization. A war elephant can trample men under foot, batter down obstacles, and strike terror into the hearts of soldiers and horses. Its main purpose is to terrify the enemy while smashing through its ranks. Horses won’t charge into a bristling wall of sharp points, but even a phalanx-style formation won’t halt an elephant’s charge. Also, horses fear the smell of elephants. The presence of elephants on a battlefield can render cavalry useless.
The war elephant, used in India as far back as the 3rd millennium BCE (at any rate, soapstone carvings depicting elephants with cloth on their backs indicates use by humans), was familiar to Persians of the 4th century BCE. Their presence in Hannibal’s army of 218 BCE, despite the extreme difficulties they presented, demonstrates their perceived utility (mostly in willingness to charge both men and horses, and from the panic that it inspired in horses). Hannibal's personal elephant (named Surus, meaning “Syrian”), his only Asian one, was the only one to survived and reach Italy. African elephants have much larger ears, used to dissipate body heat – which wouldn’t have been helpful in the Alps.
The powerful Angkor Empire came to regional dominance in the 9th century CE, utilizing war elephants. Mangrai of Lanna (ruled 1259-1318) defeated invading Mongols in 1296 and 1301, most likely more from insufficiency of invading troops and, overextended, undefended and thin supply lines than from utilization of lots of war elephants, despite that closely neighboring Lan Xang – northern Laos – was supposedly the Land of a Million Elephants (surely an exaggeration). He later made some counter-raids into China, then sent elephants and other gifts to the court of Timür Khan. Sino-Thai relations stabilized. Bas-relief murals at Angkor Wat show Ayuddhayan T’ais (or Siamese) attacking with war elephants; when Angkor collapsed, both Burmese and Siamese had adopted widespread use of war elephants, and in the 1548 Burmese invasion into Siamese territory, war elephants were used to fight each other. But as some elite fighters had matchlocks or muskets, introduced to the rival kingdoms by the Portuguese a bit earlier, this was clearly closer to the end of the war elephant’s great utility than to its beginning. They were still used a couple centuries later, but by the time of the Chakri kings, had become primarily ceremonial, while diplomatic cleverness had become much more important than fighting techniques.

The baht, once called the tical (from Portuguese or Malay), was worth about a US nickel ($.05, or 5¢ – a baht was a tical and a tical was a nickel, from 1956 to 1978 (sometimes closer to 4¢, but still real money in the local sense, although not nearly of as much value as it'd been a century earlier). Before 1860, Thailand didn’t have coins, but rather bars of metal, thicker in the middle, bent round to form a complete circle on which identifying marks were stamped: "bullet" coinage (some of which did look like bullets, a bit flattened). Prior to the introduction of decimalization at the turn of the 20th century currency units included (from largest to smallest) the hap, chang, tamleung, baht, mayon, salung, feuang, sik, sio, att, solot and bia (the last 5 being very small units). Many Siamese cities in the 19th century used porcelain Chinese gaming counters (poker chips) for small change; were an issuing casino lost its license or otherwise had to go out of business, its owners would have to send a crier thru the local streets banging a gong and announcing that anyone with chits had 3 days to redeem them. In 1851, the Thai government issued ⅛, ¼, ⅜, ½ and 1 tical notes, then 3, 4, 6 and 10tamlung notes in 1853. After 1857, 20 and 40 tical notes were issued, which stated their values in Straits dollars and Indian rupees. In 1892, notes for 1, 5, 10, 40, 80, 100, 400 and 800 ticals were called baht in the Thai text. In 1897, the decimal system, with one baht = 100 satang, was introduced. Until 1902, the tical was silver, and valued accordingly; 15 grams of silver was a baht. Coins of the old units were issued until 1910, then in 1925, notes were issued with the denomination “baht” used in the English text (denominated at 1, 5, 10, 20, 100 and 1000 baht). After WWII, the B1000 notes disappeared until the 1990s. The pre-decimalization saleung (25 satang, ¼ baht) is still called that, but only used in certain places (gas stations and 7-11 shops, mostly, but also for paying electric bills). Twenty years ago I tried to buy a box of matches with 4 saleung coins; the seller, sitting on the sidewalk, told me beggars wouldn’t take those. By the late 20th century the baht had become one of Asia's most important currencies, mysteriously stable and strong.

With the invention of the automobile in the late 19th century began a huge rubber boom; in 1895, Henry Ridley, head of Singapore's botanical garden, persuaded two coffee growers to plant two acres of Hevea brasiliensis trees. Twelve years later Ceylon and Malaya had over 120,000 acres of rubber, grown at only a fraction of the cost of collecting wild rubber in Brazil. Soon rubber trees were planted in Phuket as well, the first in 1903. Many large and profitable plantations were established, covering more than a third of the island and creating a wave of immigration to fill the needs of this labor intensive industry. As automobile and aircraft industries demand huge amounts of rubber, things were good until WWII; afterwards the rubber industry spiraled through a series of boom and bust cycles. Synthetics were introduced, but they haven’t made for good condoms, so, since HIV, the market for natural rubber is back. Since 1991, Thailand has been the leader in world production, and the largest exporter of natural rubber. Now the rubber tree also provides most of the wood for furniture made in Thailand (beware – much is insufficiently cured, and moulds quite easily, especially in humid weather).
Thailand is also the world’s largest producer and exporter of pineapple, accounting for over 40% of all pineapple exports (over 2 million tons per year). Hawaii produces only 10% of the world's pineapple crops; its pineapples are much sweeter, and softer. Even canned, Thai pineapple is crunchier – I remember with fond nostalgia the “no-name brand” canned Thai pineapple – so much better than the more expensive (and exploitative) Dole brand product!
Pineapple isn’t indigenous, nor as important commercially as rice or rubber, or even sugar cane, cassava, cotton, maize, kenaf (a jute substitute used for fiber, from Africa) and other more recently introduced crops (coffee is a significant new one, as is the potato). Mungbeans, soybean, oranges and tangerines, tobacco and peppers are also important Thai crops, but the Thai pineapple has achieved special recognition.
Thai cuisine uses a variety of sauces, such as fish, soy, chili, and oyster. Other ingredients include lime and lemon juices, tamarind juice, coconut milk, garlic, lemon grass, galangal, basil, cilantro, bean sprouts, shrimp, cayenne and black peppers. Important also are the tomato, which, like cassava, tobacco, pepper (like the tomato, a member of the nightshade family, from the Americas), maize and sugar from sugar beets (sugar cane is from the East Indies, perhaps New Guinea, but decomposes rapidly) – all imports over the last half millennia (we don’t know quite when… there’s even some speculation that a Chinese fleet brought back many of these things in the early 1400s – carbon testing should be done on residue in unearthed old tobacco pipes!). Rice, on the other hand, is truly indigenous: pottery shards bearing the imprint of both grains and husks of Oryza sativa were discovered at Non Nok Tha in the Korat, rice plant remains from 10,000 BCE were discovered in Spirit Cave, MaeHongSon (on the Thailand-Myanmar border), suggests that agriculture may be older than previously thought. Some Korean archaeologists claim to have discovered the world's oldest domesticated rice at 15,000 year old; others claim rice cultivation originated in China about 12,000 years ago, and it’s possible that it was cultivated on now undersea areas of the Sunda Shelf even earlier, but the ever-popular Thai fragrant kao hom mali jasmine rice is certainly purely Thai.

A Mangrai Story

2011-08-10T23:10:00.001-07:00

Yesterday I heard an interesting story: when Good Father Mangrai was settled into ChiangRai, he met Princess Eua Ming Wiang Chai, of ChiangSaen (Yonok, or whatever it was called then) and wanted to marry her. She insisted on a promise that he would then take no other wife. He gladly agreed.
first queen was distraught and went into a nunnery,
But when much older, after a successful campaign against the Burmese and tired of fighting them, negotiations for peace included a traditional offering of Princess Pai Koma in marriage; he decided to accept. Queen Eua Ming, distraught, withdrew to a nunnery, in anguish and grief so strong that it infected a great storm, and later died there. It was gossipped about that the broken promise, and her broken heart, produced the lightening that struck Mangrai down and ended his life.

Lanna Tai Textiles Center

2011-08-08T21:28:00.000-07:00

The Lanna Tai Textiles Center at ChiangRai Rajapat University (open 9-16:30, Mon.-Fri.) is a great place to learn about, admire and even buy regional handmade cloth weavings of various Mekong River Region styles. Some are hung in vertical drawers, some in regular, horizontal ones. There’s a loom with operator, plus a yarn and dye making exhibit, pattern-making design materials on a splendid computer program, and also an exhibit of regional traditional clothing. The displays are professionally done, although only the weavings collection itself is at all extensive. Located right between the demonstration school and the CRU community radio station, bear right as you enter campus through the front gate (staying on the entry road) until you’ve completed a 90° right turn, it’s right to the right!

CR Health hub

2011-07-25T22:45:00.000-07:00

Could ChiangRai become a “hub” for expat health care? We’re already a massage “hub”; we’ve hot-springs and spas, lots of good clinics (skin, dental, cosmetic, you name it), the best weather in Thailand (and maybe, excepting Shan State, in Southeast Asia)… Could ChiangRai host retirement homes, health resorts, assisted-living communities and rehabilitation centers? Maybe.
But consider all the resorts around Mae Chan (or, as I’d prefer to spell it, Mae Jaan). About 10 times as many as function (adequately, profitably, regularly, however you wish to look at it) simply don’t. I enjoy telling folk they were bought on credit, defaulted on then auctioned off and bought by representatives of the defaulters – for use privately, by their families. But I couldn’t provide any proof for such an assertion. Still, the many falling-apart resorts are there to see.
Too often middle-class Thais have been led by Thai elites into foolish investment gambits: island paradise resorts and other flash-in-the-pan fads. For a while it was computer game and e-mail shops. Home-stay accommodations had a recent surge in popularity, and right now coffee-shops are ubiquitous.
But with ChiangRai’s low cost-of-living, increasing modernization and now fairly reliable infrastructure, might not Farang, Japanese, Overseas Chinese and others find a better deal for their “Golden Years” here? It could happen. But not only is the level of general education against it, and political stability worrisome, there’s this matter of recurrent fraud.
An interesting example is the recent rage for rubber-tree planting. Called yang para (sounding to me just like the para used to refer to Paracetamol), absentee landlords have taken to planting lots of it here in ChiangRai. But do they stand a chance of making a profit? From selling the wood (rubber wood accounts for 70% of Thailand’s wooden furniture), maybe, but from rubber itself, I find doubtful. The world’s rubber markets have bounced around, well, like a rubber ball, for over a century. Rubber export is Thailand’s 2nd largest, after rice, bringing in about $US2 billion annually, but a family working in the rubber plantations is very lucky to earn over B4500/month.
Rubber trees originated in Brazil, and were brought to Thailand a century ago from Indonesia. Indonesia and Malaysia dominate the world’s rubber trade, and although the latex flows best in cool, still weather, good production requires more of a hot season than we’ve been having here lately. The price often falls below break-even, work is quite labor-intensive, and it takes about 7 years for a tree to be ready for tapping. But rubber will grow in poor soil, and the wood certainly becomes more readily available than that of teak, another popular long-range investment crop of recent. Maybe those putting rubber trees on otherwise vacant land are thinking mostly of selling the wood, and will do OK from that. There’s got to be lots of healthy competition from the South’s rubber-wood, but still…

In Thailand’s touristy places, vulgar scams have long been the norm. The Bangkok jewelry (especially unset stones) have long been well known, in fact notorious, but they still take place. Letters-to-the-Editor in our English-language papers have recently featured reports of damage claims on jet-skis, hotel rooms, and other things innocently rented by unsuspecting tourists. It seems nothing is done, as these things are under the control of “influential figures.” Well, we still have mafia-types here… in reference to which I’ll mention a recent heavy upsurge in gambling venues, and then keep my mouth shut about that!
And not only are foreign-language abilities low (although many locals are bi- or tri-lingual, it seems only Akha folk are frequently conversant in English), but even maid-service too often is totally inadequate. It seems generally considered too demanding to sweep under and behind beds, or to dust atop things. Spider-webs accumulate dust in ceiling corners. Dishes aren’t washed in hot water. And food… well, bakeries are just another example of much foolish investment in nothing.
Some of our best restaurants offer Japanese cuisine, but I’ve seen plenty of questionable sushi, and flies still abound where fresh meat is sold, as do rats. We’ve lots and lots of restaurants, but that’s about as significant as our plethora of 7-11s and other retail shops. Selection isn’t really great.
It’s said educational reform will take generations, and there’s much to that. And there’s a lot to be said for a non-anal-retentive society which places fun and good feelings above order and discipline. But people in need of health care often find being generous and forgiving counterproductive to real personal requirements. There’s good reason to wonder if the talk of turning our wonderful province into a health destination isn’t just another scam.

Progress and development

2011-06-12T22:47:00.000-07:00

Opening soon will be an important part of the once-imagined ring road around Chiang Rai. From Highway 1233 (the road from SriSimon to WiangChai), perhaps a kilometer east of the little bridge, to Highway 1232 (Poh Khun Road) and the 5023 road to the new airport, will be an alternate route to our main “superhighway” (Route 1, the superhighway with stop lights). This will ease up some holiday traffic.
A new Rajapat University is being built at Chiang Khong. The bridge there to Laos should be finished before much longer, changing our tourist climate a bit. The advent of ever-popular “I’m going to Laos” backpacker traffic will result in fewer stay-overs in our usually quiet province. Khun Maleewan’s Ban Rim Taling is purportedly up for sale already, although there are others much more optimistic. For a long time now, travelers to Laos have often stayed overnight in Chiang Khong; now that will hardly be necessary. Of course, the travelers will lose opportunity to brag, “I’m going to Laos”!
The train from Den Chai in Prae Province (just north of Uttaradit) is projected to come here in 5 years or so, and traffic on the new road through Laos to China to bring in lots of business. That remains to be seen, but many investors clearly believe it, as evidenced by our local housing boom. We’ve no now industry going in, nor much reason to expect much in the way of increased income from tourism or agriculture, although those things, too, could happen.
Or, we could end up with more empty housing – like the many shop-houses from 1997 which never got used, or the housing estates south of the 2nd MaeSai bridge. With another Rajapat opening, one must wonder how well all the new housing near Ban Du’s Rajapat will do… seems to me a lot of young folk would much rather have nice cars, jewelry, nights on the town and lots of phone conversations than a step up in housing. But perhaps a lot of occupancy will come about through a certain kind of gift-giving… in the way of gift-giving with utility for the gift-giver (our short-time hotels don’t appear to have been experiencing any sort of boom).
It could be that some of this investment is in response to fears of Bangkok sinking. Another factor might well be the declining quality of ChiangMai as a destination for hospitality-seekers. But the main things seem to be expectations that the railroad and increased vehicular traffic to and from Yunnan will pick things up here substantially. I suspect that those believing that haven’t really done their homework; it seems entrepneurs agree with me, judging by our restaurants and pubs. But I’m glad there will be an alternate route to our main throughway soon – for a short distance within our capitol-city district, anyway. Will new and better maps, including that route, come about also? One can only hope. Somehow I expect that my paved but unnamed soi, on no maps now, will remain that way.

2011-06-03T23:25:00.000-07:00

The roof of the old Funny House restaurant, now another World Class Hamburgers (with pretty good pizza, which they don’t have at the Night Bazaar), is a quite nice place to sit. Small, though, which makes me think of the nutty ex-pat who told me of a great B99/hr foot massage place. “Where?” I asked. “I’m not telling!” he gleefully replied. Another Farang pulled the same about a good shop for big motorcycles – despite that I’ve never even had one. Both were semi-irrationally scared of losing easy access to a good thing, through that good thing gaining too much popularity. But price will keep the FunnyHouse roof available, I think.
At Steve’s “Hangover’s Corner” (was British Pub and Massage), there’s a great-looking pool-table, surely the best in town for anything but snooker. And he’s got clientele now. Not a low, but who does? Also, Ploy from Nam Lat, who used to work at the Big C food court, should prove a great addition to that establishment too. Maybe she’ll even pick up some reasonable English…

Warning: some despicable Farang are working to increase the power of Monsanto here – offering small, short-term help to a few of the poor, to greatly increase the power of the richest (power they happily use to virtually enslave as many of the rest of us as they can).
I won’t name names, but I’m deeply suspicious of a small, privately-owned NGO just north of the Kok River, which was doing “agricultural surveys” a few years ago. It’s easy to think they can get support money by nefariously working to undermine what remains of independent agriculture here. Sound a bit reminiscent of Mr. T’s “populist” plans – to lend money people too quickly spend, thinking it was free? Well, indeed he is involved in this, through a Thai-US “Free Trade Agreement” (the sound in the background is me gagging) the Big Guy tried to push through, just before getting deposed. Monsanto hopes Thailand still has room for another “Hub” – this one a regional base for genetically engineered (GE) products.
Monsanto has sued farmers who wanted no part of them, but had Gm pollen blown onto their plants anyway (intellectual copyright infringement; sorry about the further gagging). Not only can Monsanto sue, they eventually force all to buy their Roundup Ready crop seeds, pesticides and fertilizers, as nothing else will work anymore (suddenly, after they get a few farms going).

Monsanto – Worse Than War. And coming here to help increase xenophobia, against YOU!

2011-06-02T23:19:00.000-07:00

It having been quite awhile since I've posted here, I decided to put a little something together...
Not that I'm much up on local current events, finding too little cause to get out and about. But I did visit a couple places in our old village of Nam Lat the other night, and heard that the go-go bars are now visited by the police every night (used to be about once a week). All employees must be over 20, and get checked. Or so I was told - if so, it's quite a big change. Don’t know if the cops are still pretending to protect ASCAP rights to pennies for songs played, but do now one of our longest-term and most popular Farang bars went out of business because of that.
Here in Ban Du lots of housing for students is going up, some, absurdly, tiny single, free-standing (or almost, maybe there's only one bathroom for each pair of units. Not long ago students mostly lived 8 to a room in dorms, but perhaps an easy curriculum and those tight, slitted black skirts, well... anyway, there're lots of entertainment venues around ChiangRai Rajapat University (CRU), some with big ads for VO and Johnnie Walker - not student drinks, if my understanding of things is at all correct. This isn't happening at the other schools - just here. Down the road at MaeFahLuang, apparently they study – or at least the half of the student body on scholarship does. There’re a lot of rich kids up there, but the kids here clearly have more expendable funds. You figure it out.

On an interactive Net forum, someone asked me, "so what is there to do where you are?"

My reply: "Well, we have bars, and temples... and mountains, tribal groups and other exotica...
bookstores, restaurants (Japanese ones at the new Central Department store for the super-rich who no longer want to shop where they live are great, and so's another Japanese one - the rest are mostly just mediocre).
One can swim, or boat, or fish (etc etc) or get involved in agricultural pursuits (we raise fish, mostly catfish, fruit, veges, chickens...)and some of the Farang like to argue with each other, act like jackasses regularly.
Others preach religion (see previous comment)."

He replied, "alright it sounds very good ive seen several cities there and they all seem a bit different some have only karaoke bar some rola up the sidewalks at nite... sounds like you do have some variety ...."
So I went on a spiel:
Here one can do most of what one can do anywhere: enjoy hobbies (paint, play music, garden, grow bonsai or sculpt land, watch birds… one popular thing here which I find peculiar is riding bikes in groups – lots of guys have tight, bright biking suits they put on for this. Other guys who prefer motorized bikes put on pads and leathers which look even hotter – by which I mean sweaty, and, amazingly, even more useless, absurd and ridiculous. But to each their own, different strokes for different folks and all…)…
Most jobs are illegal for us, but there’s still work: teaching for instance. Some teach even though they don’t need the money. When kids learn, it can be well worth it, but most don’t.
One can breed animals, visit jailed inmates, do other kinds of volunteer work, get involved in some sort of business. Shopping is always fun (I used to do it as a business), but it’s good to offset spending money with earning some. Best way to get a little money here: bring a lot of it!
One can, of course, play sports (or watch them: we’ve now some soccer teams), lift weights, walk around… get a massage, learn massage (or a hundred other things), use the Net (I use it to monitor an investment portfolio, as well as play the Tagged Pets game and occasionally fool around “socially”). One can meditate; we’ve places that teach vipassana meditation. Or gossip, gamble, raise kids. Or watch girls, flirt with girls, etc (I used to know where whorehouses were; now I don’t). Some try to stay drunk most of the time; I notice that not working out very well. Combining in drugs to smoke might stretch things out a bit, but one still falls apart well before one would otherwise, even if one gets out for occasional exercize).
We’ve had a playhouse, but I never went. My wife likes to help out at funerals – somehow I suspect that’s not for you. Main thing is, here you can live on less money, with less stress, and with more freedom, than elsewhere. One additional point: anything can get old, but a bit of self-discipline helps fight that.
ChiangRai is not for the easily bored; ChiangMai has many more amusements, but at hefty price (pollution of many sorts, higher cost of living, too much proximity with crazies, more stress, less grace, and things simply aren’t as safe). They’ve ice-skating, butterfly houses, little race cars, bungie jumping, and lots more. We’ve begun to get some of that, but I’m loathe to say more.

Anyway, for what’s it was worth, that’s my two bits. It gave me something to do. I thought about making this suitable for posting on ThaiVisa’s ChiangRai forum, then decided against it. A few people spend a lot of time there, but like Facebook, it too soon gets to feeling limited, and old. I much prefer the quite useless fantasy aspects of the Pets game. Which is pretty silly, but nevermind. I find it amuses…
Anyway, all that said, I thought I'd include what I've done recently (for my other blog, mythrorelics):

A Story With Legs: How a few became a million.

The old woman, chewing some khat (qāt), took her time to get started, but when she did, her words quickly gained steam. This is what she told:

Long ago, a story goes, 3 boys saw, in each other, much more than they saw in others. And so they excited each others’ ambition, and promised mutual assistance, to help those ambitions along. Then, later, they naturally fought.
The story has been retold, changed, and made to serve a variety of differing purposes, pruposes, though, mostly not about transmitting understanding of the human condition. No-one really thinks it wrong that the great no longer are as they were when young, and no longer see things as they did then. And a story is just a way to tell other things, things that come with the story itself.
The three became kings, or heroes, or villains – it doesn’t matter which. They became important, and thus, rivals. Instead of doing each other good, they sometimes did each other harm, much as we sometimes do to ourselves. For though we like to be part of something big, we like even more to be big. And that makes us small.
Over a thousand years, this story travelled 10,000 miles, and then did that again, all the while becoming more and more a part of us, until what had been wrong and tragic had become no more than normal. This happens with stories. So, that three united would unceasingly fight became not a marvel, but expected. And that one might leave honor behind, for another kind of success, became normal too. And bad became good, and good bad, in the swirling eddies of our minds… and what once was laughed off as a Million, a whopper, a Really Big One, became somehow like truth itself, repeated so often and changed so very well that arrogance became idolized, and who was admired despised. It’s an old story indeed, and in many an ancient story you can find its seed.
Consider: those who went out to do good, but did more bad, return to brag on what they learned, telling others of things they’ve been told, and misunderstood.
Consider the story of Nizam, Omar and Hasan, and that of the Peach Tree Vow.

Abu Ali al-Hasan al-Tusi Nizam al-Mulk (or Qiwamu ad-Deen, Abu Ali al-Hasan bin Ali ibn Ishaaq at-Tusi, or Abu Ali al-Hasan al-Tusi Nizam al-Mulk, best known now as Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk al-Tusi) was a Persian scholar, and became (albeit briefly) sole ruler of the Seljuk Empire. Born about 1018, in Tus (now the Iranian city of Imam al-Ghazali), he was educated for administration. When still young he chose to enter into the service of the foreign Seljuks, and in the mid 1040s became an adviser to a commander in Balkh (now part of Afghanistan). It was the custom for the Seljuk princes to rule a portion of the empire in order to gain experience for running the entire empire, and Nizam al-Mulk was able to quickly demonstrate his genius by advising the Turkic prince and heir to the Seljuk throne who became Sultan Alp (or Alab) Arslan. After serving brilliantly as Alp Arslan’s secretary, he became the vazir (like a prime minister) of the new sultan, around 1054. Later, he was also vazir to that sultan’s son, Malik Shah (ruled 1072 to ’92).
By 1059 he was chief administrator of Khorasan province. Despite early poverty, by diligence, perseverance and the strength of a strong persona, he gained great success. Vizier for 30 years, from 1063 to ’92, under two sultans, he abolished taxes, made a new military system, built libraries and paid salaries for both teachers and students. One of the most illustrious ministers of the East, known for redressing the wrongs that occurred under his government and with great ability in organizational matters, he encouraged study of Islamic sciences and arts, and spent much money on the seekers of knowledge, yet, still, he seemed to many aloof and autocratic, and was the subject of much satire. And he irritated Shi’ites, by showing preference for fellow Sunnis.
The Seljuks, a tribe of the Central Asian Kazakh Steppes, driven west by other tribes, entered Anatolia soon after 1000CE, and captured Baghdad in 1055. They soon completely overpowered the Abbāsids but left to the Abbasid caliph his position as religious leader, leaving the caliphate some authority. They built a powerful empire centered on Persia, and came to be seen as the restorers of Muslim unity under the Sunnite caliphate. Soon after 1060, their empire included Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and almost all of what’s now Iran; somehow they considered themselves as rightful heirs to all conquered for Islam in Prophet Mohammed’s time. Like the Mongols who came after, they were great horsemen. They were also Sunni Moslems, but with little of Islamic tradition, let alone literary heritage. They adopted much of Abbasid Persian culture. The first invade all of Anatolia, with them Turkey became Islamic.
Malik’s empire controlled much of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and other areas near the Persian Gulf, with a policy of utilizing diplomacy rather than military conquest. Nizam al-Mulk earned the title al-Wazir al-Kabir, meaning “The Great Minister;” Nizam al-Mulk means “the order of state”. A brilliant leader, modest and devoutly religious, brilliant at mathematics and eloquent in his writing, his work did much to smooth over the political gap between the Abbasids (who had the 2nd great Muslim empire, after the Umayyad caliphate) and the Seljuks, and also against their various rivals. He wrote a voluminous treatise on kingship, the Siyasatnameh (Book of Government, King’s Policies or Rules for Kings), a treatise on kingship and governance. A devout Sunni, Nizam founded a number of theological schools, the famous Nizamiyyah schools, which were named for him. He built the famous madrasa (university) in Baghdad named for him, the An-Nizamia, and several other schools (one in his hometown, another in Basra, others in cities you may not have heard of, Nisapur, Marw, Harat, Balkh and Isbahan). He also built and funded hospitals. But his schools were Sunni oriented, the Shia group Ismaelia accused him of being a tyrant, and rebelled against him. After administering affairs of state for 30 years, Nizam-Al-Mulk was overthrown. The principal sultana has been accused of instigating this, and utilizing the aid of the Chamberlain, an enemy to Nizam. Perhaps he was impeached for having rashly declaring that his cap and ink-horn badges of office were connected by divine decree with the throne and diadem of the Sultan. That’s claimed too. At any rate, at age 93, Nizam-Al-Mulk was dismissed from office, and at almost the same time, murdered. The assassination may have been about a rivalry between two groups of religious jurists (Shafi’ites and Hanafites), also, it mioght have been ordered by Hassan i-Sabah, who’d become a personal enemy of Nizam-Al-Mulk, and at odds with the state for at least 15 years. This also involved religious differences. You can decide which seems most likely, as proof, one way or another, is unlikely now to be discovered.

Legend tells that Hasan al Sabah, Omar Khayyam and Nizam al Mulk became tight friends while studying together. They decided to cement their bond, and in a pact just a bit too reminiscent of the Peach Garden Pact at the start of the famous ancient Chinese classic “The Three Kingdoms”, those three swore that, since at least one of them was bound to attain wealth and power, “to whomsoever this fortune falls, he shall share it equally with the rest, and preserve no pre-eminence for himself.” The three personalities, though, or however, were hardly compatible. The story of the three school-fellows is also unlikely to have much truth as Nizam ul-Mulk was at least 12 years older than Hasan, maybe almost 40. Omar Khayyám may have been younger than Nizam, but was also at least a decade older than Hasan. While it’s true that Hasan started his studies at an early age, and friends can have age differences, the age difference is simply too great. But maybe they knew each other: it’s said that while Khayyam was reforming the calendar, Hassan Sabah became mace-bearer to Sultan Alp-Arselan, and that enmity between Hasan and Nizam occurred only after that.
Their agreement, that if one should gain prominence, he’d help the other two to do likewise, meant that when Nizam became vizier, and so the most powerful of the three, he offered both friends positions of rank in the court. It’s significant that he’s now the least (by far) remembered – although it was perhaps he who had the most lasting impact. Omar’s calendar should have been more important – it’s better than the one commonly used now. Omar asked only to be given the means to continue his studies indefinitely; he didn’t want responsibilities at court. So Nizam built him an observatory. Hassan rose to become the court’s Intelligence Chief, but the vizier, whether once a friend or not, became vexed at his ambition, and deviously undermined Hassan’s growing power by pushing Hassan into agreeing to furnish records for the entire kingdom, after just 40 days preparation. Going to make his presentation, Hasan found the records tampered with; the report was ruined, and Hasan shamed before the court. The king, furious, sentenced him to death. Omar Khayyám, pleading for clemency, got the sentence reduced to banishment. Or so one story goes. Some say he was forced to flee after plotting to dispose Nizam as vizier.
Nizam was assassinated much later, in 1092. Some have said he was stabbed by the dagger of a member of the Assassins (Hashshashin), disguised as a dervish. Others tell of a Sufi who pretended to hand Nizam al-Mulk a gift while he was being carried on his litter. As Nizam al-Mulk reached out to take the gift from him, the esoteric stabbed him with a knife in his chest. Nizam al-Mulk died from the wound, and his soldiers later killed the assassin. Another report says he was killed in secret by Malik Shah in an internal power struggle, and his murder avenged by the vizier’s loyal academics. It’s also been insinuated that Nizam al-Mulk was murdered from within the government at the orders of a governor. This governor did not live for more than a few months after Nizam al-Mulk’s assassination. The last words Nizam al-Mulk uttered purportedly were, “Please do not kill my assassin because I have forgiven him. There is no god but Allah.”
Perhaps the top of the whoppers is that he was assassinated with Malik, after a he prepared a debate between Sunni and Shi'a scholars on Malik’s orders, a debate which resulted in both him and the king converting to Shi’a ideology. This story was told by Nizam al-Mulk’s son-in-law Muqatil bin Atiyyah, who attended the debate.
Revolts soon ended Malik Shah’s reign. The empire dissolved. The glorious years for the Seljuqs were over; with Malik’s death came sudden decline. A practice of dividing provinces among a deceased ruler’s sons led to numerous independent and unstable principalities, and internecine war. The last Iranian Seljuqs died in battle in 1194; by 1200 Seljuk power was at an end everywhere except in Anatolia. For a short time a few emirs maintained small principalities in mountainous districts, but soon Mongols were galloping all over the region.
Crusaders and other Europeans, enchanted by highly exaggerated stories of daring-do by Nizari fida’is (self-sacrificing devotees), longed to hear more. Tales were told of people who’d selectively target, then eliminate, prominent enemies of their community – tales of underdogs revenging themselves on overlords.
As Nizari Ismailis became famous as Assassin followers of a mysterious “Old Man of the Mountain,” truths and fictions about them got harder and harder to separate. Marco Polo and his “Million” tall tales, which tens of thousands read in the early 1300s, increased the confusion. One reason for the legend of the longevity of the “Old Man” is that it’s based on two people, one of whom died 70 years after the other. The first was Hasan i-Sabbah, the 2nd, Rashad Sinan. Sinan’s said to be the real “Old Man”, but his castle, Masyaf, stands on a platform only about 60 feet above its surrounding plane. Nearby are the An-Nusayriyah Mountains, of which he’s said to have been a “shaykh al-jabal” (Arabic for “mountain chief”), but the likelihood of mistranslation playing a part in the legend’s development can’t be discounted. Which is much the point here. Sinan’s story was confused with, then grafted onto, that of Hasan-e Sabah. Even now, narration about all this is difficult, as not just names, but other significant terminology relevant, indeed crucial, to explication of what might, or likely did not, occur, does not have standardized spelling. Of course, interpretations of much terminology vary too!
Omar Khayyam may never have written poetry - in a peculiar inversion of “intellectual property,” verses used mostly as quotations were attributed to him, perhaps because of his scholarly reputation. Contemporaries never commented on his verse, and not until two centuries after his death did a few quatrains appear under his name.
By the 1200s, Western writers were telling of Turchia instead of Anatolia. First came the Seljuqs, then other Turkic (Tatar or Tartar) tribes, including the tribe of Osman Gozi, son of Ertugral. He and his Ghazi warriors soon became the Ottomans, with a new empire which stretched from Yemen and the Crimea to Morocco. The rise of the quick-witted, flexible Ottomans in the early 1300s was as swift as that of the Muslim Arabs had been, and by the end of that century, they had a regular, standing army, the 1st professional paid army in Europe (they controlled Bulgaria) since the Romans.
The Mongols had come and gone, and the Ottomans had fought their way to power… To the Ottomans, these stories of a vizier and friends weren’t important. This isn’t history written by the victor. So, who gained? Maybe just the story-tellers, and listeners. Maybe the stories got varied to suit the occasion for telling, Books were still quite rare, and story-telling greatly valued as quality entertainment. And perhaps, really, that’s all these stories are, still…

Here, the teller nodded off.

Central ChiangRai

2011-04-06T00:02:00.000-07:00

While acknowledging that consumption, indulgence and shopping can be fun, and that no-one thinks it my place to instruct the world (except maybe me, and I do sometimes know better), I yet believe my observations might not only have validity, but perhaps even utility, for those so inclined as to review them. And I guess I’d best apologize at how pompous that sounds!

Today we (my family) just had lunch at Sukishi buffet restaurant, in the new Central Plaza. It was my first visit to the Plaza; my wife’s second. She went for the first (of two) Opening Day. We’re both impressed – aside from the inadequate parking for the current crowds, it’s quite a nice place. We arrived early, fortunately - as we ate, the place really filled up. A hint for finer dining there: sit near the drinks machine, so as to choose from the dishes going by on the conveyer belt, before others get a chance at them!

My first impression was that a Central for ChiangRai was presumptuous, if not just plain silly (as the first attempt proved to be: for those who don’t know, Appy Square was originally built to house a Central). It seemed poorly informed regarding local realities (but then again, Robin of Starbright once informed me that he knew there was clientele for his hotel and “spa”. “I did my demographics,” he told me. But it still seemed too fancy for ChiangRai, and I still don’t see much clientele there).

Today I noticed something I hadn’t taken into sufficient consideration. Most of the people enjoying our new shopping plaza aren’t from here at all: and it wasn’t built for us, it was built for them! ChiangRai has become a more pleasant for people who simply don’t care about cost to come to shop.

Indeed, Central Plaza ChiangRai may be the most pleasant place to shop in the whole country. And that might even remain true (although usually one would not expect something like this to last, some harsh economic realities may prove to be the determining factor).

Cars had plates from ChiangMai, Lampang, KrungThep… people were very well dressed, and I really doubt that even 10% of the money being spent was earned here. Well, let’s not quibble about “earned” – acquired. The people there got their money elsewhere, and came here to spend it pleasantly, without battling hoards of obnoxious kids, foreigners and people they don’t really want to bump into. ChiangRai, once again, is getting promoted as the new alternative to Pattaya, ChaAm, HuaHin, Phuket, or ChiangMai. We’re the place to get away from it all.

One thing that interests me about all this is that there’s a history of it, particularly around MaeChan (MaeJaan) and the “Golden Triangle”. Seems to me there’re quite a lot of resorts around there that neither have nor really want customers, and that a lot of investment was made with little concern for weather it would provide real profit or not. Sometimes I conjecture that it might have been like this:
A Bangkok “Hi-So” investor buys land and contracts to build a resort, using borrowed money. When bills come due but no returns have come in, the shell company arranged for the enterprise declares bankruptcy. The lending institution acquires the land and buildings and auctions them off. But maybe the auction isn’t well promoted, or some people find themselves not allowed in… and the original owner (or a proxy) merely buys it back for dimes to the dollar (OK, satang to the salung). Then the “resort” is used for family outings.
Could it be? Stranger, more insidious things certainly have occurred. How well do you think Central Plaza will do during the rainy season?

Drugs and Cultural Survival in the Golden Triangle

2011-01-05T01:11:00.000-08:00

Drugs and Cultural Survival in the Golden Triangle

Revised again, February, 2012

Nations, countries, are artificial, boundaries more wishful thinking on the part of moneyed power-mongers than dividing, restricting realities; one must learn of important regional neighbors to understand any specific place. China without knowledge of Mongolia or Russia would be a confusing picture which Confucianism certainly can’t explain; examining Spain without acknowledging Islamic impact would be like looking at a Hollywood-movie wild-west town false-front. Many think the USA its own thing, dominating Canada and Mexico but hardly influenced by them, but that’s less than silly.
Unfortunately, there’s little morality in big business or international politics. Governments protect business and wealth, often little more than feigning concern with public welfare; education is especially poorly managed. Governments seldom encourage indigenous self-sufficiency, close-to-nature and/or obdurately traditional; only occasionally are governments far-sighted. Power doesn’t like to share, so certain essential vitality doesn’t come to it. And indeed, the meek remain when power is gone (although always, new replacement powers come along).
With Dutch government financial backing, writer Guy Horton says he’s documented slave labor, systematic rape, conscription of child soldiers, massacres and deliberate destruction of villages, food sources and medical services, along the Myanmar side of the Thai frontier and most especially in Shan and Karen States. He presented evidence meeting the standards of international law in a 600-page report, “Dying Alive: A Legal Assessment of Human Rights Violations in Burma” (2005). “Typically,” Horton said, “the army will move into a village, confiscate anything of value, slaughter the animals, and destroy the cooking pots and looms. The village is burned and usually mined. The inhabitants are relocated to a new site, usually with inadequate food and water, where they’re forced into labor schemes such as road-building. In the long run, many just can’t survive.” Horton also ran across numerous Burmese army defectors. International reaction remains lame.
Sanctions against Iraq before the second U.S. invasion caused as much death as Saddam Hussein and both recent US/Iraq wars - deaths mostly of babies, at that. Israel, perhaps more hypocritical for being a state more based on religion, gladly offers Myanmar dangerous weapons while bemoaning Palestinian barbarity. Thailand has used its weapons successfully only on its own people (excepting Thai airmen of WWI fighting in France; some served in Korea, and over 10,000 in Vietnam, but Thailand’s been a laudably peaceable neighbor - whilst in the few clashes it’s had, not militarily dazzling), yet because media is owned by businessmen doing business with other businessmen who’re often in government, need to purchase ever larger quantities of ever more powerful and of weapons isn’t questioned (also, now one doesn’t need an external enemy; there are always ‘terrorists’). International Law has become less meaningful since the USA became the sole ‘Superpower’ (bully) - in the mode of Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, soon to be espoused by China. The world’s largest, and perhaps shakiest, democracy, India refuses to impose sanctions on Myanmar; China, with few pretensions to morality, is a major Myanmar trading partner; so are Thailand, Korea and Singapore. Japanese invested heavily until they found funds brought in had to stay, but their government still gives aid. Sanctions in Iraq didn’t work, and Myanmar is considered ‘isolated’ (like North Korea), but without the considerable (and indefensible) support from other countries (and mega-corps), the (literal) rape of Myanmar by its rulers could not continue. But for over a generation, Myanmar’s military regime has inflicted over 10,000 violent deaths annually.
The supposed cultural hegemony which Thailand advertises and Myanmar’s Burmese warlords try to ‘promote’ begs acknowledgement of refugees, overtly racist acts common at almost all levels, and Islamic discontent. While many Muslims and tribal people are well adjusted and even well integrated, there are substantial numbers who are not. The problem seems to rest primarily on insidious greed and economic colonialism: self-reliant/self-sufficient farmers (or herders, or hunter-gatherers for that matter) just don’t pay much tax, or much provide for, or pander to, power! Something artificial and destructive is being imposed – in the name of progress. The volatile situation in Thailand’s south, where Yawi-speaking people of close cultural similarity to their Malay neighbors have been treated like second-class citizens and are now subject to separatist or government-inspired violence, gets major (albeit misguided) attention, while a potentially more dangerous circumstance festers to the north. Both give possible justification for indulgence in giant military purchases (big toys for big boys).
When Britain annexed the Shan States in 1887, colonialists pushed opium production, producing it under license in Kokang, Loimaw and the Wa states (where it’d been grown for local consumption). About 40 tons per year were made in the late 1940s. Then arrival of Kuomintang (KMT) troops beaten by Communists caused increased production. A famous quote by KMT General Tuan Shi-Wen goes: “To fight [communists] you must have an army and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium.” A CIA website says leading producers of opium are hill-tribe people of Southeast Asia who “live under very primitive conditions with no electricity and no running water. They are very poor - opium is their currency, and it is sold or traded for basic necessities like food, clothing, and utensils. Opium is also used locally as a substitute for modern medicines because few medical supplies are available in these remote areas.” Well, that’s changed – methamphetamines, once ya-ma horse medicine, then ya-ba crazy medicine, are now “ya kai”, medicine you sell (or perhaps “hard-working pills”, as in kaiyan: industrious, assiduous), among people north of the Thai border.
In 1962 the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ of General Ne Win ruined private business outside the black market (which expanded); manufactured goods remained available only from trade of opium and heroin for Thai products. Daw AungSan SuuKyi returned in 1988; rallies against despotism erupted; the junta ordered demonstrators fired on, killing thousands. In reasonably fair elections (1990), the National League for Democracy won 82% of seats in the national assembly - support for Daw SuuKyi was overwhelming, except within the military and in Shan State, which voted for Shans. SuuKyi’s father, independence hero Aung San, persuaded independent ethnic leaders to accept his negotiation for terms ending British colonial rule by promising choice for secession, after ten years, to the Shan, Karen and Kachin. He was assassinated just before independence, and his promises became void. SuuKyi is English educated; her husband (now deceased) was English, her children are in England. This English influence worries Myanmar’s generals, who suspect English complicity in the assassination. As with many things in Myanmar, the military’s intentions in holding that election remain hard to comprehend, but it seems they failed to take Daw SuuKyi’s great charisma into account.
Infrastructure is substandard, with regular, wide-spread power-shortages (outages), and most gasoline purchased on the black market (from the military). The currency worthless not only out-side the country but many places in it as well. Than Shwe (pronounced “shoo-ee”), Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, which took over government as SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Committee) 16 years before making this outrageous proclamation, says, “The Tatmadaw {armed forces, pronounced tah-mah-doe} will systematically hand over state power to the public, the original owner.” Sure. More likely, Burma will implode, as Eastern European communist regimes did, but the populace is cowed, demoralized, terrified.
Way underdeveloped, but frequently charming and picturesque, like a place somehow out of another time, Burma is potentially rich. The hospitality industry barely achieves a low standard, education and healthcare are abysmal, but Burmese (as opposed to Chin, Shan, Karen, etc.) culture thrives, magnificently free of commercial globalization.
This will change though, as deforestation is proceeding faster even than in the Amazon. Thai jungles are gone; landslides cover roads, houses, people… rainfall and river levels are down, cement has become regarded as a positive aesthetic, and as things get hotter, the potential for virulent disease spreads. SLORC acknowledged over 400,000 HIV-positive people in Myanmar in 1996 - more realistically it’s over a million and possibly 4% of population (in 2003 over 2% of military recruits were). The highest rates of HIV infection in both China and India are along their Myanmar borders.
Burma has about 135 ethnic groups (over twice as many as China). Besides Myanmars or Burmans, there are Kachin, Karenni (Kayah or Kayan), Karen, Chin, Arakanese, Mon and Shan, for which States have been named, related tribes, tribes of Tibetan or Mongoloid origin, including Mizo, Lahu, and Palaung, and the indigenous Naga and Wa. Most have their own armies, largely for protection from the Burmese Tatmadaw. Other armed forces include descendent remnants of the KMT and Burmese Communist Party, an ‘All-Burma Students Democratic Front’, totally mercantile drug-trade protection organizations and armed bandits (in the last few decades, several hundred groups). The total number of rebel armies at one time once was 26; most accepted cease-fire with the government, in hopes of development-help or other economic gains, but there remain about 125,000 non-governmental armed, trained and organized soldiers (some merely boys); figures for insurgent fighters are lower as they exclude commercial armies. The Shan, largest of Burma’s ethnic minorities, once comprised a third of the country’s population (now about 48 million). 10% of Shan men may be HIV positive; many Shan (and Karen) have fled to Thailand. With little else available to them, they’re reliant on traditional herbal understandings, and often have but unreliable access to even that form of help. The potential for survival of Shan culture, and that of other minority cultures in Myanmar, is becoming as if-y as in/with next-door Thailand, under globalization.
The military has doubled over 20 years, to 350,000 soldiers, despite no imminent external threat. In this time, almost half of Myanmar government monies have gone to the violent, terrorizing Tatmadaw, but moral is low, with little civilian support outside families dependent on army money. Still, conflicting politics, lack of geographic commonalty, historic animosities, communication difficulties, religious differences, and incompatible financial support bases make rebel unification, or victory, unlikely. In addition to Buddhist, Moslem and Christian rivalries, there are animistic and charismatic cults, and feuding clans. The Karen and Mon are anti-narcotic, but sometimes provoke each other. Internal strife led to the fall (after almost 40 years) of the Karen headquarters at Mannerplaw (not far from the Thai town Mae Sam Laep, on the Salween River) - Buddhist soldiers were dissatisfied with Christian leadership.
China sold SLORC F-7 fighter-bombers and two frigates (to be fitted with surface-to-surface missiles), in return asking for a naval base, or at least refueling rights for submarine and aircraft carriers, in the Bay of Bengal, on Coco Island in the Indian Ocean and at Zedetkyi Kyun (St Matthew’s Island) off Tenasserim (close to the Straits of Malacca). They got the refueling rights. Growing influence of large oil and gas companies, some of which China is buying into if not trying to buy outright (Unocal), could add to Chinese political pressure in the area. SLORC spends more on ‘defense’ than any other country in the Asia-Pacific region; its air force has helicopters, fighters and ground attack aircraft, mostly from China. In 2003 North Korean technicians installed surface-to-surface missiles on Burma Navy vessels; eighty 75mm howitzers (mountain guns) came from India. From Russia came eight combat aircraft (and its Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) contracted to construct a nuclear reactor, for which North Korea is also supplying assistance). China gives “friendship prices” for arms, and overlooks payment deadlines. Myanmar exports gas, gems, timber, agricultural produce and other natural resources, yet can’t get along without drug money. Trade sanctions from the West exacerbate this dependency: Tatmadaw units in tribal areas operate under a self-support policy, and so rely on drug trade. Opium has spread to places which prior to 1962 had had little or none: Karenni (Kayah), Kachin and Chin States, plus Mandalay, Sagaing and Magwe divisions of Burma Proper. But amphetamines are now the bigger earner.

The USA plays typically hypocritical games in the region: it tries to keep Taiwan defended while pumping investment into China, its main currency supporter, with whom it has a trade deficit of over $100 billion a year. China has shored up the dollar with bond purchases of over a trillion dollars. It utilized American policies and trade to grow, while acquiring US-made jet engines for warplanes it sold to Myanmar. Peasant uprisings in China take ever more violent turns, with rural communities becoming less credulous and submissive, and abandoning hope of economic trickledown… Burmese know their government doesn’t help them (for them, government always has always been oppressive, but many accept a necessity for unresponsive authority), while Thais, Chinese and even Americans (yes, Mexicans and Canadians, surely) are learning how dangerously - even to their small lives - power corrupts…

Opium was used in early Siam, not only medicinally, but to calm war elephants and make them more handle-able in battle. In the same year that the British started cutting teak (1826), a British merchant tried to sell opium imported to Bangkok illegally (from India, via Singapore), but wasn’t successful.
Chinese working in Southeast Asia are documented smoking opium in Java as early as the 1620s; in 1702 Siam got laws rewarding help confiscating opium. King Rama I prohibited both consumption and trade in it. But in 1855, emboldened by success in China and advances into Burma and the Malay peninsula, Britain forced the Bowring Treaty on Siam; as mentioned above; this gave British subjects exemption from Thai legal and made opium a legal commodity (supposedly, anyway), with no import duty. In reality opium was made legal only for un-naturalized ethnic Chinese. An opium tax soon brought in over 15% of tax revenues. In 1906 an Opium Department was established, so the government could distribute, sell and supervise opium dens. In the dens, not only opium, but tea, was served. Thais preferred betel (which Rama VI began to discourage about 1930, while also encouraging a change to more modern clothing).
In 1824 tea plants in India had first been noticed by Westerners, growing in frontier hills between Burma and Assam state; but in the 1830s, tea still came only from China. Indian (or Ceylon) tea has come to dominate the world market, but back then tea was still a Chinese thing; the British still needed to learn the process by which it’s cured, to produce it for themselves and their trading partners. After many botched attempts, they succeeded in the 1860s, and began to produce tea in Assam and Darjeeling, northeastern India. But to finance their taste for tea, the British long found only opium, to provide them with a trade balance. Homegrown opium, eaten rather than smoked, had long supplied most Chinese needs; the British changed this by introducing tobacco, soon often smoked with opium. Britain accounted for over 80% of the opium smuggling trade – ‘necessary’ to meet its demand for tea; eventually they resorted to force to continue bringing opium from India to China (the “Opium Wars”).
In 1793, British ambassador Lord Macartney collected shoots of tea plants and took them Bengal, with samples of soil where they’d grown; Macartney achieved little towards friendly relations, or trust, between China and Britain – and subsequent embassies weren’t as well treated. Opium smuggling became totally out of control, and relations between Britain and China became unstable (when not openly hostile).
By the mid-1830s opium had become the most traded single commodity in the world. In early 1800s Siam, its popularity was largely due to Chinese laborers come to work constructing canals across the central plains. Soon there were many working on boats and docks, as laborers, craftsmen, rice millers, tobacco growers and shop-workers. Siam’s Chinese population became the largest in Southeast Asia, reaching 440,000 in 1821 (and constituting half of Bangkok by 1880), and with the Chinese came opium. In 1811 King Rama II banned its sale and consumption; in 1839 Rama III ordered the death penalty for major traffickers. But legislative efforts failed, especially as British merchant captains, even before Bowring, were largely immune to prosecution; if a British captain was arrested, the British embassy pressed for his release, and soon the captain could smuggle in another cargo. In 1852, King Mongkut (Rama IV) bowed to British pressure and established a royal opium franchise, leased to a wealthy Chinese.
Pressed for revenues to finance public works, European colonial governments in Asia established opium farms, then leased them to Chinese merchants. By 1900, each Southeast Asian state, from Burma to the Philippines, had either an opium monopoly or an officially licensed franchise. In 1905-1906, opium sales provided 16% of taxes for French Indochina, 16% for the Netherlands Indies, 20% for Siam, and a whopping 53% for British Malaya. In 1930, Southeast Asia had 6,441 government opium dens, serving tons of opium to 542,100 registered smokers, but it didn’t become a significant opium producer until the 1950s. Poppy cultivation spread in the highlands during the decades before World War II, but the region remained a minor producer – mostly due to state monopoly fears of lowered prices.
In 1892, the Thai government for 16% of its revenues from opium taxes; that rose to over 20% in 1908, and from 1912 to 1919, then dropped back. In 1927, opium shops were made state owned. A 1938 Opium Act ordered severe penalties for smuggling or illicit dealing, but in 1939 permits were given to hill-tribe people in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Nan provinces, to grow opium for the government. After WWII, imports from India and Turkey resumed; in 1959 opium was again made completely illegal.
That under 1% of the population (57,500 opium smokers were counted in 1939, 71,200 in 1941… realistically, there may have been 2 or 3 times that) supplied 15 to even 24% of revenues, especially as many of those taxed were rickshaw pullers and very low-wage laborers, may defy credulity, but one must note that cash, and tax, were then of smaller general significance. Corveé labor, import duties, the benefits of land control, spoils of war and perhaps other matters (including bribes) may have had greater significance.
When Britain finally abandoned the Asian drug trade in 1907, opium was as entrenched as coffee, tea and alcohol. China's harvest of over 35,000 tons supplied 13.5 million addicts, 27% of its adult males, and represented about 85% of world production. A League of Nations eradication campaign in 1925 got governments to restrict imports and close opium dens, but smugglers serviced the continued demand. Thailand and Indochina couldn’t close their mountainous borders to caravan trade from Yunnan; with 50 % of the region's smokers and 70% of its dens, Bangkok and Saigon were premier markets.
Much as the British encouraged opium growing, their rivals the French did also, although quite a bit later. The cost of running Indochina (which the French started to take only as late as 1858, then absorbing under total suzerainty in 1893) soon got out of hand; French colonial administrators started encouraging growing of opium to raise taxes (and line their own pockets) in the early 1900s. Later, they needed even more funding for increasing numbers of troops. When they officially outlawed it in the early 50s, their intelligence service, the Deuxieme, took over wholesaling the product, and soon used it to repay the Corsican Mafia for helping the Resistance in WWII (much as parts of the US government made arrangements with Italian mobsters). As in Burma, after the 1949 Communist success in China, opium was used to finance anti-Chinese activity in Indochina; as it also proved useful for suppressing results of anger and discontent, before long heroin was readily accessible in most large Western cities, and even, it can be well said, significant in Western affairs.
Handsome and dashing University of Virginia graduate Wall Street lawyer Desmond FitzGerald enlisted as a private after the Pearl Harbor bombing, but got transferred to Officer Candidate School and became liaison officer to a regiment of Chinese troops in Burma (under General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell). Amoebic dysentery was rampant, and so severe some soldiers cut out the seat of their pants, in order to march. FitzGerald smoked opium with Burmese chieftains, headed some small-scale infantry maneuvers in Hunan Province, and contracted a skin condition which made direct exposure to sunlight painful for the rest of his life; he had to apply thick layers of ointment. He returned in March of 1951, as the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination’s executive officer. In order to create a “diversionary force” – supposedly to divert Chinese troops from the Korean War (despite the war being thousands of miles away, and the Chinese having millions of troops) - supplies and American advisers were dropped to General Li Mi by the Overseas Southeast Asia Supply Company (Sea Supply). LiMi attacked the Red Chinese in April, but was quickly driven back into Burma. His “Yunnan Province Anti-Communist National Salvation Army” (known to many as brigands) doubled in size to 12,000 men, and invaded again that summer, making it 60 miles into Yunnan. But the Sea Supply radio operator in Bangkok was reporting to Beijing his location and troop strength, and on 11 February, 1952, the New York Times reported witnesses in Burma seeing Li Mi’s men with new American weapons. Secretary of State Dean Acheson denied any U.S. involvement. Li Mi refused the CIA’s appeals for him to relocate to Taiwan; his troops started farming opium. Despite the poorly run operation, Des FitzGerald benefited from good publicity, and his standing at the CIA rose.
The Chinese Communists, vehemently anti-opium (although it’s said Chao En-lai/Zhao Enlai, Communist China’s first Premier, had been an opium smoker), waged a successful anti-opium campaign from the time of their victory; by the mid-50s, there was little cultivation in mainland China. The last growers were Wa in Ximeng Wa Autonomous County, Simao District, Yunnan. Even they stopped in the early 1960s. The Communist Party of Burma also suppressed opium; they encouraged crop substitutions in northern Shan State and further south along the Chinese border, including in Kokang and the Wa hills, which nevertheless remained the region’s main producers. Having lost China’s support in 1968, the CPB took over Shan State’s Wa and Kokang regions, and in 1982 began to officially tax opium farming. In 1989, Kokang and Wa CPB troops, dissatisfied with their predominantly ethnic Burmese leadership, mutinied. The new leadership entered the drug trade.
In 1961 the Nationalist Chinese KMT’s “Lost Army” moved into Thailand, many to take up residence at Doi MaeSalong in Chiangrai, where Muslims of Chinese descent already lived. The KMT planted round pears (‘sali’), plums and tea, but also continued in the opium business they’d entered into while in Shan State, Burma.
Northern Thailand was still sparsely populated and undeveloped into the early 1970s, by which time drug money had become the dominant force and the area called the “Golden Triangle”. Communist activity kept the United States interested even after the Vietnam War; such interest increased proportional to American consumption of drugs produced in Tai Yai hills. Communist insurgency in the north wasn’t strong, in part due to drug-producing KMT army remnants, but in the early 60s, Thailand’s northern border had “unknown areas”.
In 1982 powerful drug-lord Khun Sa was pushed out, and by 1990, a Royal Foundation directed by the King’s Mother, Princess Mother Sangwan Sri Nakarin, or colloquially, Mae Fa Luang &/or Somdet Ya, took great interest in the north, and did much to successfully contain, if not end, illicit drug production in Thailand. But drug lords in Shan State (including Khun Sa) increased output. ChiangRai was still a small town and in many ways decades out of date (though not so much as KengTung (KyaingTawng), capital of Myanmar’s Shan State, remains today). The wife of a USA Drug Enforcement Agency agent’s was murdered in an attempt at intimidation &/or retribution, in ChiangRai in the late 80s.
As late as 1984, in Huai Krai, 15 km south of Mae Sai on Highway1, an Opium Warlord was even issuing his own paper currency. The various groups (Communists, drug armies and KMT) gave up their weapons during amnesty programs of the late 1980s, and the area became amenable for tourism. Although the KMT armed forces dispersed in the mid-1980s, networks established by the Shan State KMT still operate; whether army and police officers in Thailand and Laos are still in the trade may be open to question, but of course it is denied, and dangerous to investigate. That active members of Myanmar’s Tatmadaw army, and other Burmese officials, are still actively engaged in it, is much less open to question; it is widely accepted that many still are.

Khun Sa
For years the largest insurgent force in Southeast Asia was the Khun Sa’s Mong T’ai Army (MTA). Zao Khunsa (the “Prince of Prosperity” referred to in media usually as Khun Sa, originally Chan Cheefu or Zhang Qifu, hereditary Loimaw headman) made America’s “Most Wanted” list, ’though he was never in America: a Brooklyn, New York court indicted him on heroin trafficking (narcotics racketeering) charges. He died in 2007, while living in an Inya Lake villa in Yangon (Rangoon)…
Brief background: Lo Hsing-han/Law Sit Han, a major warlord/drug-lord, started in the early 1960s as a gofer, assisting poppy-growing Kokang royalty. Lo got command of a ‘KKY’ junta-sanctioned militia, and worked with KMT General Li Mi (of the KMT), sending opium to Thailand. In ’93, General Khin Nyunt (long head of Burmese Intelligence but now under house arrest) assured him safe-smuggling of heroin from Kokang to the Thai border at Tachilek.
Tachilek has the only airport in Burma within walking distance of another country; flights from Rangoon or Mandalay bring Burmese officers with parcels of bank notes to carry over the Mai Sai bridge, Tachilek’s link to international banking. Mae Sai, Thailand’s northernmost point, is an ultimate in proverbial border towns; the area’s Shan, Tatmadaw, Wa and Thai soldiers have frequently clashed; all of these and more rake untaxed income from dodgy dealings, but who should judge? Golden Triangle drug barons are hardly less moral than Europeans who “settled” the American West, the CIA or many Americans working prisons… Now frequently used for Thai-visa extension purposes, the border was only opened to tourists in fall, 1994. Although non-Thai visitors weren’t allowed beyond the town itself, I went to take a look. It seemed poor but light-hearted; I saw kids playing on stilts, and small roadside gambling hovels. There were antiques and handicrafts, but nothing distantly approximating what was available in Mae Sot (on the western border Salween River). The only well-organized business I noticed was the Mae Sai gem market. Burmese currency, kyat, was not then, nor is now, used in Tachilek; just Thai baht. Tachilek reportedly had as many as 14 heroin refineries in the past; now it has a Tatmadaw base and a busy market with a plethora of cheap Chinese goods, some jungle products and carved teak, and pirated CDs and DVDs. On my first visit, I was amazed to see a man in fatigue jacket which instead of a name above the pocket, said “It takes balls to rule the world.” Of many postcards I sent out from there, none arrived.
Lo (or Law) Hsing-han has moved to Yangon to live with a son doing active business with Singaporians, but still owns poppy fields in the Tang-yang area. In 1973, while leading the largest opium militia and a coalition of most Shan rebel groups, he sent a proposal to the US government inviting American experts to help with poppy eradication by buying the current crop for US$12 million. A Thai helicopter came to take Lo for negotiations, but once away from his army, he was arrested, deported to Burma and sentenced to death - later commuted to eight years in jail. The DEA suppressed the proposals.
KhunSa, similarly captured by Rangoon authorities (in 1969) was freed in ’73, after supporters kidnapped two Russian doctors and got Thai General Kriangsak Chomanan (soon prime minister) to negotiate his release. He revived the proposals, and invited members of a US Congressional committee on narcotics to visit his base at Ban HinTaek, ChiangRai. US officials visited, but President Carter’s administration instead started an $80 million gift program (over 14 years), to the junta.
For a decade Khun Sa had about 4000 armed men: the SUA (Shan United Army). The DEA planted tracking devices up the asses of opium caravan mules, but the Burmese, given precise coordinates, intercepted nary a convoy. In January 1982, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanan had Thai troops attack KhunSa at HinTaek (which subsequently became Ban Thoed Thai); after three days, the SUA scattered. KhunSa and remnant troops drove some KMT and Lahu soldiers out of borderland Doi Lang, and temporarily settled there, but a Chinese officer (who later become SUA chief of staff) proposed something better: setting up headquarters at HoMong, across the border from sparsely populated MaeHongSon, and practically inaccessible from anywhere else. A road from Thailand was put in; troops rallied back. Shan State heroin lords (despite his denials, including KhunSa) increased their output. In ChiangRai, in the late ’80s still a small town and in many ways decades out of date (though not so much as KengTung remains today), the wife of a US DEA agent was murdered in an attempt at intimidation &/or retribution. By 1990, a Royal Foundation directed by the King’s Mother was successfully containing drug production in northern Thailand.
In 1985, 10,000 soldiers of the Shan United Revolutionary Army under Col. YawdSerk joined to form the Mong T’ai Army (MTA), which in 1993 had its first sustained, concentrated attack from the Tatmadaw. The situation looked dangerous; KhunSa adopted an even more fervently nationalist posture. On December 13, 1993, he declared an independent Shan State. More soldiers joined; the MTA grew to 25,000. In 1994 HoMong grew to 20,000 and even had facilities for overseas phone calls (Christopher Cox of the Boston Herald says 10,000, but also says Chiang Saen means “trumpeting elephant” and that “Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchu empire”). Surely well over a hundred journalists, photographers, NGO staffers and adventurers traveled to the Thai/Myanmar border to see KhunSa, as did I.
Khun Sa offered to eradicate Shan opium/heroin supply in return for security and stability for his people, who were violently threatened by the Burmese. The price would have been a tiny fraction of American tax dollars spent on surveillance, interdiction, incarceration, rehabilitation, hospitalization, etc. “Persuade the government of Burma to return to the legal constitution of Burma, because the drug trade can only flourish in a state of anarchy”, he asked. Thirty years later, the anarchy, and drug trade, still flourish. Shans request for help with crop substitution, schools, hospitals, and infrastructure met little response, but captivated my interest; I decided to see what I could do to help.

My Trip to HoMong
After attracting KhunSa aide Khernsai Jaiyen’s attention through newspaper letters-to-the-editor supportive of Khun Sa’s independence posturing, and a trip to Khun Sa’s office in MaeHongSon (I just flew up, then asked a motorcycle taxi driver to take me there, using my not-yet very good Bangkok Thai), I received an invitation to visit Ho Mong, and even a piece of paper to serve as provisional passport.
MaeHongSon wasn’t yet a vast urban wasteland of excess cement. Most houses were of wood, and many quite beautiful. There were five 5-star hotels without customers, and many two dollar a night backpacker guest-houses (much more convivial and entertaining places than expensive hotels). Interesting regional delicacies like deep-fried bird were common, and standard fare available along a short row of places oriented to backpackers. There was an upstairs dance-hall, dime (B10) a dance; my next-door neighbor at the guest-house I found to be of the taxi-dancers! The pace of life was slow, modern vulgarity had begun encroaching, but much serene magnificence truly charmed. Vegetation was thick, mornings cool, almost cold, and nowhere did anything feel intimidating, except perhaps the 5-star hotels. No one seemed shy about Khun Sa having an office there, at all, but neither were they going to discuss the trucks with huge teak trunks loaded on, standing along the road outside of that office, despite official logging ban.
I met Kernsai there, at the office, and was told where to catch a ride early in the morning. I did so, and after an hour and a half trip, found myself at a small Chinese village of low brick houses. There I mounted a mule bred for the difficult job of traversing rugged mountainous terrain. The mule’s caretaker led us along a mountain stream for a couple hours, crossing it, back and forth, many, many times. Along the first few miles of the path were impressive water-works, earth constructed runnels carrying water from a creek to fields lower down. It was nice and easy, breezy and beautiful for a while, then for a second I thought the horse was going out from under me, down a cliff-side. We quickly descended 8 or 10 feet while progressing on perhaps hardly a yard. The creek fell to 60 feet below us sometimes; the trail was seldom level. It was often so steep that the mules used long holes a foot or more deep, sometimes 40 or more in close rows, doing a kind of high-step.
We frequently went up, way up high slopes, the porter-guide-muleteer after a while pulling in front to help the mule, and my spine going almost parallel with that of my mount. When the slopes became too extreme we began using switchbacks, some 10 or 15 yards long, others reversing quite quickly. The horse sweated profusely, horseflies buzzing about its eyes. I tried with little success to swat them away with my quart (crop). We saw no-one for over five hours, until after resting on a level area we reached after topping three previous ridges. They were gorgeous to look back upon, but we were soon engulfed again in trees. We then encountered two men bearing ancient long-barrel rifles, and acting as if they were hunting. An hour later we met another man, at a very refreshing small waterfall.
Parties of international journalists, whom we saw evidence of in their trash leavings (Tablerone chocolate boxes given free on international flights, cigarette packs, pop cans), were said to have done the route in eight hours. I’d hoped to do it in less, and did, but to little advantage. My guide hobbled the horse outside a small dusty village, then left me in a room that resembled a small barracks, outside of which were tunnels into a hillside. I was exhausted and not unhappy to rest while waiting for a vehicle. I fell asleep, and someone woke me, offering to share smoke of some #4. I wanted to see it, but politely declined to partake. He took out a small vial of white powder and a cigarette, unrolled the cigarette and mixed in powder, rolled it back up, partook, then nodded off. Shortly after, I was directed to a pickup, which took me to the headquarters of KhunSa’s administration, where I was given a room at the VIP quarters. I’ve no idea how things would have gone had I been narcoticized.
A treaty had just been negotiated with some Lisu tribal elders, and I was invited to the celebratory dance at KhunSa’s residence. I was fed first, and had time to pour ladles of cold water over myself in my room’s private bath (equipped with an electric light), and to put on decent clothes. I was soon holding hands between two beautifully bedecked Lisu maidens, with green-uniformed but unarmed soldiers to either side, dancing in a circle that soon included KhunSa. He sang out enjoyable verses of voluble song, but I understood nary a word. I forgot my tired feet and legs, and tried my best to follow along in dance with my fellows. KhunSa made what was clearly a jest; people laughed. A European crew (Belgian?) went about with TV cameras and bright lights, recording the event.
My host Khernsai Jaiyen, the aid to Khun Sa most quoted in English-language newspapers, used his self-taught English fluently. I found his manner friendly and intelligent. He introduced me to several other English speakers, including two gentlemen of Shan descent purportedly based with the UN in New York. We were served candy and “whiskey” (which should really be called rum), after the dancing stopped. My new friends and I considered visiting HoMong’s karaoke lounge, but chose instead to visit the drinking stall of a woman who had a bit of English. There we had Carlsberg beer, tasty Shan/T’ai food, and a pretty good time. The electricity in HoMong, however, went off at ten, and I had to prepare for bed by candlelight.
Early in the next day’s dawning I was shown around a bit after breakfasting with the UN guys, at a charming outdoor market. I was saw a lake, schools, a church, garment factory, printing department, pharmacies, a new neighborhood and road construction. Half a year after his declaration of independence, KhunSa’s efforts in HoMong showed results: he’d established mushroom and silkworm farms, pineapple plantations, textile and garment production, a hydroelectric dam, a jewelry factory and a gem emporium. In the pleasant main market and well-stocked stores, dry-goods were mostly Thai, and only Thai money was used. Schools and medical facilities were readily in evidence, and two small hotels. There were no door-locks, nor need of, as there was virtually no crime. Rugged terrain, logistics insufficiencies (especially in transportation), and strained political relationships limit economic potential, but the Mong T’ai capitol HoMong (a mile or so from Mong Mai, more readily identifiable on maps, ‘though sometimes as Mong Mau - about 50 kilometers due north of MaeHongSon City, but over twice that far in actuality, due to the mountains) had thousands of new pre-formed reed-mat houses creating dozens of neighborhoods along the main road through a long mountain valley. Women mostly wore modern clothing; men and boys uniforms.

HoMong Morning Market

A new neighborhood

Kernsai explained that KhunSa wanted me to become his “Propaganda Minister” for which I would be given room and board; would I care to review his troops with him in the morning? I didn’t think so. Unfortunately it quickly seemed I had little time left… I chose to walk back, rather than wait for another rough ride on a mule. Walking took the same amount of time, and brought me closer to things. I still had a guide; he could hardly believe how slow I was, and at one point reached into an almost invisible hole in the ground and pulled out a colorful bird. This he put in a pocket for a while, then took out and flung into the air. It flew off making joyful noises, and I knew the difficult walk had been the right choice. But it left me tired immensely, and with sores on my feet still visible two months later. Arriving just before dark at the little brick town where I could catch a ride, I made it to MaeHonSon in time to be informed at the airline office that I should report for standby very early in the morning. I was very lucky I did so, as fog kept subsequent flights from leaving for the next 2 days.

I’d gone to offer some ideas for alternate income sourcing and possibly support in crop-substitution programs, and remain hopeful of helping provide viable substitutes for dependency on drug production for people in Shan State, through use of solar and wind power, and 12-volt pumping systems. I also had ideas for Angora rabbits… and it interests me to use this situation as a case example helpful in elucidating many problems in present political and economic frameworks and realities. Too much is ignored or wishfully swept temporarily out of sight, only to fester until erupting into danger to society at large. The absence of much available information on this situation is but one symptom of the problem; organized crime and drug-use epidemics are others. As important, of course, are general human rights, respect for nature and tradition, and awareness of history and resultant responsibilities. My hopes of encouraging profitable handicrafts production have come to little; dreams of promoting wind-energy utilization and water-storage have come to even less. There clearly needs to be a total paradigm shift of people in general, before we lose our heritage, and future.

When well entrenched and popular, the MTA had heavy artillery, surface-to-air heat-seeking Stinger missiles, and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles (made in USA). Traditionally Shan, Kachin, Pa-0, Palaung and Lahu accept cultural pluralism as a fact of life, despite occasional necessity for violence. Farmers not protected by a local army then, as now, ran high risk of being press-ganged into work as porters &/or land-mine detectors for the Tatmadaw, without pay, even in food, and forced into situations of extreme danger without protective gear, acting against the interests of their own people. Thousands of porters have died and thousands more become severely mutilated while engaged in this work, supposedly for the good of their nation.
The main enemy was soon to change, though, from KhunSa to neighbors not far from his original base-town of Lashio: the ‘wild’, or ‘red’ Wa. Some of these Wa can still remember ancestors who were headhunters, living inaccessibly in small villages surrounded by impenetrably thick thorn strands. For two decades most Wa were Communist Party supporters; then they became capitalistic poppy cultivators and now protect the manufacture of amphetamines. The Wa fought against Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army until his surrender, and now are avowed supporters of the junta, while using Chinese money and acting under the orders of Chinese advisers. They want back lands Shans ‘civilized’ 850 years ago… Perhaps tens of thousands of the recently displaced 150,000 to 200,000 Wa were born in China; many Lahu people were evicted to make way for them, but as the government in Yangoon is interested in becoming less isolated (and making money doing more legitimate forms of business), this may not result in a new refugee crisis.
The Wa long kept Burma separate from China; the rugged Wa ‘states’, located in the far northeast of Shan State, are the poorest territory in Burma; indeed, Wa farmers are among the world’s poorest peoples. Wa have fought lowlanders for centuries, vigorously. China had no problem absorbing all of Yunnan, even with its many tribal peoples. Many Chinese passed on through into Shan State, but the Wa Hills remained frontier. Until just recently, there were few roads in the area (none paved), no educational system and no medical clinics. Only 10% had electricity. After Aung San’s assassination, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) revolted; its most successful recruiting was among the traditionally warlike Wa. In March, 1989 the BCP collapsed; the leaders fled to China. The United Wa State Party (UWSP) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) requisitioned BCP uniforms, arms, ammunition and soldiers, and merged with a smaller non-communist Wa army, soon having 20,000 troops with additional militia. They quickly struck a cease-fire deal with the junta, so kept all weapons and, free to run its region as a semi-autonomous state, expanded trade in heroin – remember, the Wa hills were once legal opium-growing territory. Starting in 1993, they added methamphetamines.
About that time, tea cultivation began to offer a realistic alternative source of income (to opium). Two principal varieties of tea have become common: the small-leaved China plant (C. sinensis sinensis) and the large-leaved Assam plant (C. sinensis assamica). Science indicates that tea production originated in Southeast Asia, in the mountains where China, Burma and Laos meet. Tea seems to have been first used in Yunnan, especially in its southern districts (Pu’er Prefecture and Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture – to Thais, Sipsongpanna). Its natural habitat is in the fan-shaped area between the Naga, Manipur and Lushai hills of the Assam–Burma frontier (to the west), through China and the Himalayan foothills of upper Burma and Thailand east to Chekiang Province and south into Vietnam and mountains of upper Cambodia. The three main varieties of the tea plant - Chinese, Assam and Cambodian - occur in their most distinct forms at the extremes of this fan-shaped area. Teas are classified by region of origin, by size of processed leaf, and, most importantly, by manufacturing processes, which produce fermented (black), unfermented (green), and semi-fermented (oolong or pouchong). Many hybrids between varieties are commonly found in most tea fields.
In the late 1980s, experts from Taiwan helped the ex-KMT upgrade to high-quality hybrids of Camellia sinesis, from which they produced the much more expensive Oolong (‘black dragon’) teas valued by connoisseurs. Oolong refers to a processing technique by which tea leaves are only slightly oxidized (green tea isn’t oxidized; black tea is fully oxidized). Live top leaves are collected on clear mornings, along with buds yet to blossom. These are steamed, "withering" the leaves, oxidizing them slightly. After the brief withering stage, the leaves are lightly rolled by hand, until red and fragrant. Machines are increasingly used, to roll the leaves into small balls, and dry them completely.
Research in the early 1990s found polyphenol antioxidants, beneficial to human health, in tea; they help lower blood cholesterol and reduce blood pressure. Tea also contains antibacterial agents, can relieve cold and flu symptoms, stimulate the cardio-vascular system, and even help fight cancer.
Thai ice-tea, cha-yen, made from strongly-brewed red tea, anise, coloring, sugar and milk, is much less traditional than nam bai-toei – usually drunken cool, without ice. While in China hot tea is drunk to cool one, in hotter climes this isn’t much done, and tea, except for weak Chinese tea for breakfast on cold days and in Chinese restaurants, didn’t become popular in Thailand until betel was actively discouraged and ice became commonly available.

At the turn to the 21st Century, the Wa attained a new significance in the local picture. Many relocated to areas just north of the Myanmar border, where they produce mass quantities of amphetamines for export to Thailand and elsewhere. Perhaps as many as 200,000 of these Wa are currently in the limbo of displaced people; tens of thousands of these were born in China. Many Lahu people have been evicted to make way for them, but as the government in Yangoon is interested in becoming less isolated, this may not result in a new refugee crisis.
This situation began to develop when dreams of an independent Shan State were shattered by a mutiny in June 1995 (at least for the time; it keeps, quixotically, or chauvinistic in the sense of being hopeless, popping up again). The MTA’s officer-training school’s second in command, KanYot [GunYod or Kan Ywet], incensed at despotism and racial discrimination by those with Chinese blood, revolted. He and 200 soldiers left. 1500 MTA soldiers went to negotiate with the mutineers, hardly 10% returned. Rumors of KhunSa’s ill-health were becoming believed (there were so many, so absurd rumors before, such as the killing of a barber for a bad hair-cut, that they often weren’t taken seriously); weariness was showing in his face. When the Wa launched their winter ’95 offensive against the Shan, desertions caused outpost after outpost to fall; some claim the central headquarters would have also, within days, if surrender hadn’t brought in the Tatmadaw - but that’s conjecture.
KhunSa’s surrender caught most observers by surprise, and it’s clear not all weapons were turned over - Stinger and SAM-7 missiles believed to be there weren’t. KhunSa called a session of Shan parliament to make a surprise announcement of immediate retirement; it seems he also betrayed those who hadn’t betrayed him to revenge those who had, demonstrating the correctness of their suspicions (and meanwhile destroying the Shan cause). KhunSa moved to Yangon New Years Day 1996, renounced his Shan name and took a Burmese one. According to the ‘New Light of Myanmar’, 1,894 recruits and 138 heavy arms were handed over to the Tatmadaw on 12 January 1996, and on 14 January, 9,749 MTA soldiers surrendered with 6,004 heavy and small weapons, 197 HoMong-made launchers, 13,452 (or 24,452) grenades, 10,346 (or 18,346) mines and 7,407 (or 17,027) heavy arms rounds. 9,749 MTA soldiers surrendered, or maybe ‘over’ 4000 surrendered, in return for 50,000 sacks of rice. KhunSa was given a commercial bus concession from Rangoon to Shan State, a casino at Myawaddy (near the old Karen National Union headquarters at Mannerplaw, which has become a notorious ‘ya-ba’ transit point) and more; the junta steadfastly refuses a US offer of $2 million for his extradition. The USWA took over many of the border strongholds: “They have real capabilities and a growing infrastructure,” Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) quoted a diplomat. “This has the appearance of an emerging state.” In Mong Yawn valley north of ChiangMai’s Mae Ai district, the Wa have built roads, dams, an electricity-generating plant, underground fuel tanks, military compounds, schools, a hospital and modern town, employing 6,000 Thai laborers - with the only money they have, drug money.
A settlement built in 2000 by southern Wa boss Wei HseuhKang (Wei Xuegang, first part of KMT intellignence, then with Khun Sa until 1995 when he joined the small Wa National Council, later merged with the United Wa State Army), about 6 km from the border opposite Chiang Rai Province, reportedly has shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles (ones Khun Sa got from Cambodia and mujahadeen?). Plans to enlarge Mong Yawn - population around 10,000 early in 2004 - to about 120,000, involve a shifting Wa southward: part of a mysterious plan for ending opium cultivation by forced depopulation instead of crop substitution. Perhaps it’s really about allowing (un-assimilatable) Wa from Yunnan to move into evacuated old Wa areas. Settlers on both sides of the Thai border are planting hundreds of thousands of fruit trees, as well as beans, corn and coffee, but Mong Yawn can’t support even another 50,000 people through just agriculture and livestock breeding.
“The Burmese are playing with fire,” S.H.A.N. quotes a Western analyst. “By diversifying their forces and territory, the Wa are gaining strength and influence.” Many Wa leaders are actually ethnic Chinese; north of the Wa “states” is Kokang state (all these are parts of Shan State), where most people are ethnic Chinese. The enmity between the Burmese government and Wa has resulted in a mini-arms race, and it’s doubtful the ethnic minorities will ever feel, or be, secure without having their own military capability. The UWSA has become one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking organizations, well able to procure powerful munitions. The US Justice Department indicted eight senior Wa officials in January 2005 (in absentia), on narcotics charges, but is really little threat to them. By forcing impoverished people to migrate, the UWSA has greatly increased its influence in Shan State, particularly in areas new to it where the Shan State Army (S.S.A., successor to the MTA) also operates – mostly along the Thai border.

Complicating the picture are new roads and infrastructure arrangements to make a “growth quadrangle” expanding the “Golden Triangle” of Burma, Thailand and Laos, to include Yunnan, China. This big area has many people with common ethnic backgrounds: Shans, Dai/Zhouang, Laotians, Lawa and Yi/Lolo hill-tribes. The proposals mean to boost tourism, encourage economic imperialism, and facilitate repressive political control. “The formation of the Golden Rectangle is inevitable because of the geo-economic advance of China toward the south,” Thai political scientist Sukhumbhand Paribatra told the Bangkok Post. “One has to be very careful, because this advance will be linked to the region’s powerful local Chinese communities.” Kunming officials have expressed hope that Bangladesh and China will work together: “Yunnan is China’s southwest province... and we want to develop a framework to enhance economic cooperation between China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and India,” Shi Minghui, deputy director general of the Foreign Affairs Office of Yunnan, was quoted as saying. China’s relations with Bangladesh bear major politico-economic implications; China has begun using the Bay of Bengal for military purposes, and wants to access it overland to increase commerce from land-locked Yunnan. Meanwhile, overcrowded Bangladesh poses a refugee problem - regular flooding dislocates its citizens, but more refugees come in - particularly Rohingya, Islamic people from Myanmar’s Arakan State - than leave. That that could change surely concerns Indian authorities.
Myanmar’s SPDC (a newer acronym for what once was SLORC) has initiated more “War on Drugs,” banning opium. Over a quarter of Kokang’s population left; rigid enforcement keeps half the remaining poor, with food security only six months a year. Some must work fields nearly naked, and try eating tree bark, as in North Korea. Throughout Shan State, 350,000 households, about two million people, are losing their primary source of earnings, indeed, 70 percent of cash income, because opium is now prohibited. People are withdrawing children from school and passing up health services, selling off livestock, land and daughters. “The reversed sequencing of first forcing farmers out of poppy cultivation before ensuring other income opportunities is a grave mistake,” warned Martin Jelsma of the Trans¬national Institute (TNI, an international network of activist-scholars based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands). “Aggressive drug control efforts against farmers and small-scale opium traders, and forced eradication opera¬tions in particular, will have a negative impact on prospects for peace and democracy in both countries.” Alternative livelihood programs should have been in place before eradication, as reductions in income will result in malnutrition and poor health. But about a hundred drug refineries remain, and a fully successful ban seems unlikely. Raids on refineries carried out in a “War on Drugs” target only smaller players. Control of all aspects of the huge business is now in the hands of a few major players, most prominent among them, the USWA.
Most refineries have been relocated to ‘safer’ UWSA areas. One being run by a local Lahu militia in western Mongton was raided on March 30, 2003 - a clear example of a small player being ousted out. The refinery set up by Kya Nu, leader of a militia group numbering only about 30-40 men was in Mongjawd. After the raid, Kya Nu was arrested and jailed; his militia was disbanded and the raid publicized by the SPDC as an example of UWSA cooperation in drug eradication efforts. The reality is that the UWSA has simply monopolized the drug trade in Mongjawd – it’s since set up new refineries in the same area. The SPDC junta and its military remain involved in all aspects of the drug trade, and condones such involvement as a means of subsidizing army costs at field level.
Roads now link Mae Sai with Jinghong, Yunnan, and thus Kunming, through Sipsongpanna (the “twelve kingdoms” or 12,000 rice fields legendary birthplace of the T’ai race). Soon there should be easy passage through Laos, and someday maybe even northern Burma; so far most roads in Northern Burma and Laos are barely passable for 4-wheel drive vehicles, but serious commercialization of the region appears imminent.

Burma’s northernmost state, Kachin, bordering Tibet in the foothills of the Himalayas, is one of the world’s most mineral-rich areas, with gold and high-quality jade. Opium production was substandard, and is no longer attempted. Kachin State remains poor and sparsely populated, with some rugged sub-Himalayan areas labeled ‘uninhabited.’ Still, teak and other hardwoods flow from those mountainous areas through Thailand to Japan, alarming rainforest preservationists. Thai prime-minister Taksin Shinawatra (pronounced Sin-awat or Chin-awat) spoke of developing ski resorts there, with flights from Chiang Mai.

Along the north-south Thai-Burma border, some Karen and Mon remain insurgent, with just a bit of international media attention and a little outside aid, but the possibility of their cultural survival seems as much in question as that of the Shan and small hill-tribes. An extremely controversial natural-gas pipeline (Yadana, Kanchanaburi, Unocal) was put in to supply a questionable Thai electricity-generating factory, disrupting much; Baptist and other fundamental Christian Church organizations, non-governmental relief organizations and global mega-corp business interests (Big Pharma, carbonated beverages, electronics) also have on-going, questionable, impact. Perhaps in all as disruptively exploitative are the many international tourists who go to “undeveloped” hill-tribe villages to photograph “long-necked women” (from the small Padaung tribe, perhaps one born under a full moon, whatever, one with many brass rings covering the neck and depressing the collar-bone). Such tourism seldom benefits the ethnic people, especially financially. What little they might gain they are certain to soon lose. Exploitation and manipulation by the rich and influential in the area involves little governmental interference. Now many long-neck villages (human zoos) are reachable by car, and advertised.
For over 20 years refineries in Shan State produced half the world’s supply of heroin, the area’s primary hard currency earner. It traveled through China and/or Thailand, as documented by Alfred McCoy in “The Politics of Heroin” (1972, Harper & Row), often in the care of ChiuChau (TehChiu) dialect speakers whose ancestors came from Swatow, the port of Kwantung in SE China. The TehChiu, a dominant part of Thai politics, are scattered around the world and suspected of extensive ‘Triad’ (secret society) involvement. Ethnic Yunnanese Muslim Panthays, called by the Thai “Haw”, are also blamed (but poorly identified, except as expatriate Yunnanese), and one runs across mention of new “triads” like 14K, competing strongly with the legendary Chinese secret societies.
However supplied, illegal heroin remains available virtually worldwide, flowing not only from the Golden Triangle, but equally from Afghanistan (and especially the Pakistani border area). It also comes from Laos, Lebanon, Columbia, Mexico, Sudan, and recently, southern ex-Soviet states (“-istans”). It’s questionable why American law enforcement thought capture of KhunSa might have any impact on narcotic availability or price, and why crop substitution or eradication is even necessary, as there is important medical utility, and legal narcotic production in India, Iran, Turkey, and Tasmania, Australia. Poppy seeds are used as food, on buns and bagels. In Burma they’re widely used for one of the country’s delicacies, Bein Mon (pancake made of rice flour, palm sugar, coconut chips and peanuts, garnished with poppy seeds), and are traded openly. With use of a bit of intelligent imagination, alternative income sources could be found: ganja/cannabis seeds also have great value, and are easily transported, but are irrationally suppressed. Drugs burned in public displays are suspected of adulteration by addition of food poppy, gum, sap and pods emptied of seeds; no-one can investigate thoroughly. Lashio officials were quoted as saying that as soon as foreign guests and reporters left, national security officials doused the fire and retrieved residue for the next round of bonfires - it’s all a farce, all about control.
In the 1970s, Burma produced 250 to 400 tons of opium per year. 350 tons in 1985 rose to 1,280 tons in 1988; in ‘89, it was 2,000 tons, maybe more. For the ‘90s, US State Department figures show between 2,000 and 2,500 tons a year, and for year 2000 were about 1,200. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) put Burma’s 2003-2004 output at 370 tons, down from 2002’s 800 plus, due to bad weather. In peak year 1993, Laos produced 210 tons of opium. In response to Rangoon officials’ claim that opium output had dropped in 2001 to 865 tons from 1,065 tons in 2000, noted Shan scholar Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe commented that official figures were “arbitrary.” Opium production in Burma may not have been as much as many ‘experts’ have stated – quotes may often have been double or more of actual production. In the ’70s, production may have averaged as little as 200 metric tons per year, and only 250 in the ’80s; it is hard to be authoritatively accurate about that. But by 1997, production began to decrease. By 2007, Laos produced only 10 metric tons, and production in Myanmar was down to about 20% of peak. Meanwhile, Afghani production, already high (well over 2000 metric tons) trebled, and extensive production began in Latin America. And, as production decreased in Shan State, it increased (although hardly correspondingly) in Kachin State – as also has use. And where opium farming ceased, the poverty of hundreds of thousands of ex-opium farming families increased.
Population, and especially AIDS, statistics vary a lot, and government, like bureaucracy, is more self-protecting than altruistic. S.H.A.N. reports Dai officials in Yunnan’s Dehong Autonomous Prefecture, opposite northern Shan State, questioning the annual output figures given by the UN and US, which have been shrinking each year. “What we are seeing here in Mongmao (Ruili) is a rise not only in trafficking but also addictions,” it quotes a drug enforcement source who posits more than 3,000 users in Ruili’s Zegang neighborhood alone, at least 10% of them female. “If there is really a drop in the production then the logical question is from where are we getting all the dope?” Chinese authorities are also displeased by Myanmar’s failure to hand over 24 of 34 drug fugitives who took refuge there.
Specialists from the USA have provided satellite and other intelligence about opium convoys, yet narcotics seizures have never reached 1%. During the period of most intensive US aid, ’85-‘88 - opium fields were sprayed with 2.4-D herbicide, from planes given by the USA - but estimated opium yield doubled. US aid was typically ineffective in achieving what it was purportedly intended to do. KhunSa’s surrender didn’t lower heroin production, but the SPDC claimed it incinerated 625 kilos of opium, 759 kilos of heroin and 3 million methamphetamine pills, 2000 kilos (over 2 tons) of drugs, on June 26, 2005: Yangon’s 19th propagandistic destruction of narcotics (in one they bulldozed bottles of ‘Krakindaeng’ Thai energy drink).
“The junta’s token attempts at crop substitution, often with international assistance, have also failed miserably, due to poor planning, coercive implementation and complete disregard for the welfare of local populations. Under the so-called “New Destiny” project launched in April 2002, farmers in many townships have been forced to plant a new strain of rice from China, which has failed in each locality,” according to S.H.A.N. Opium takes only three months and is a cash crop. Nothing else yet compares, as “ya-ba” doesn’t require farmers. Constant terror, atrocities and warfare make opium cultivation still the only choice for many.

Early last century, Shan were selling opium to the Yunnanese, who transported it down the Yangtze and sold it to the French. The Shan were then divided into 34 small principalities, but had no concept of rigid border demarcation. Warlords demanded to receive ‘taxation’ on all that passed by (as KhunSa said is all he did), and thus discouraged much farming of food for market. Trade was ruined to the point where salt became expensive and goiter a widespread problem. Without the drug business, the consumer economy of Burma might grind to a halt, as much of the little for sale is funded through it. Shan people wish to enter the modern world with the respect and the dignity merited by capable and industrious people, which they are, but commerce in narcotics hasn’t helped much, except insofar as it kept at bay, for awhile, Burmese military madness. The Myanmar government has, unintentionally or not, limited big business concerns that eventually may present an even more disruptive danger to Burma’s various peoples and cultures. Modern infrastructure can be doubly dangerous in this area, tending as it does to bring governmental repression and corporate exploitation. A direct relationship clearly exists between poverty and the narcotics problem, but KhunSa’s aide Khernsai Jaiyen expressed no interest in the parallels with problems in South America, or in contacts there, when I asked. Shan State may never be able to have more impact on the world beyond it than it had through narcotics, and it’s unclear how much outside people should feel obliged to become involved in internal Shan State affairs. But with drug addiction a problem of increasing magnitude, especially due to AIDS, it can easily seem to be a problem of either influencing the situation, or being influenced by it.

The emerging situation
The once-famous drug-lords dead and gone, most refineries in the eastern Shan area are now controlled by Wei HseuhKang (or Xuekang), an ethnic Chinese from Yunnan wanted by both Thai and US law enforcement. In 2003 he moved from Monghsat to a northern area of Tangyan, given to him in 2001 by then SPDC Secretary-1 KhinNyunt (a supposed master-spy elevated to Prime Minister then put under house arrest, who proposed turning HoMong into a tourist attraction - an idea sure to be revived). Wei’s refineries in MongTon and Monghsat are run by other Yunnan Chinese, Chao Ching and Li Hsen. With Pao Yuqiang, these people briefly had a thriving metropolis at Möng La, opposite Daluo in Yunnan.
Wei’s brothers Wei HsuehLong and Wei HsuehYing (also Yunnanese) fled to the Wa States when Communists took over China, and were connected to the KMT-CIA spy network along the Burma-China border until the 1970s. Wei HsuehKang served as KhunSa’s treasurer at Ban HinTaek (now Thoed Thai) just south of the Thai-Burmese border in ChiangRai. After 1989, the Wei brothers linked up with Wa president Bao Youxiang’s United Wa State Army (UWSA), but remained little known until a New York court indicted them, and other senior Wa leaders, on charges of smuggling heroin and amphetamine to the US. Xiao Minliang, Vice Chairman to Bao Youxiang, Ai Lone, Chief of Staff of the United Wa State Army, Zhao Wenxing, deputy Chief of Staff, Li Chengwu, a Kokang-Chinese hard-liner against Yangon serving as Bao’s military adviser, Vice-chairman Bo Lakham, who knows little Burmese but headed the Wa delegation to two sessions of the National Convention, are reported by S.H.A.N. as top cadre. These people are worrisome to both Yangon and Beijing, as they speak of themselves as a government. Wa’s don’t want to be Chinese anymore than they want to be Burmese, or under either’s authority. Important Chinese business communities in Mandalay and Yangon are growing rapidly; both Than Shwe and USWA are dependent on Chinese arms, and neither can stay isolated and intransigent much longer. At any rate, by 1993, the UWSA had moved heavily into the less complex methamphetamines production, less complex and more profitable.
In rural Shan State, people use “ya-ba” openly, to stay up to help at a ceremony or temple festival, or for extra “energy” in the fields; there’s little social stigma for those who use it, much as, traditionally, with opium. In the past few years, it’s become common for polite hosts in Shan State to offer meth to visitors, with the traditional tea. This isn’t weird: varieties of drugs are accepted everywhere, and natural kinds are used pleasantly and successfully, within appropriate social context. Amphetamines are dangerous, but are known to have been used in moderation (doctors in the USA prescribed them freely when I was young, and many people took no more than their doctor recommended).
Nasu Lahu-na (my wife) remembers when most people along the border were engaged in the drug trade: there were many rivalries, there was much pride, gossip and back-stabbing. She says people would burn with urges for revenge, and report rivals to police… Once somebody caught their favorite enemy out alone on a jungle path, cut his head off and hung it up. Nasu’s father forbade her to go out there, but she couldn’t resist, and snuck a look. There was easy money to be made, but it wasn’t, isn’t, a good trade. The Thai Ministry of Health estimated 2,650,000 meth addicts in 2001 (4.3% of population total and 91% of the total addict population); mornings going to work I’d see herds of thin post-adolescents with brightly colored hair loitering in filling-station lots, after discos closed at 7 a.m. Even today, entertainment places for Thai youth close well after tourist-oriented ones, no explanation offered.
Around Kengtung, farm hands sometimes now get paid in meth pills instead of money. In 1994, a group of Thai dealers approached Khun Sa, but he spoke against meth: ‘Heroin is okay’, he reasoned, ‘our main customers are across the ocean. But, with ya-ba, we only have Thais for customers. If we start producing it, we’ll come face to face with Thailand. That’ll make our position more difficult.’ His uncle Khun Hseng (Chang Ping-yuan) was won over, though, and soon yaba produced in HoMong was of top quality. Drug producers in Shan State tried expanding into Extasy, but their chemists haven’t made a popular product (maybe good chemists don’t want to live in back woods). Wa and Kokang leaders could abandon heroin by establishing meth labs, and then not need to worry about weather. Labs can be moved, and food farming gives a stabler economic base. Opium is making a temporary disappearing act (locally), but other drugs substitute (‘date rape’ drugs have certainly made a name for themselves). The ya-ba market was lucrative until Taksin’s Drug Wars, but customers remain in the Bangkok area, and India, Malaysia, Singapore, China and Korea.
Amphetamines go to many of Myanmar’s armaments suppliers and other enablers. The Thai “War on Drugs” which started in 2003 with the murder - in just a couple of months - of thousands of possible small-timers (with minimal subsequent investigation, at best), made Shan State traffickers avoid the northern Thai border, and sell only to long-term, well-trusted Thai contacts. Thai newspapers still regularly report busts, but trafficking drugs into China has become preferable to down through Lashio and Mandalay to Moulmein, Kanchanaburi and Bangkok (though that still happens too). Beijing replaced paramilitary police with five regular army regiments, to patrol the northern Shan-China border; corruption among border officials was contributing to the problem, especially at Zegao and Ruili, opposite Muse (on the ‘Burma Road’). Many fewer Chinese officials currently enjoy the high-life in the gambling town of MongLa (on the border), than did just a few years ago. Taksin’s ‘War on Drugs’ forced drug operators to reroute their products, but a Chinese attitude that it’s better to die than be poor, means many replacement traffickers will be available. The 25 March, 2005 Bangkok Post reported 1.14 million addicts in China, equally divided between heroin and methamphetamine (quoting Yang Fengrui, spokesman for the Ministry of Public Security, as saying, “the situation has begun to deteriorate.”). The Wa have become a Chinese ally, and much of Shan State is becoming Wa State.
One report claims that as many as 300,000 Wa were relocated, to areas just north of the Thai/Myanmar border, to cut off support for the SSA-South. Many who’d recently come from Yunnan were replaced by Han Chinese. Certainly, many Shans and Lahu were evicted to make space for arriving Wa, and as a result suffer increased poverty. The Wa region along the Chinese border has passed several deadlines to become drug-free; but what are viable alternatives to drug production? What can be done towards sustainable community-based development and strengthening civil society to enable farmers to participate in decision-making processes about their future?
An Akha displaced from just south of Mong Hsat by Wa newcomers asserted that Chinese were easily distinguishable from Wa: “There were some Chinese with them (the Wa settlers). They set up shops and sold various food items. They also made whiskey to sell from corn. I also saw some Chinese soldiers and officers with the Wa Army. They wore Wa uniforms, but they were whiter-skinned than the Wa, so it was easy to tell them apart. They spoke no language other than Chinese.” A report from the Mong Karn, east of Mong Hsat, mentions that among 300 new Wa households moving into Mong Karn village, were 30 Chinese households. New Chinese are particularly concentrated at Ban Hoong, south of Mong Hsat. There, about 1000 Chinese are helping conduct Wei Hsiao Kang’s military and economic affairs.
The Wa area on the Chinese border is now pressured to become drug-free, but how are poor ex-cultivators to replace their lost income? What crop substitution projects and possibilities are there? Will there be reliable markets for the substitute crops? What can be done towards sustainable community-based development and strengthening civil society to enable farmers to participate in decision-making processes about their future?
Rubber, tea and oranges are now grown extensively in the area, and gem and zinc mining are expanding, as is cigarette production. Expanded road infrastructure and consequent growth in trucking has led to Chinese marrying love-for-hire, and more cultivation of corn, sesame, soybeans, peanuts, fruit and cabbages. Success in alternatives depends largely on China. Thailand doesn’t impose tariffs on import of fruits grown under the UWSA control, to help the Wa renounce so much that is counter-productive in their way of life, but farmers remain with little voice in decision-making processes affecting their livelihoods. Both opium prices and wages rose at least 50% between 2003 and 2005; seasoned observers expect little else to change, but even right on the border, in April 2006, both opium and amphetamines are hard to find.
The Shan Human Rights Foundation estimated Shan refugees denied refugee status, but arrived in Thailand from 1996 to 2002, at over 230,000. Sunai Phasuk, a Thai academic and consultant for Human Rights Watch (HRW) said, “These people are not just fleeing war, but also forced labor, executions, mass relocations and systematic rape;” and Thailand is “violating international law” for denying basic humanitarian assistance to the Shan. An HRW report documents the murder, rape, enslavement and brutal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians during the Tatmadaw’s long-running assault on Karen insurgents: 650,000 made homeless in eastern Burma alone. It’s pointless to discuss who suffers more, Karen or Shan; Mon I met in Rangoon, and Burmese in Pagan, also told stories of murder and mayhem by “governmental authorities.”

The UN World Food Program has supplied rice and cereal grains to Wa and Kokang ex-poppy farmers, particularly in Kokang, Panghsang and Lashio and to some of the other many needy in the potentially wealthy country. A million ‘Internally Displaced Persons’, 42% in eastern areas, are on the run from “scorched earth” policies that Human Rights Watch calls ethnic cleansing… 140,000+ are in refugee camps along the western Thai border, many for over 20 years now. Political reform and better economic management are more needed than charity; Burma lacks intelligent logistics, not rice.
Yangon isn’t the capital anymore, and neither is there really a junta now. Than Shwe has become “father of the country”, and wants control of the Chinese border, for which purpose divisions among the frequently-feuding Wa would come in handy. China’s stake in the relocation program is unclear, but it has provided much towards the huge costs of Wa relocations to the southern border of Shan State. Chinese authorities may want tribal people who show no propensity towards assimilation as Chinese to relocate from Yunnan to a place where they may serve some political purpose. Wa leaders want to use their areas in the north for resettling Wa villagers from China… but the world, it seems, is more interested in profits and oil.
Meanwhile, displaced populations bring to the generally porous border a huge increase in dangerous disease: pneumonia, dysentery, hepatitis, malaria, dengue, smallpox, TB, typhoid, typhus, cholera, yaws, polio, yellow fever, blackwater fever, influenza, scabies, meningitis, leprosy and even humans infected with anthrax! One with anthrax was a Chinese “Wa” leader - hospitalized in Tachilek. Despite Thai law, tea pickers and other laborers daily cross the border, and traders and even big businessmen do regular, though often officially unsanctioned, cross-border commerce. The environment is being ruined, individuals lose integrity through involvement in drugs, others lose all sense of propriety through systematic rape (certainly not helpful for containing HIV), cultures crumble - all for the sake of egotism among the small-minded wealthy and powerful. Ideals may seem anachronistic, and political involvement suspect; one becomes tempted to turn ones back to quietly just tend ones own garden, but meanwhile immune deficiency offers germs and viruses chance to rapidly develop new forms... The most popular of Taksin’s populist policies, his 30 baht health scheme, has resulted in long hospital queues for pain-killers and antibiotics. The rampant, almost indiscriminant usage of antibiotics exacerbates the potential plague menace, and not just because doctors haven’t time to seriously investigate complaints or suggest behavior modifications: germs not only gain immunity to poisons, but both pain-killers and antibiotics weaken immune systems.
If not Lo, or Khun Sa, or Wei, then surely someone else; so why does the DEA offer a tip-off reward, especially knowing it not enough to compensate for the danger elicited by providing it? Fear may or may not keep the starving from crime, but a whole society cannot be intimidated. Someone will come forward to assert self-respect, and regardless of how it provokes those seen as oppressors. People will always seek some chemical comfort from intoxicants, be it nicotine, alcohol, caffeine or something illegal. Should public welfare gain precedence over profits for dictators and global mega-corporations, the Shan, Wa and others could grow useful and beneficial hemp of non-intoxicating varieties; this might well help things in general. Instead of us allowing China to dominate world trade, a resurgence of valuable products could be quickly fostered. Surely China would get in on the act too, but innovations could more easily occur elsewhere first. The benefits from lowering dependence on drugs alone should be enough for governments to get behind this idea, if public welfare is indeed of concern to them, and not just power of a most temporary kind.
Burma has never known good governance, and drug trade and genocide in Shan State won’t stop without it. The government of China doesn’t care about genocide or cultural extinction(s); it’s become focused (like the West) on exploitation and profit. Many Chinese, though, recognize massive errors in their governance. Of Southeast Asian countries, the best-governed is semi-feudal Malaysia, where ethnic Malays get two votes while ethnic Chinese citizens only one. Modern, autocratic Singapore doesn’t mind if neighbors to the north receive drug flow; newly autocratic USA has lost moral legitimacy through inequitable “free trade” pacts, gross over-consumption, pollution, refusal to deal with global warming, and, of course, gross failure in regard to ‘terrorism’ and Iraq (illegal, inept invasion after mass-murder of innocents first through supplying Saddam Hussein then through ill-conceived sanctions). Mainland countries east of India and south of China can hardly pretend to honest, transparent governance, and are coming increasingly under the sway of Chinese… North America will fall further and faster if it doesn’t clean up its act by taking real interest in justice, human rights, environmental preservation, good governance and corporate restraint, instead of media manipulation, crowd-control weaponry, and ‘regime change’ - which should be the business only of the UN and local populations. Is there even an ‘international community’ to respond to genocide anymore? Why are there so few people like Guy Horton, documenting problems and making varieties of important information (such as the boom in “crowd control” weaponry) readily accessible, in organized fashion, through the news media or on the Net?
Nowadays druggies and some of the young set like to go to Laos to stay with poor people and try drugs, but anyone with even a shred of pretension to integrity will notice the negative effect doing that has on local communities visited. Unconstructive over-indulgence gets a stamp of approval from people of enviable position; greed and avarice are rewarded while dignity mislaid. Dope, while natural remains fairly innocent, but commercialized becomes a tool of exploitative greed, used against the already oppressed. Mess with it, and sooner or later, and more likely sooner, you will be, and feel, betrayed. One doesn’t really get to choose to join a mafia, or other secret organization; one must already be in place, before one even knows it… It’s not only other people who often aren’t what they seem, but sometimes also even you own self can suddenly seem quite different, changed or revealed… Remember, you can’t buy respect, or trust, or love.

In 1994 a U.S. grand jury indicted a member of Thailand's parliament as a major marijuana supplier, alleging he smuggled 40 to 49 tons of potent marijuana (“Thai stick”) to the U.S. West Coast, using container ships to carry it from Thailand. The indictment charged parliament member, Thanong Siripreechapong (alias Por Ped – Little Duck - Yodmuangcharoen, a.k.a. “Thai Tony” to some US government agents, particularly in Customs and the DEA), with heading a sophisticated 14-year-long pot-smuggling operation (1973 to 1987); some say the DEA was more concerned with his involvement in heroin. Thanong was accused in a sealed federal indictment handed down in 1991; the U.S. government seized Thanong’s Beverly Hills home and a Mercedes-Benz on the grounds that they were purchased with the illegal profits of his narcotics business. Thanong, once Chart Thai MP from Nakhon Phanom, pled not guilty; Judge Vaughn Walker sentenced him to time served (nearly four years of pre-trial detention) then sent him home to Thailand the same day. Apparently the accusations involved fabrication by the informer, false statements by the case agent, and the commission of crimes by both, during the course of the investigation and prosecution. It appears that significant information provided to the grand jury was false, and most likely deliberately fabricated, but this controversy blocked deputy Chart Thai party leader Watana Asavahame from being appointed Interior minister, the Cabinet post in charge of the police.
In his book, “Blow Back” (Sidgewick & Jackson, then Pan Books, ©2009), Michael Forwell claims that Sunthorn Kraithamjitkul was the first Thai Tony, and died about 1982, after which he was replaced by Thanong Siripreechapong, who took over his business using Sunthorn's nickname (reminiscent of what’s claimed about Kim Il Sung of North Korea: according to Encyclopedia Britannica originally Kim Song Ju! He became his country’s supreme leader after appropriating the name of a legendary war hero who’d fought the Japanese). Forwell claims that Thai Tony (Thanong) “knew everything” and everyone, and that there “was barely a dope deal that went down in Thailand at the time that he didn’t have a hand in somewhere along the line.”
In “Reefer Men” (2007), Tony Thompson tells a bit more about “Tony the Thai”: that the first one owned a Bangkok car dealership, and died in LA in the spring of 1982, indicted for lying to US customs. He’d been carrying $831,000 in cash, and the business cards of some indicted US pot smugglers (Ciro Mancuso and Brian Degen of the “Colorado Company”, a main customer). By that time, American Brian Daniels was a bigger wholesaler of Thai Stick than Thai Tony, and with not only higher quality product, but better packaging. Daniels, in 1988, was buying in Laos, shipping form near DaNang, Vietnam, and working with New York mafia. IN July of that year, he went bust with the capture of the cargo ship Encounter Bay; 72 tons were seized – enough for at least 125 million joints, which would retail for well over $250 million.
The second “Thai Tony”, Thanong Siripreechapong, by age 13 already an accomplished smuggler (of electronics, watches, booze), gained control of many marijuana fields in Nakhon Phanom province in the far northeast, and in 1980 ran for parliament. He lost, but soon after won, and by 1984 had become a major wholesaler, working not only with Lao and Vietnamese military officers, but marijuana that had been seized from other smugglers. In late 1988 Thanong brought 40 tons into California, then started using 40 foot shipping containers and working with the Genovese mafia family. But his bad temper led to him shooting a pistol at clients in his home to discuss dissatisfaction with poor quality. In 1989 one of his commercial containers brought in 9 tons, but when indicted, he was confused with the earlier Thai Tony. The first Thai extradited by his government to the US, he was released after being held over three and a half years (waiting for trial), because the agent who busted him had compromised himself by accepting a bribe.
Be all that as it may, Thai stick, which had become popular in Europe and Australia and the US East Coast as well as in California and elsewhere (to my knowledge with a larger market share in the ‘70s than in the ‘80s), disappeared. A rumor spread that (the original?) Thai Tony had been a gofer for a US Army supply sergeant when a young lad, and that the pot came from Isaan, but aside from the claims in “Reefer Men”, I’ve no way to validate or repudiate any of that. Nor do I know how popular, or widespread, marijuana use has ever been in Thailand - seems to me it’s use has been mostly with the backer set, in Pai, MaeHongSon, and at islands where full-moon raves are held. It doesn’t seem popular with locals, although I understand that the seed was a traditional ingredient in a popular kind of kwiteao noodle soup. At the ChiangMai Night Bazaar, hemp products have long been available, but mostly they’re from China, I’m pretty sure.
Soon after Thanong’s release, ChiangRai seemed to be awash in cash and partying for a week. Suddenly Big C supermarket was selling something called “Little Duck Munchies”, which soon completely disappeared. Poh Pet certainly could have gotten elected back to parliament from ChiangRai, but pleaded poor health. Also, on December 15, 2003, just after a meeting with close aides of Chonburi’s infamous Somchai Khunpluem (Kamnan Poh), Thanong was allegedly being beaten up, and then fetched a pistol from his car and shot one of his attackers, aide to Kamnan Poh, Wallop Supapornpasuphat, four times.
Another member of parliament, M.P. Mongkol Suthanamanee from Chiang Rai, was refused a U.S. visa because he is believed to be part of the drug network headed by fellow northern M.P. Narong Wongwan. Narong, named Prime Minister designate of Thailand in March, 1992, lost the nomination when it was publicly revealed that the U.S. refused him a visa because of his involvement in the drug trading. This also happened to Vatana Asavahame, deputy leader of Chart Thai Party. But, as with Narong, Thanong and Mongkok before him, the Thai authorities have found no reason to even investigate Vatana further. Vatana, Puea Pandin party chairman in 2008, is believed to be in hiding in Cambodia.
By the end of the 1980s, Southeast Asian reefer was no longer a significant factor in the international drug scene. Narcotics re-assumed the foremost position in the trade for several years, then were replaced by amphetamines. Whatever the relation of drugs to indigenous culture, the money they brought in was, and remains, essential to maintenance of any sense of autonomy, hope for self-respect and local self-determination, and feeling that ambition can have any meaning. As Myanmar opens up to international business consortiums, the feeling of ability to maintain any sense of freedom at all could well become even more threatened, and suppressed.

The rivalry between elements of the Thai police and military involved in the drug trade, at least in the 50s, and involvement by Laotian government officials into the 1970s have been dealt with elsewhere (particularly in Alfred McCoy’s excellent and admirable work, “The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia”). Involvement by officials in Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Cambodia, Columbia, Panama, Mexico and elsewhere have also been convincingly documented - leaving quite open an interesting question of the extent of nefarious influences resultant from the suppression of natural substances long an important part of all cultures everywhere. That depression is disease (as in dis-ease) is unquestionable; that headaches from difficult situations are but chemical imbalances to be addressed only by the medical profession with the help of BigPharma mega-corps definitely questionable. Hemp, narcotics and stimulants have their value, and although some control of them is necessary, it’s been taken too far, and perhaps for less than questionable reasons. True concern for justice and public welfare must oppose the current legal format for addressing the issue of drugs.

Into the 70's, in rural Thailand, many households had a small ganja field; bai kratom (Mitragyna speciosa, probably an alkaloid), pretty poppies and opium were common, and older people still used betel… Then big money took over the world, promoting ‘heroin chic’, expensive alcohol, corporate control… When Taksin started his first drug war, a billion methamphetamine pills were sold annually in Thailand; over 3 million people took them (perhaps only 300,000 were drug dependent). But the drugs war is also a race war. Border minorities were targeted for brutal police action; there was torture, and the number of dead vastly exceeded the body counts quoted. Thailand's poorest suffered, also people threatening to the powerful: over 400,000 people 'surrendered' themselves for treatment, some of whom surely had little or no involvement, but ended up on corporate-management style target lists police still can’t ignore. With marketing and market expansion dominant forces of control, stimulants have utility, and can still be purchased - expensively - in the country’s urban center; meanwhile arts and entertainment are losing out to golf and fine dining. Self-congratulation’s far more satisfying than facing truth, values that generated society, as well as society’s future, become seen as irrelevant.
A task force of salaried scientists and engineers, in politicos dreams, will surely overcome all problems! Some believe development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be necessary for a world at peace. I don’t.

Above the ThoedThai market, towards Burma, is the “Khun Sa Old Camp” (Ban Pak Khun Sa), with a life-size statue of him on horseback. Going up a narrow pot-holed road from the market, one passes an old-style Shan “San Jao” pavilion with three tiers topped by a small royal umbrella, placed in the middle of a small lake (with dam to the lower side). A small two-tier alter with a Buddha image visible inside is next to it. Neither structure is fancy, but the panoramic picture does have a certain grace. Just a bit further up is the old encampment, and Khun Tip, who lives there (tel. 085-7077921), a charming, tiny young woman happy to show visitors around (no suggested guide price, up to you if you wish to tip Tip – but definitely the polite thing to do!).
The “museum” has been there 20 years or so, and mostly involves the original buildings, with lots of snapshots of KhunSa and his army, and some mural paintings. These include interesting depictions relevant to Shan culture and its royalty (one photo I liked was of a kinaree dancer with two people in a “Toh” deer costume, with mask). There’s a “Horng Rap Kaek” parlor with a Madame Toussard-like model of KhunSa sitting at table, arranged like 30 years ago. Close by are three bedrooms and a prayer room with benches and a minimalist altar. All walls are unfinished cement.
It isn’t a large encampment, although it was the base for about 1000 soldiers (aged from about 9 to 60). There’s a helicopter pad below, but KhunSa never had his own. As we wandered around, Tip showed me a “refinery” where poppy-flower tar was boiled (intoxicating those who stirred the brew), a “haw pak” dorm area with graffiti, and a huge piece of a Thai artillery shell dated 21 Feb 1982 (in Thai; and I’ll note here that Khun Tip doesn’t speak English). Up above on a hilltop is something which looks like a Jack & Jill well, but is actually the entrance to a “jail” used mostly for attempted deserters. The hole leads to a dark room of about 10 foot per side.
Khun Tip told me there had been about 14 different opium warlords in the area, between 1965 and 1990. Interesting, as Tachilek reportedly had 14 heroin refineries.

The 3rd and 5th Kuomintang (KMT) armies, eventually renamed "Chinese Irregular Forces" (CIF) and permitted to remain on Thai territory, working with the CIA, were the parties most responsible for turning the “Golden Triangle” into a notorious drug-producing area. After the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, many KMT forces refused to surrender, and fled. From the 93rd Division of the KMT 26th Army, many eventually settled at Möng Hsat, north of Fang and TaTon, in ChiangMai Province, and Santikiri (now Doi MaeSalong), in ChiangRai. Another group which fled was General Mi Li’s 8th Army. Altogether, there were about 12,000 soldiers who found sanctuary originally in Burma. Their leaders traded opium for arms from the CIA, and by 1953 they had several Shan State bases: in East Thanlwin, Mong Tong, Muse and Kyukok. On the first day of 1961, 5000 Burmese troops, with 20,000 from China, attacked the KMT headquarters at Mong Pa Liao, near Keng Tung, and chased about 10,000 KMT into Laos, where they settled in Nam Tha. Others fled into Thailand. Soon after, almost half of the defeated soldiers who went to Laos were flown to Taiwan. Most of the remainder were then cut off from support from there; some deserted. Soon three rival groups coalesced: the 5th Regiment (93 Division, 26th Army, under General Duan Xiwen, or Tuan Shi-sien), with 1800 men at Santikiri (Doi Mae Salong); the 3rd Regiment (also 93 Division, 26th Army, under General Ly, Li or Lee Wenhuan, or Wen-huan), with 1400 men at Tham Ngob and Pieng Luang, near ChiangMai’s border with Shan State; and General Ma Ching Kuo’s 1st Independent Unit with about 400 “intelligence operatives” (soldiers who still received some support from Taiwan). Soon skilled chemists were brought from Hong Kong and Taiwan; the “Golden Triangle” was soon the largest opium-producing area in the world. The first heroin refinery was established in the mid-1960s, near Ban HouayXai, Laos, across the Mekong River from Chiang Khong, ChiangRai; as well-documented by Alfred McCoy, Laotian Army General Ouane Tattikone was also heavily involved in the trade, as was General Vang Pao’s Hmong army. Subsistence Lahu, Wa, Lisu, Hmong, Palaung and Akha farmers grew the poppies, but earned just a pittance for months of laborious work; some ethnic Chinese peasants from Kokang and other areas in the hills east of Kutkai and Hsenwi in northeastern Shan State also grew them, and other Chinese worked in transport. For most of these people, both personal and cultural survival was at stake; for the Akha and Hmong, cultural survival remains a pressing issue. In the late 1980s, Burma's opium cultivation more than doubled; then it decreased more than 80% from 1998 to 2006.
Supposedly non-involved in narcotics business were the Burmese Communist Party, most of whom later became the United Wa State Army (of about 25000 troops), and also the Shan State Army–South (with about 10,000). How their troops have been supported is open to question, but that the Wa have had extensive involvement with amphetamine production is not.
Other candidates for patrons of the heroin refineries (from about 1980 to 1995) include:
1. Kokang district royalty, especially Olive and Jimmy Yang; this group seems to have led to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), with about 1,500 to 2,000 men under brothers Peng Jiasheng (or Chia-Sheng) and Peng Jiafu. It purportedly produced the best opium in Southeast Asia, and may still. Yang Mao-Liang and Liu Go-Shi are also cited as leaders.
2. Lo Hsing-han/Law Sit Han, his Lashio Ka Kwe Ye (or KKY) “defense” militia, with his international businessman son Htun Myint Naing or Steven Law (of Asia World Company; that opium business seems to have been later locally run by Liu Guoxi and Luo Xinghan).
3. The heirs to Gen, Sao Gnar Kham and U Ba Thein, who controlled Huay Krai, ChiangRai, in the early 80s.
4. some Karenni or Kayan (Kayah State was formerly Karenni State (home of the Red Karen)… Kayan are Padaung, who have a mostly disarmed cease-fire army, the Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA), and a subsequently formed Revolutionary Padaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).
5. small ethnic bands like the Lahu, Pa-O, Palaung, Intha and Bisu
6. KKY militia from Tang-yan, Hsenwi (Theinni), Hsipaw (Thibaw), Mong Mit (Momeik) and Yawnghwe (Nyaungshwe).
7. Chang Kai-cheng, or Thawee Sakulthanapanich, of Mae Sai, and a few Thai politicians and uniformed services officers
8. The14K Triad; and most likely also TeoChiew, Hakka and Jeen Haw (Panthay, Hui) Triad Secret Societies (notably, Yunnanese Ma Hseuh-fu, a hotelier and tea merchant in Bangkok in the 1960s, and whoever took over from him).
9. The Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA), a.k.a. Mongla army or The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, in the hills north of Kengtung, with ex-Communist Party of Burma Lin Mingxian (Lin Ming-Shing or Sai Lin, son-in-law of Kokang druglord Peng Jiasheng) and Zhang Zhiming (Kyi Myint), two former Red Guards from Yunnan, and their 3,500 to 4,000 men. Their town of Möng La, opposite Daluo in Yunnan, became one of the most important drug-running centers in the country, with thriving casinos and even expensive Eastern European prostitutes, until largely shut down due to Chinese government displeasure with some of its people losing so much money there. ESSA apparently works closely with Pao Yu-Chiang, Li Tzu-Ju and Wei Hsueh-Kang of the United Wa State Army.

Some of those can be documented, others are but semi-educated guesses. Burma’s had over 25 insurgent armies, with maybe that many at a single time: several Shan armies including the Shan United Army (SUA), the Shan State Army North (SSA-N), the Shan State Army South (SSA-S), the Mong Tai Army (MTA), the Shan State National Army (SSNA, which broke away from the MTA) and Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) led by Moh Heng joined Khun Sa's Shan (or Shanland) United Army (SUA) ) in April 1985, becoming the Mong Tai Army (MTA), headquartered at HoMong, just north of Maehongson. When Khun Sa surrendered on 7 January 1996, a faction of former SURA fighters led by Colonel Yawd Serk resurrected the SURA. This is now the Shan State Army - South (SSA-S), to distinguish it from the original SSA, a cease-fire group known as the Shan State Army - North (SSA-N).
The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) sponsors the National Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K); I’ve also found mention of U Mahtu Naw and the Kachin Defense Army (KDA); the Kachins are a coalition of people with at least six distinct and mutually incomprehensible languages.
Others at least sometimes involved in opium trade include:
PSLA – the Palaung State Liberation Army
KDA – the Kachin Defense Army (a.k.a. Kachin Independence Army, KIA)
USWA – the United Wa State Army
NDAA – the National Democratic Alliance Army
SNPLO – Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization
PNO – Pa-O National Organization
And the 3 revolutionary groups in Karenni State:
KNLP – the Kayan New Land Party
KNPLF – Karenni National People’s Liberation Front
KNPP – Karenni National Progressive Party

Due to its illegality and desperate competition for its great potential profits, how the heroin trafficking business has worked remains shrouded in much mystery. After most Turkish production ended, more and more was produced elsewhere. Was some that which was couriered by Nepalese royalty from the Golden Triangle? More likely, most was local, or from Pakistan and Afghanistan, but who knows? Lots of it has been carried by secret service operatives, by active members of uniformed services, and even by diplomatic pouch. Many say most left Bangkok by air. Opium isn’t grown in Cambodia, but Burmese-made heroin also leaves through Phnom Penh's airport, and the ports of Sihanoukville and Koh Khong. From Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar, lots got loaded onto yachts or other, larger vessels, then shifted from one vessel to another and perhaps even another, maybe even ship to cigarette boat. Some, surely, went overland through China, by river, to Hong Kong and Macao. Much went in small lots, hidden inside things or intestines; much more went in wholesale quantity, assisted by bribes - and here one must suspect Triad involvement. Many small-level couriers were Nigerian; they often carried it home, where it was passed on to other couriers. Some traveled from Laos to Russia, to be sold and used there, or passed on to Western Europe. It reached most well-populated places, even South America (which now produces some of its own). It is easy to expect that much more was well-protected by syndicates, than was ever transported by all small operators combined, but also to expect that that will never be demonstrated. Certainly the extent of risk for small operators must be considered to have been the greater!

Over 20 years ago I was befriended by an Englishman I quickly grew to know somewhat well. He was an HIV positive addict engaged in similar handicraft trade as I also was then deeply involved in. For his supply back home, he sent many first-class letters, with about a gram enclosed each, to a variety of addresses. At that time, I also had a friend in Ohio who was a regular user. She never traveled, nor did she know anyone in Asia. She died of an overdose in a fast-food franchise restroom. I never knew anything of her source. Due to the nature of the dependency usage tends to involve, though, and that heroin is perishable, with a limited shelf-life, one must recognize that most distribution has involved regular channels. Only very few can have relied on methods at all similar to those of my English friend, with whom, almost needless to say, contact failed to last.
Around the turn of the millennium, 4 or 5 Western tourists were found dead of heroin overdoses, in various ChiangRai guest-houses, on the same day. Not long after, urine testing became common in border villages, and only a few very old people, with money from descendents working in Taiwan, or perhaps stashed drug money or money from amphetamine sales in Bangkok, were still smoking opium. The smell of smoked amphetamine resembles that of burning plastic; young locals became more interested in other consumer fashions, and before long, the influx of drug-seeking backpackers fell off. Certainly, as amphetamines are made all over, the allure of easy money from transporting it cannot have rivaled that of narcotics!
Cultural survival for tribal groups in Burma and Laos remains problematic, with few signs of hope on the horizon. The importance of cultural diversity, like the importance of ecological diversity, seems lost on far too many, but remains nevertheless real. Much as those who fail to learn from history will repeat mistakes, those who refuse to learn from the experience of others will also.

The Heart of Chiang Rai

2011-01-04T17:53:00.000-08:00

Between Amphoe Wiang Chai and the Kok River is Amphoe Wiang Nua, where life is about as it ought to be. Rice, corn, pumpkins, coconut, banana and other fruit, and tobacco, grow in profusion. Tourists are few - in fact, almost non-existent. The pace of life is slow, people are friendly, reliable and honest, and passing fads of fashion must seem to locals as but crazy fairy-tales from far away. As everywhere in Thailand, there are many temples.
One of the temples is called Wat Boran; it may hold the oldest remnants of by-gone society to be found in northern Thailand. It’s not much, except perhaps in significance. Just how old the Buddha effigy is isn’t clear, but bricks and mortar from a jedi (pagoda), wall or gate, dug up in 1972, are from the early Chiang Saen era (before the city was called that), about 1200 years ago. Better info might be had by calling 053-725014 or 01-0205820; I expect Pasa neua language skill would be handy for that, though.
To get there, head straight east from the Ha-yaek at the Mengrai Monument south of the Kok River bridge on Highway 1 to MaeSai. Continue past the Sports Stadium, and after about 10 kilometers you’ll come to Wat Panalai Kasem in Ban Panalai, about 4 kilos south of Wiang Chai. Going on, you’ll pass Ban Wiang Nua, and start to notice more and more old style clothing and architecture. By the time you get to Ban Rat Jalern, you should have seen many ‘galae’ roof horns, raised houses and even polished teak ones. Wat Ratjalern has fancy embossed temple doors and colorful front wall paintings of Mae Toranee and Taewadah angels. The next small town is Ban Sansalit; Wat Sansalit is just before Wat Boran, which is in Ban Wiang Doem (or Derm, given the Thai predilection for transliterations using silent r’s with no counterpart in corresponding Thai script).
At the back of Wat Boran a new temple structure is under construction. It was interesting to see construction materials and a laundry basket stored on verandas of houses for spirits of the newly deceased. In front of all that, between it and the ‘bot’ (sala si-ri tamon pracha-nuson) for chanting and services, are lots of birds - many caged (some ‘talk’) and others fly around inside the bot. The old things are in a fancier temple building, just to the right after a small pavilion at the gate. Nothing is in English… and often no-one is around. But one does get a hint about what was here before Mangrai.

Front of Wat Sansalit

Image unearthed at Wat Boran

Another fascinating historical temple is just a few kilometers further on. Pass the turns to the interestingly named Ban Ta-bandai (water-stairs, or perhaps, “waiting for stairs” place. If it seems I should explain why sometimes I’m not sure of a translation, I’ll be getting to that presently! First let’s get to our next old temple).
Wat Bang Trai-gaeo, at Ban Trai-gaeo, is a bit down at the heels, but not a century old, I’m sure. Just past it, take a clearly marked (in English even) left turn, to Wat Ku-na (the sign in Thai calls it Boran Satan Prajao Ku-na). After about a kilometer and a half, turn right and go the same distance to Ban Ku-na (no real village) and pass the little rest stop for weary drivers (I think the only one I’ve seen in Thailand). Then turn left at the lake.
This is an amazing place. Built first by Lanna’s animist king while he was still a Buddhist, over 630 years ago, the setting charming, ambience delightful and surprises amazing. I particularly like the little “ti-pak ron jai” (place to stay for hot hearts) tiny jail.

More noticeable, in fact, impossible to miss, is a roofed over fallen tree. A sign in Thai explains that it was a rubber tree (ton yang) over 100 years old, over 29 meters tall and 4.1 meters around, found in the river early in 2004. But a caretaker there told me it was a “Ton sai” tree, and not only do I clearly remember the tree being there, and not with a new roof, either, before that, I have pictures from my first visit – over a year before that! So, I’m reluctant to trust everything I read or hear…
By the roofed tree’s roots are gifts: women’s cloths and zip up wardrobe, make-up equipment and a donation box. Clearly a spirit is believed to be in residence.

There’s no resident monk at Wat Ku-na, just a caretaker who sweeps up and sells fish food, incense and candles. Often one simply puts money in a bowl and helps oneself. The bowl is on a table in a “sala” between the small lake and a sturdier sala with a large Buddha statue. That is the main bot – with no walls.
People tend to ignore the bot, and place their offerings before a huge 5 or 600 year old Ton sai tree (well, the caretaker told me that’s what it is, I thought maybe a Bo tree… but it’s another kind of fiscus, the banyan; and, apologies to the caretaker, rubber is a kind of fiscus, too!) which often has images of royals among its roots. High up in its branches are over 20 bee hives, easily visible. The largest appears to be over a meter in length. Locally, bees building a nest is regarded as a token of great good fortune.
Extending over the lake is a small wood sala, with benches, placed above a cement walk around it, with protective railing, used for
feeding the many fish – many fairly big for such a small lake. There are pla duk catfish, pla ja-la met butterfish, pla tah pien and long pla chon fighting fish, I was told by visitors feeding them.
West of the big tree, near the river, is something like bleachers for images given to the tree, and the riverside is where the Loi Kratong parade from Wiang Nua ends and people launch their kratongs.
It’s all quite lovely, with the air cooled by breezes passing above the river and lots of vegetation, including plenty of trees. Well worth a visit, especially if one wants to see a bit of unspoiled northern life.

When I started compiling ChiangRai tourist information a decade ago, WiangChai was off the tourist track, and few people there spoke anything but northern &/or central Thai. Although with a primarily rice-based economy, due to proximity to Amphoe Muang, good soil (a legacy from when the ChiangSaen Lake was huge), and plentiful water, WiangChai is more prosperous than PhrayaMengrai, Theung or other outlying areas of ChiangRai. Santiburi Golf has helped too, as has land speculation. Grounds preparation for another golf-based community, “Happy City”, is well underway, and already there are Farang faces to be seen around and about. There are internet cafes, modern homes aplenty, and other signs of development; with that, though, has come removal of some mountains (over towards otherwise beautiful Bung Luang and charmingly slow PrayaMengrai), for materials. Soon the area will be ‘discovered’ – and much busier. Global economic problems will surely affect this development, and perhaps the success of Happy City, but ChiangRai is sure to replace ChiangMai in the hearts of many. We should regard ourselves as fortunate to still be able to enjoy the unspoiled charm in Wiang Chai. One of its nicest places is just north of town on 1173, 2.5 km along PhaNgio (spelled Pha Giew on signs) Road from Ban DonRuang, 3 km. past the turn to ChaingRung and ChiangKhong.

WangChang

The-elephant-rest-canal

a-most-rikkety-bridge

WanChang's-biggest-weir

Khun Sa Old Camp

2010-10-02T03:02:00.000-07:00

Above the ThoedThai market, towards Burma, is the “Khun Sa Old Camp” (Ban Pak Khun Sa), with a life-size statue of him on horseback. I vaguely knew it was there, then saw on a map, “KhunSa Museum”, and decided to take a look.
Going up a narrow pot-holed road from the market, one passes an old-style Shan “San Jao” pavilion with three tiers topped by a small royal umbrella, placed in the middle of a small lake (with dam to the lower side). A small two-tier alter with a Buddha image visible inside is next to it. Neither structure is fancy, but the panoramic picture does have a certain grace. Just a bit further up is the old encampment, and Khun Tip, who lives there (tel. 085-7077921), a charming, tiny 22-year-old, is happy to show visitors around (no suggested guide price, up to you if you wish to tip Tip – but definitely the polite thing to do!).
The “museum” has been there 20 years or so, and mostly involves the original buildings, with lots of snapshots of Khun Sa and his army, with some mural paintings. These include some interesting depictions relevant to Shan culture and its royalty (one photo I liked was of a kinaree dancer with two people in a “Toh” deer costume, with mask. There’s a “Horng Rap Kaek” parlor with a Madame Toussard-like model of Khun Sa sitting at table, all arranged just like 30 years ago. Close by are three bedrooms and a prayer room with benches and a minimalist altar. All walls are unfinished cement.
It isn’t a large encampment, although it was the base for about 1000 soldiers (aged from about 9 to 60). There’s a helicopter pad below, but Khun Sa never had his own.
As we wandered around, Tip showed me a “refinery” where poppy-flower tar was boiled (intoxicating those who stirred the brew), a “haw pak” dorm area with graffiti, and a huge piece of a Thai artillery shell dated 21 Feb 1982 (in Thai; and I’ll note here that Khun Tip does not speak English). Up above on a hilltop is something which looks like a Jack & Jill well, but is actually the entrance to a “jail” used mostly for intended deserters. The well-sized hole leads to a dark room of about 10 foot per side.

For some pictures of the old encampment, see:
http://www.doi-mae-salong.com/thoed-thai/khun-sa-opium-warlord

After visiting, I thought I’d add this segment on Khun Sa, including some material from my book, “Enticing Siam” (2006):
“In May 1942 the Thai took control of the Shan region around Keng Tung. These “United Shan States” or, euphemistically, “Original Thai States”, were recognized by treaty with Japan in August 1943. Sayaburi (Xaignabouri, or Muang Ngoen until taken from Siam in 1903) and Champasak, Laos, and Siem Riep and Battambang provinces, Cambodia, were reattached to the Thai kingdom. On Japan’s surrender, August 15, 1945, the Thai government undertook action to restore prewar boundaries. A peace agreement with Britain was signed at the end of December, but not until January 1947 did Thailand return the French colonial provinces.
“Although the Japanese conscripted people of the northern Muang and built roads which penetrate the rough, mountainous Lanna area (roads still used today), they also encouraged opium production, and area didn’t really open up until the 80s. Military governments of the 50s, 60s and 70s alienated many free-thinkers, and after student uprisings of 1973 were brutally put down and dictatorship resumed in 1976, many radicals took to the hills of Northern Thailand to join in communist insurgency. When Mao Tse Dung’s victory put Mainland China under Communist government in 1949, an influx of anti-Communist Chinese had entered the Lanna area, mostly soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek’s Koumintang (KMT) army. The Thai government limited the number of Chinese immigrants to 200 a year (increased to 2000 in the 60s), reluctant to receive any (except from non-Communist areas, i.e. Taiwan and Hong Kong, from which few wanted to come). Many Kuomintang soldiers, mostly from Yunnan, settled from Fang and Mae Ai in northern Chiang Mai Province, across to Huai Krai on Highway 1 in Chiang Rai (which goes to Thailand’s northernmost point at Mae Sai). The 93rd Division settled at Santikiri (Doi Mae Salong), and others, supported for a while in Burma by CIA and KMT from Taiwan air-drops, arrived more gradually."
“The area was still sparsely populated and undeveloped into the early 1970s, by which time drug money had become the dominant force and the area called the “Golden Triangle”. Communist activity kept the United States interested even after the Vietnam War; interest increasing proportional to American consumption of drugs produced in Tai Yai hills. Communist insurgency in the north wasn’t strong, in part due to drug-producing KMT army remnants, but in the early 60s, Thailand’s northern border had “unknown areas” and Opium Warlords even issued their own paper currency (until as late as 1984, in Huai Krai, 15 km south of Mae Sai on Highway 1)! The various groups (Communists, drug armies and KMT) gave up their weapons during amnesty programs of the 1980s, and the area became amenable for tourism. The King’s mother, Princess Mother Sang Wan Sri Nakarin, or colloquially, Mae Fa Luang &/or Somdet Ya, took great interest in the north, and did much to help end illicit drug production in Thailand.
“In 1982 the drug-lord Khun Sa was pushed out, and by 1990, a Royal Foundation directed by the King’s Mother was successfully containing drug production in northern Thailand. Heroin lords in Shan State (including Khun Sa) increased their output. Chiang Rai was still a small town and in many ways decades out of date (though not so much as Keng Tung remains today); the wife of a USA Drug Enforcement Agency agent’s was murdered in an attempt at intimidation &/or retribution, in town in the late 80s.”

Twenty years ago, “the largest insurgent force in Southeast Asia was the Mong T’ai Army (MTA), headed by Zao Khunsa (referred to in media usually as Khun Sa, originally Chan Cheefu or Zhang Qifu, hereditary Loimaw headman). He made America’s “Most Wanted” list, ‘though he’s never been to America: a Brooklyn, New York court indicted him on heroin trafficking (narcotics racketeering) charges. Prosperous KhunSa now lives in an Inya Lake villa in Yangon…
“Brief background: Lo Hsing-han/Law Sit Han, a major warlord/drug-lord, started in the early 1960s as a gofer, assisting poppy-growing Kokang royalty. Lo got command of a ‘KKY’ junta-sanctioned militia, and while KhunSa was in jail (from late ’69 to ’74), worked with KMT General Li Mi (of the KMT), sending opium to Thailand. ’93, General Khin Nyunt (long head of Burmese Intelligence but now under house arrest) assured him safe-smuggling of heroin from Kokang to the Thai border at Tachilek. Tachilek has the only airport in Burma within walking distance of another country; flights from Rangoon or Mandalay bring Burmese officers with parcels of bank notes to carry over the Mai Sai bridge, Tachilek’s link to international banking. Mae Sai, Thailand’s northernmost point, is an ultimate in proverbial border towns; the area’s Shan, Tatmadaw, Wa and Thai soldiers have frequently clashed; all of these and more rake untaxed income from dodgy dealings, but who should judge? Golden Triangle drug barons are hardly less moral than Europeans who “settled” the American West, the CIA or many Americans working prisons… Now frequently used for Thai-visa extension purposes, the border was only opened to tourists in fall, 1994. Although non-Thai visitors weren’t allowed beyond the town itself, I went to take a look. It seemed poor but light-hearted; I saw kids playing on stilts, and small roadside gambling hovels. There were antiques and handicrafts, but nothing distantly approximating what was available in Mae Sot (on the western border Salween River). The only well-organized business I noticed was the Mae Sai gem market. Burmese currency, kyat, was not then, nor is now, used in Tachilek; just Thai baht. Tachilek reportedly had as many as 14 heroin refineries in the past; now it has a Tatmadaw base and a busy market with a plethora of cheap Chinese goods, some jungle products and carved teak, and pirated CDs and DVDs. On my first visit, I was amazed to see a man in fatigue jacket which instead of a name above the pocket, said “It takes balls to rule the world.” Of many postcards I sent out from there, none arrived.
“Lo (or Law) Hsing-han has moved to Yangon to live with a son doing active business with Singaporians, but still owns poppy fields in the Tang-yang area. In ’73, while leading the largest opium militia and a coalition of most Shan rebel groups, he sent a proposal to the US government inviting American experts to help with poppy eradication by buying the current crop for US$12 million. A Thai helicopter came to take Lo for negotiations, but once away from his army, he was arrested, deported to Burma and sentenced to death - later commuted to eight years in jail. The DEA suppressed the proposals. Khun Sa, freed after supporters kidnapped two Russian doctors and got Thai General Kriangsak Chomanan (soon to be prime minister) to negotiate his release, revived the proposals. He invited members of a US Congressional committee on narcotics to visit his base at Ban Hin Taek, Chiangrai Province, Thailand. US officials visited, but President Carter’s administration preferred to start an $80 million gift program (over 14 years), to the junta.

“For a decade Khun Sa had about 4 thousand armed men: the Shan United Army (SUA). The DEA planted tracking devices up the asses of opium caravan mules, but the Burmese, given precise coordinates, intercepted nary a convoy. In January 1982, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanan had Thai troops launch an attack on Khun Sa at Hin Taek (which subsequently became Ban Thoed Thai); after three days, the SUA scattered. Khun Sa and remnant troops drove some KMT and Lahu soldiers out of borderland Doi Lang, and temporarily settled there, but a Chinese officer who later become SUA chief of staff proposed something better: setting up headquarters at Ho Mong, across the border from sparsely populated MaeHongSon, Thailand, and practically inaccessible from anywhere else. A road from Thailand was put in, and troops rallied back. In 1985, 10,000 soldiers of the Shan United Revolutionary Army under Col. YawdSerk joined to form the Mong T’ai Army (MTA), which in 1993 had its first sustained, concentrated attack from the Tatmadaw. The situation looked dangerous; Khun Sa adopted a more fervently nationalist posture. On December 13, 1993, he declared an independent Shan State. More soldiers joined; the MTA grew to 25,000. In 1994 HoMong grew to 20,000 and even had facilities for overseas phone calls (Christopher Cox of the Boston Herald says 10,000, but also says Chiang Saen means ‘trumpeting elephant’ and that ‘Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchu empire’). Surely well over a hundred journalists, photographers, NGO staffers and adventurers traveled to the Thai/Myanmar border to see Khun Sa, as did Chris Cox, and as also did I (earlier than Cox, who wrote Chasing the Dragon, 1996 Henry Holt and Co., about his visit).
“Khun Sa offered to eradicate Shan opium/heroin supply in return for security and stability for his people, who were violently threatened by the Burmese. The price would have been a tiny fraction of American tax dollars spent on surveillance, interdiction, incarceration, rehabilitation, hospitalization, etc. “Persuade the government of Burma to return to the legal constitution of Burma, because the drug trade can only flourish in a state of anarchy”, he asked. Thirty years later, the anarchy, and drug trade, still flourish. Shans request for help with crop substitution, schools, hospitals, and infrastructure met little response, but captivated my interest; I decided to see what I could do to help.”

“Tachilek reportedly had as many as 14 heroin refineries” - interesting, as Khun Tip told me there had been about 14 different opium warlords in the area, between 1965 and 1990.
For decades, Khun Sa symbolized Golden Triangle heroin trafficking. Dramatic declines in regional poppy cultivation followed his surrender in December of 1996. The Golden Triangle now produces only about 5% of the world’s opium, down from 70% in the early 1980s. Khun Sa, as a leader in the Shan separatist movement, traded opium for weapons (he claims to have only ‘taxed’ the opium, but few ever believed that). He controlled large areas of the rugged, remote and impoverished Shan region, during a time when it had few roads, much lower population, and very little in the way of hegemonic control. He may once have controlled 70% of the heroin business, and his total army may have occasionally exceeded 20,000 soldiers.
Born on Feb. 17, 1934, in northern Shan state, his father was Chinese, his mother Shan; he changed his name from Chang Chi-fu (Chufu or Shee-fu) to his nom de guerre, Khun Sa, in the 1970s. His father died when he was young; his mother became mistress to a local tax collector. His education and military training was with Chinese Kuomintang forces who’d fled into Burma in 1949. In 1963, the Burmese government authorized him and others to form militias to fight against tribal groups trying to assert independence. Within a year he broke ties with the Burmese and with about 800 men established an independent fiefdom near the Chinese border in northern Shan State. Captured by the Burmese and imprisoned from 1969 to 1974, as related above, he was released after his men abducted two Russian doctors in 1973, to swap for him.
By 1976 he’d re-established himself at Ban Hin Taek, where he’d lived for a year in 1964. He built schools, infrastructure for public water and electricity supply, and a hospital. In 19890, Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda ordered bombing of HinTaek, but only in 1982, after General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, with the Thai Border Police, made a ground assault, did Khun Sa give up and retreat back to Shan State (Time Magazine, 1 March 1982, has an amusing article about this, entitled, “Thailand: the Great Opium War”). Soon Khun Sa was back, at a camp near Fang in ChiangMai Province. But to establish himself as a freedom fighter, he returned to Shan State, where he again built schools, infrastructure for public water and electricity supply, and a hospital, this time at HoMong, his own creation. In 1977 he proclaimed himself the “King of the Golden Triangle,” which was soon producing almost half of the heroin entering the USA - and certainly the most potent. He may, though, have been front-man for an organization from Yunnan Province, China, more than an independent operator.

More from “Enticing Siam”:

My Trip to HoMong
After attracting Khun Sa aide Khernsai Jaiyen’s attention through newspaper letters-to-the-editor supportive of Khun Sa’s independence posturing, and a trip to Khun Sa’s office in MaeHongSon (I just flew up, then asked a motorcycle taxi driver to take me there, using my not-yet very good Bangkok Thai), I received an invitation to visit Ho Mong, and even a piece of paper to serve as provisional passport.
MaeHongSon wasn’t yet a vast urban wasteland of excess cement - most houses were still of wood, and many were very beautiful. There were five 5-star hotels without customers, and many two dollar a night backpacker guest-houses (much more convivial and entertaining places than expensive hotels). Interesting regional delicacies like deep-fried bird were common, and standard fare available along a short row of places oriented to backpackers. There was an upstairs dance-hall, dime (B10) a dance; my next-door neighbor at the guest-house I found to be of the taxi-dancers! The pace of life was slow, modern vulgarity had begun encroaching, but much serene magnificence truly charmed. Vegetation was thick, mornings cool, almost cold, and nowhere did anything feel intimidating, except perhaps the 5-star hotels. No one seemed shy about Khun Sa having an office there, at all, but neither were they going to discuss the trucks with huge teak trunks loaded on, standing along the road outside of that office, despite official logging ban.
I met Kernsai there, at the office, and was told where to catch a ride early in the morning. I did so, and after an hour and a half trip, found myself at a small Chinese village of low brick houses. There I mounted a mule bred for the difficult job of traversing rugged mountainous terrain. The mule’s caretaker led us along a mountain stream for a couple hours, crossing it, back and forth, many, many times. Along the first few miles of the path were impressive water-works, earth constructed runnels carrying water from a creek to fields lower down. It was nice and easy, breezy and beautiful for a while, then for a second I thought the horse was going out from under me, down a cliff-side. We quickly descended 8 or 10 feet while progressing on perhaps hardly a yard. The creek fell to 60 feet below us sometimes; the trail was seldom level. It was often so steep that the mules used long holes a foot or more deep, sometimes 40 or more in close rows, doing a kind of high-step.
We frequently went up, way up high slopes, the porter-guide-muleteer after a while pulling in front to help the mule, and my spine going almost parallel with that of my mount. When the slopes became too extreme we began using switchbacks, some 10 or 15 yards long, others reversing quite quickly. The horse sweated profusely, horseflies buzzing about its eyes. I tried with little success to swat them away with my quart (crop). We saw no-one for over five hours, until after resting on a level area we reached after topping three previous ridges. They were gorgeous to look back upon, but we were soon engulfed again in trees. We then encountered two men bearing ancient long-barrel rifles, and acting as if they were hunting. An hour later we met another man, at a very refreshing small waterfall.
Parties of international journalists, whom we saw evidence of in their trash leavings (Tablerone chocolate boxes given free on international flights, cigarette packs, pop cans), were said to have done the route in eight hours. I’d hoped to do it in less, and did, but to little advantage. My guide hobbled the horse outside a small dusty village, then left me in a room that resembled a small barracks, outside of which were tunnels into a hillside. I was exhausted and not unhappy to rest while waiting for a vehicle. I fell asleep, and someone woke me, offering to share smoke of some #4. I wanted to see it, but politely declined to partake. He took out a small vial of white powder and a cigarette, unrolled the cigarette and mixed in powder, rolled it back up, partook, then nodded off. Shortly after, I was directed to a pickup, which took me to the headquarters of Khun Sa’s administration, where I was given a room at the VIP quarters. I’ve no idea how things would have gone had I been narcoticized.
A treaty had just been negotiated with elders of the Lisu tribe, and I was invited to the celebratory dance at Khun Sa’s residence. I was fed first, and had time to pour ladles of cold water over myself in my room’s private bath (equipped with an electric light), and to put on decent clothes. I was soon holding hands between two beautifully bedecked Lisu maidens, with green-uniformed but unarmed soldiers to either side, dancing in a circle that soon included Khun Sa. He sang out enjoyable verses of voluble song, but I understood nary a word. I forgot my tired feet and legs, and tried my best to follow along in dance with my fellows. Khun Sa made what was clearly a jest, and people laughed. A European crew went about with TV cameras and bright lights, recording the event.
My host Khernsai Jaiyen, the aid to Khun Sa most quoted in English-language newspapers, used his self-taught English fluently, and I found his manner friendly and intelligent. He introduced me to several other English speakers, including two gentlemen of Shan descent purportedly based with the UN in New York. We were served candy and “whiskey” (which should really be called rum), after the dancing stopped. My new friends and I considered visiting HoMong’s karaoke lounge, but chose instead to visit the drinking stall of a woman who had a bit of English. There we had Carlsberg beer, tasty Shan/T’ai food, and a pretty good time. The electricity in Ho Mong, however, went off at ten, and I had to prepare for bed by candlelight.
Early in the next day’s dawning I was shown around a bit after breakfasting with the UN guys, at a charming outdoor market. I was saw a lake, schools, a church, garment factory, printing department, pharmacies, a new neighborhood and road construction. Half a year after his declaration of independence, Khun Sa’s efforts in Ho Mong showed results: he’d established mushroom and silkworm farms, pineapple plantations, textile and garment production, a hydroelectric dam, a jewelry factory and a gem emporium. In the pleasant main market and well-stocked stores, dry-goods were mostly Thai, and only Thai money was used. Schools and medical facilities were readily in evidence, and two small hotels. There were no door-locks, nor need of, as there was virtually no crime. Rugged terrain, logistics insufficiencies (especially in transportation), and strained political relationships limit economic potential, but the Mong T’ai capitol Ho Mong (a mile or so from Mong Mai, more readily identifiable on maps, ‘though sometimes as Mong Mau - about 50 kilometers due north of MaeHongSon City, but over twice that far in actuality, due to the mountains) had thousands of new pre-formed reed-mat houses creating dozens of neighborhoods along the main road through a long mountain valley. Women mostly wore modern clothing; men and boys uniforms.

Kernsai explained that Khun Sa wanted me to become his “Propaganda Minister” for which I would be given room and board; would I care to review his troops with him in the morning? I didn’t think so. Unfortunately it quickly seemed I had little time left… I chose to walk back, rather than wait for another rough ride on a mule. Walking took the same amount of time, and brought me closer to things. I still had a guide; he could hardly believe how slow I was, and at one point reached into an almost invisible hole in the ground and pulled out a colorful bird. This he put in a pocket for a while, then took out and flung into the air. It flew off making joyful noises, and I knew the difficult walk had been the right choice. But it left me tired immensely, and with sores on my feet still visible two months later. Arriving in the little brick town where I could catch a ride, just before dark, I made it to MaeHonSon in time to be informed at the airline office that I should report for standby very early in the morning. I was very lucky I did so, as no subsequent flights were able to leave for the nest two days, due to fog.

I’d gone to offer some ideas for alternate income sourcing and possibly support in crop-substitution programs, and remain hopeful of helping provide viable substitutes for dependency on drug production for people in Shan State, through use of solar and wind power, and 12-volt pumping systems. I also had ideas for Angora rabbits… and it interests me to use this situation as a case example helpful in elucidating many problems in present political and economic frameworks and realities. Too much is ignored or wishfully swept temporarily out of sight, only to fester until erupting into danger to society at large. The absence of much available information on this situation is but one symptom of the problem; organized crime and drug-use epidemics are others. As important, of course, are general human rights, respect for nature and tradition, and awareness of history and resultant responsibilities. My hopes of encouraging profitable handicrafts production have come to little; dreams of promoting wind-energy utilization and water-storage have come to even less. There clearly needs to be a total paradigm shift of people in general, before we lose our heritage, and future.

When well entrenched and popular, the MTA had heavy artillery, surface-to-air heat-seeking Stinger missiles, and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles (made in USA). Traditionally Shan, Kachin, Pa-0, Palaung and Lahu accept cultural pluralism as a fact of life, despite occasional necessity for violence. Farmers not protected by a local army then, as now, ran high risk of being press-ganged into work as porters &/or land-mine detectors for the Tatmadaw, without pay, even in food, and forced into situations of extreme danger without protective gear, acting against the interests of their own people. Thousands of porters have died and thousands more become severely mutilated while engaged in this work, supposedly for the good of their nation.
The main enemy was soon to change, though, from Khun Sa to neighbors not far from his original base-town of Lashio: the ‘wild’, or ‘red’ Wa. Some of these Wa can still remember ancestors who were headhunters, living inaccessibly in small villages surrounded by impenetrably thick thorn strands. For two decades most Wa were Communist Party supporters; then they became capitalistic poppy cultivators and now protect the manufacture of amphetamines. The Wa fought against Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army until his surrender, and now are avowed supporters of the junta, while using Chinese money and acting under the orders of Chinese advisers. They want back lands Shans ‘civilized’ 850 years ago…
These Wa kept Burma separate from China; the rugged Wa ‘states’, located in the far northeast of Shan State, are the poorest territory in Burma, indeed, Wa farmers are among the world’s poorest peoples. Wa have fought lowlanders for centuries, vehemently. China had no problem absorbing all of Yunnan, with its many tribal peoples, and many Chinese passed on through into Shan State, but the Wa Hills remained frontier. Until just recently, there were few roads in the area (none paved), no educational system and no medical clinics. Only 10% had electricity. After Aung San’s assassination, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) revolted; its most successful recruiting was among the traditionally warlike Wa. In March, 1989 the BCP collapsed; the leaders fled to China. The United Wa State Party (UWSP) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) requisitioned BCP uniforms, arms, ammunition and soldiers, and merged with a smaller non-communist Wa army, soon having 20,000 troops with additional militia. They quickly struck a cease-fire deal with the junta, so kept all weapons and, free to run its region as a semi-autonomous state, expanded trade in heroin - remember, the Wa hills were once legal opium-growing territory. Starting in 1993, they added methamphetamines.
Dreams of an independent Shan State were shattered by a mutiny in June 1995 (at least for the time; it keeps, quixotically, popping up again, chauvinistic in the sense of hopeless). The MTA’s officer-training school’s second in command, Kan Yot [Gun Yod or Kan Ywet], revolted. He and 200 soldiers, incensed at despotism and racial discrimination by those with Chinese blood, left. 1500 MTA soldiers went to negotiate with the mutineers, hardly 10% returned. Rumors of Khun Sa’s ill-health were becoming believed (there were so many, so absurd rumors before, such as the killing of a barber for a bad hair-cut, that they often weren’t taken seriously); weariness was showing in his face. When the Wa launched their winter ‘95 offensive, desertions caused outpost after outpost to fall; some claim the central headquarters would have also, within days, if surrender hadn’t brought in the Tatmadaw - but that’s conjecture. Khun Sa’s surrender caught most observers by surprise, and it’s clear not all weapons were turned over - Stinger and SAM-7 missiles believed to be there weren’t. Khun Sa called a session of Shan parliament to make a surprise announcement of immediate retirement; it seems he also betrayed those who hadn’t betrayed him to revenge those who had, demonstrating the correctness of their suspicions (and meanwhile destroying the Shan cause). Khun Sa moved to Yangon New Years Day 1996, renounced his Shan name and took a Burmese one. According to the ‘New Light of Myanmar’, 1,894 recruits and 138 heavy arms were handed over to the Tatmadaw on 12 January 1996, and on 14 January, 9,749 MTA soldiers surrendered with 6,004 heavy and small weapons, 197 HoMong-made launchers, 13,452 (or 24,452) grenades, 10,346 (or 18,346) mines and 7,407 (or 17,027) heavy arms rounds. 9,749 MTA soldiers surrendered, or maybe ‘over’ 4000 surrendered, in return for 50,000 sacks of rice. Khun Sa was given a commercial bus concession from Rangoon to Shan State, a casino at Myawaddy (near the old Karen National Union headquarters at Mannerplaw, which has become a notorious ‘yaba’ - meth - transit point) and more; the junta steadfastly refuses a US offer of $2 million for his extradition. The USWA took over many of the border strongholds: “They have real capabilities and a growing infrastructure,” Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) quoted a diplomat. “This has the appearance of an emerging state.” In Mong Yawn valley north of ChiangMai’s Mae Ai district, the Wa have built roads, dams, an electricity-generating plant, underground fuel tanks, military compounds, schools, a hospital and modern town, employing 6,000 Thai laborers - with the only money they have, drug money.
A settlement built in 2000 by southern Wa boss Wei HseuhKang (Wei Xuegang), about 6 km from the border opposite Chiang Rai Province, reportedly has shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles (ones Khun Sa got from Cambodia and mujahadeen?). Plans to enlarge Mong Yawn - population around 10,000 early in 2004 - to about 120,000, involve a shifting Wa southward: part of a mysterious plan for ending opium cultivation by forced depopulation instead of crop substitution. Perhaps it’s really about allowing (unassimilatable) Wa from Yunnan to move into evacuated old Wa areas. Settlers on both sides of the Thai border are planting hundreds of thousands of fruit trees, but Mong Yawn can’t support even another 50,000 people through just agriculture and livestock breeding.
“The Burmese are playing with fire,” S.H.A.N. quotes a Western analyst. “By diversifying their forces and territory, the Wa are gaining strength and influence.” Many Wa leaders are actually ethnic Chinese; north of the Wa “states” is Kokang state (all these are parts of Shan State), where most people are ethnic Chinese. The enmity between the Burmese government and Wa has resulted in a mini-arms race, and it’s doubtful the ethnic minorities will ever feel, or be, secure without having their own military capability. The UWSA has become one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking organizations, well able to procure powerful munitions. The US Justice Department indicted eight senior Wa officials in January 2005 (in absentia), on narcotics charges, but is really little threat to them. By forcing impoverished people to migrate, the UWSA has greatly increased its influence in Shan State, particularly in areas new to it where the Shan State Army (S.S.A., successor to the MTA) also operates – mostly along the Thai border.

Complicating the picture are proposals from international business consortiums and the Asian Development Bank, for new roads and infrastructure arrangements to make a “growth quadrangle” expanding the “Golden Triangle” of Burma, Thailand and Laos, to include Yunnan, China. This big area has many people with common ethnic backgrounds: Shans, Dai/Zhouang, Laotians, Lawa and Yi/Lolo hill-tribes. The proposals mean to boost tourism, encourage economic imperialism, and facilitate repressive political control. “The formation of the Golden Rectangle is inevitable because of the geo-economic advance of China toward the south,” Thai political scientist Sukhumbhand Paribatra told the Bangkok Post. “One has to be very careful, because this advance will be linked to the region’s powerful local Chinese communities.” Kunming officials have expressed hope that Bangladesh and China will work together: “Yunnan is China’s southwest province... and we want to develop a framework to enhance economic cooperation between China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and India,” Shi Minghui, deputy director general of the Foreign Affairs Office of Yunnan, was quoted as saying. China’s relations with Bangladesh bear major politico-economic implications; China has begun using the Bay of Bengal for military purposes, and wants to access it overland to increase commerce from land-locked Yunnan. Meanwhile, overcrowded Bangladesh poses a refugee problem - regular flooding dislocates its citizens, but more refugees come in - particularly Rohingya, Islamic people from Myanmar’s Arakan State - than leave. That that could change surely conserns Indian authorities.
Myanmar’s SPDC has initiated more “War on Drugs,” baning opium. Over a quarter of Kokang’s population left; rigid enforcement keeps half the remaining poor, with food security only six months a year. Some try eating tree bark, as in North Korea. Throughout Shan State, 350,000 households, about two million people, are losing their primary source of earnings, indeed, 70 percent of cash income, because opium is now prohibited. People are withdrawing children from school and passing up health services, selling off livestock, land and daughters. “The reversed sequencing of first forcing farmers out of poppy cultivation before ensuring other income opportunities is a grave mistake,” warned Martin Jelsma of the Trans¬national Institute (TNI, an international network of activist-scholars based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands). “Aggressive drug control efforts against farmers and small-scale opium traders, and forced eradication opera¬tions in particular, will have a negative impact on prospects for peace and democracy in both countries.” Alternative livelihood programs should have been in place before eradication, as reductions in income will result in malnutrition and poor health. But about a hundred drug refineries remain, and a fully successful ban seems unlikely. Raids on refineries carried out in a “War on Drugs” target only smaller players. Control of all aspects of the huge business is now in the hands of a few major players, most prominent among them, the USWA.
Some refineries in northern areas or UWSA areas close to the Thai border have been relocated, to ‘safer’ areas. According to S.H.A.N., a “raid by UWSA on a heroin refinery being run by a local Lahu militia in western Mongton on March 30, 2003, is a clear example of a small player being ousted out. The refinery in Mongjawd had been set up by Kya Nu, leader of a militia group numbering only about 30-40 men. After the raid, Kya Nu was arrested and jailed in Kengtung, and his militia disbanded. The raid was publicized by the SPDC in the state-run press, as an example of UWSA cooperation in drug eradication efforts. Yet the reality is that the UWSA has now simply monopolized the drug trade in Mongjawd, and has since set up new refineries in the same area.” SPDC is a newer acronym for what once was SLORC; military personnel remain involved in all aspects of the drug trade. The junta condones such involvement as a means of subsidizing army costs at field level.
Roads now link Mae Sai with Jinghong, Yunnan, and thus Kunming, through Sipsongpanna (the “twelve kingdoms” or 12,000 rice fields legendary birthplace of the T’ai race). Soon there should be easy passage through Laos, and someday maybe even northern Burma; so far most roads in Northern Burma and Laos are barely passable for 4-wheel drive vehicles, but serious commercialization of the region appears imminent. Burma’s northernmost state, Kachin, bordering Tibet in the foothills of the Himalayas, is one of the world’s most mineral-rich areas, with gold and high-quality jade. Opium production was substandard, and is no longer attempted. Kachin State remains poor and sparsely populated, with some rugged sub-Himalayan areas labeled ‘uninhabited.’ Still, teak and other hardwoods flow from those mountainous areas through Thailand to Japan, alarming rainforest preservationists. Thai prime-minister Taksin Shinawatra (pronounced Sin-awat or Chin-awat) spoke of developing ski resorts there, with flights from Chiang Mai.

Along the north-south Thai-Burma border, some Karen and Mon remain insurgent, with just a bit of international media attention and a little outside aid, but the possibility of their cultural survival seems as much in question as that of the Shan and small hill-tribes. An extremely controversial natural-gas pipeline (Yadana, Kanchanaburi, Unocal) was put in to supply a questionable Thai electricity-generating factory, disrupting much; Baptist and other fundamental Christian Church organizations, non-governmental relief organizations and global mega-corp business interests (Big Pharma, carbonated beverages, electronics) also have on-going, questionable, impact. Perhaps in all as disruptively exploitative are the many international tourists who go to “undeveloped” hill-tribe villages to photograph “long-necked women” (from the small Padaung tribe, perhaps one born under a full moon, whatever, one with many brass rings covering the neck and depressing the collar-bone). Such tourism seldom benefits the ethnic people, especially financially. What little they might gain they are certain to soon lose. Exploitation and manipulation by the rich and influential in the area involves little governmental interference. Now many long-neck villages (human zoos) are reachable by car, and advertised.
For over 20 years refineries in Shan State produced half the world’s supply of heroin, the area’s primary hard currency earner. It traveled through China and/or Thailand, as documented by Alfred McCoy in “The Politics of Heroin” (1972, Harper & Row), often in the care of Chiu Chau (Teh Chiu) dialect speakers whose ancestors came from Swatow, the port of Kwantung in SE China. The Teh Chiu are said to be a dominant part of Thai politics. They’re scattered around the world, and suspected of extensive ‘Triad’ (secret society) involvement. Ethnic Yunnanese Muslim Panthays, called by the Thai “Haw”, are also blamed (but poorly identified, except as expatriate Yunnanese), and one runs across mention of new “triads” like 14K, competing strongly with the legendary Chinese secret societies. However supplied, illegal heroin remains available virtually worldwide, flowing not only from the Golden Triangle, but equally from Afghanistan (and especially the Pakistani border area). It also comes from Laos, Lebanon, Columbia, Mexico, Sudan, and recently, southern ex-Soviet states (“-istans”). It’s questionable why American law enforcement thought capture of Khun Sa might have any impact on narcotic availability or price, and why crop substitution or eradication is even necessary, as there is important medical utility, and legal narcotic production in India, Iran, Turkey, and Tasmania, Australia. Poppy seeds are used as food, on buns and bagels. In Burma they’re widely used for one of the country’s delicacies, Bein Mon (pancake made of rice flour, palm sugar, coconut chips and peanuts, garnished with poppy seeds), and are traded openly. With use of a bit of intelligent imagination, alternative income sources could be found: ganja/cannabis seeds also have great value, and are easily transported, but are irrationally suppressed. Drugs burned in public displays are suspected of adulteration by addition of food poppy, gum, sap and pods emptied of seeds; no-one can investigate thoroughly. Lashio officials were quoted as saying that as soon as foreign guests and reporters left, national security officials doused the fire and retrieved residue for the next round of bonfires – it’s all a farce, all about control.
In the 1970s, Burma produced 250 to 400 tons of opium per year. 350 tons in 1985 rose to 1,280 tons in 1988; in ‘89, it was 2,000 tons, maybe more. For the ‘90s, US State Department figures show between 2,000 and 2,500 tons a year, and for year 2000 were about 1,200. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) put Burma’s 2003-2004 output at 370 tons, down from 2002’s 800 plus, due to bad weather. In peak year 1993, Laos produced 210 tons of opium. In response to Rangoon officials’ claim that opium output had dropped in 2001 to 865 tons from 1,065 tons in 2000, noted Shan scholar Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe commented that official figures were “arbitrary.” Population, and especially AIDS, statistics vary a lot, and government, like bureaucracy, is more self-protecting than altruistic. S.H.A.N. reports Dai officials in Yunnan’s Dehong Autonomous Prefecture, opposite northern Shan State, questioning the annual output figures given by the UN and US, which have been shrinking each year. “What we are seeing here in Mongmao (Ruili) is a rise not only in trafficking but also addictions,” it quotes a drug enforcement source who posits more than 3,000 users in Ruili’s Zegang neighborhood alone, at least 10% of them female. “If there is really a drop in the production then the logical question is from where are we getting all the dope?” Chinese authorities are also displeased by Myanmar’s failure to hand over 24 of 34 drug fugitives who took refuge there.
Specialists from the USA have provided satellite and other intelligence about opium convoys, yet narcotics seizures have never reached 1 percent. During the period of most intensive US aid, ’85-‘88 - opium fields were sprayed with 2.4-D herbicide, from planes given by the USA - but estimated opium yield doubled. US aid was typically ineffective in achieving what it was purportedly intended to do. Khun Sa’s surrender didn’t lower heroin production, but the SPDC claimed it incinerated 625 kilos of opium, 759 kilos of heroin and 3 million methamphetamine pills, 2000 kilos (over 2 tons) of drugs, on June 26, 2005: Yangon’s 19th propagandistic destruction of narcotics (in one they bulldozed bottles of ‘Krakingdaeng’ Thai energy drink).
“The junta’s token attempts at crop substitution, often with international assistance, have also failed miserably, due to poor planning, coercive implementation and complete disregard for the welfare of local populations. Under the so-called “New Destiny” project launched in April 2002, farmers in many townships have been forced to plant a new strain of rice from China, which has failed in each locality,” according to S.H.A.N. Opium takes only three months and is a cash crop. Nothing else yet compares, as “ya ba” doesn’t require farmers. Constant terror, atrocities and warfare make opium cultivation still the only choice for many.

Early last century, Shan were selling opium to the Yunnanese, who transported it down the Yangtze and sold it to the French. The Shan were then divided into 34 small principalities, but had no concept of rigid border demarcation. Warlords demanded to receive ‘taxation’ on all that passed by (as Khun Sa says is all he did), and thus discouraged much farming of food for market. Trade was ruined to the point where salt became expensive and goiter a widespread problem. Without the drug business, the consumer economy of Burma might grind to a halt, as much of the little for sale is funded through it. Shan people wish to enter the modern world with the respect and the dignity merited by capable and industrious people, which indeed they are, but commerce in narcotics hasn’t helped much, except insofar as it kept at bay, for awhile, Burmese military madness. The Maynmar ‘government’ has, unintentionally or not, limited big business concerns that eventually may present an even more disruptive danger to Burma’s various peoples and cultures. Modern infrastructure can be doubly dangerous in this area, tending as it does to bring governmental repression and corporate exploitation. A direct relationship clearly exists between poverty and the narcotics problem, but Khun Sa’s aide Khernsai Jaiyen expressed no interest in the parallels with problems in South America, or in contacts there, when I asked. Shan State may never be able to have more impact on the world beyond it than it had through narcotics, and it’s unclear how much outside people should feel obliged to become involved in internal Shan State affairs. But with drug addiction a problem of increasing magnitude, especially due to AIDS, it can easily seem to be a problem of either influencing the situation, or being influenced by it.

Nasu Lahu-na (my wife) remembers when most people along the border were engaged in the drug trade: there were many rivalries, there was much pride, gossip and back-stabbing. She says people would burn with urges for revenge, and report rivals to police… Once somebody caught their favorite enemy out alone on a jungle path, cut his head off and hung it up. Nasu’s father forbade her to go out there, but she couldn’t resist, and snuck a look. There was easy money to be made, but it wasn’t, isn’t, a good trade. The Thai Ministry of Health estimated 2,650,000 meth addicts in 2001 (4.3% of population total and 91% of the total addict population); mornings going to work I’d see herds of thin post-adolescents with brightly colored hair loitering in filling-station lots, after discos closed at 7 a.m. Even today, entertainment places for Thai youth close well after tourist-oriented ones, no explanation offered.
Around Kengtung, farm hands sometimes now get paid in meth pills instead of money. In 1994, a group of Thai dealers approached Khun Sa, but he spoke against meth: ‘Heroin is okay’, he reasoned, ‘our main customers are across the ocean. But, with yaba, we only have Thais for customers. If we start producing it, we’ll come face to face with Thailand. That’ll make our position more difficult.’ His uncle Khun Hseng (Chang Ping-yuan) was won over, though, and soon yaba produced in HoMong was of top quality. Drug producers in Shan State tried expanding into Extasy, but their chemists haven’t made a popular product (maybe good chemists don’t want to live in back woods). Wa and Kokang leaders could abandon heroin by establishing meth labs, and thn not need to worry about weather. Labs can be moved, and food farming gives a stabler economic base. Opium is making a temporary disappearing act (locally), but other drugs substitute (‘date rape’ drugs have certainly made a name for themselves). The yaba market was lucrative until Taksin’s Drug Wars, but customers remain in the Bangkok area, and India, Malaysia, Singapore, China and Korea. Amphetamines go to many of Myanmar’s armaments suppliers and other enablers. The Thai “War on Drugs” which started in 2003 with the murder - in just a couple of months - of thousands of possible small-timers (with minimal subsequent investigation, at best), has made Shan State traffickers avoid the northern Thai border, and sell only to long-term, well-trusted Thai contacts. Thai newspapers still regularly report busts, but trafficking drugs into China has become preferable to down through Lashio and Mandalay to Moulmein, Kanchanaburi and Bangkok (though that still happens. Beijing replaced paramilitary police with five regular army regiments, to patrol the northern Shan-China border; corruption among border officials was contributing to the problem, especially at Zegao and Ruili, opposite Muse (on the ‘Burma Road’). Many fewer Chinese officials currently enjoy the high-life in the gambling town of MongLa (on the border), than did just a few years ago. Taksin’s ‘War on Drugs’ forced drug operators to reroute their products, but a Chinese attitude that it’s better to die than be poor, means many replacement traffickers will be available. The 25 March, 2005 Bangkok Post reported 1.14 million addicts in China, equally divided between heroin and methamphetamine (quoting Yang Fengrui, spokesman for the Ministry of Public Security, as saying, “the situation has begun to deteriorate.”). The Wa have long been a Chinese ally, Shan State’s becoming Wa State; Beijing’s ruled by eager, perhaps desperate, expansionists.
Many Wa have recently relocated, or been relocated, to areas just north of the Thai/Myanmar border. Perhaps as many as 150,000 of these Wa are currently in the limbo of displaced people; tens of thousands of them were born in China and many of the new settlers are Han Chinese. One report says 300,000 people have been relocated, to cut off support for the SSA-South. Certainly, many Shans and Lahu have been evicted to make space for arriving Wa, but as the government in Yangon has cultivated good relations with China and Thailand, this has not resulted in a new ‘refugee crisis’. The Wa region along the Chinese border has passed another deadline to become drug-free; but what are viable alternatives to drug production? What can be done towards sustainable community-based development and strengthening civil society to enable farmers to participate in decision-making processes about their future?
An Akha displaced from just south of Mong Hsat by Wa newcomers asserted that Chinese were easily distinguishable from Wa: “There were some Chinese with them (the Wa settlers). They set up shops and sold various food items. They also made whiskey to sell from corn. I also saw some Chinese soldiers and officers with the Wa Army. They wore Wa uniforms, but they were whiter-skinned than the Wa, so it was easy to tell them apart. They spoke no language other than Chinese.” A report from the Mong Karn, east of Mong Hsat, mentions that among 300 new Wa households moving into Mong Karn village, were 30 Chinese households. New Chinese are particularly concentrated at Ban Hoong, south of Mong Hsat. There, about 1000 Chinese are help conduct Wei Hsiao Kang’s military and economic affairs.
The Wa area on the Chinese border is now pressured to become drug-free, but how are poor ex-cultivators to replace their lost income? What crop substitution projects and possibilities are there? Will there be reliable markets for the substitute crops? What can be done towards sustainable community-based development and strengthening civil society to enable farmers to participate in decision-making processes about their future?
In the Panghsang area, rubber, tea and oranges are being grown extensively. Gem and zinc mining are expanding, as is cigarette production. Expanded road infrastructure and consequent growth in trucking has led to Chinese marrying love-for-hire, and more cultivation of corn, sesame, soybeans, peanuts, fruit and cabbages. Success in alternatives depends largely on China. Thailand doesn’t impose tariffs on import of fruits grown under the UWSA control, to help the Wa renounce so much that is counter-productive in their way of life, but farmers remain with little voice in decision-making processes affecting their livelihoods. Both opium prices and wages rose at least 50% between 2003 and 2005; seasoned observers expect little else to change, but even right on the border, in April 2006, both opium and amphetamines are hard to find.
The Shan Human Rights Foundation estimated Shan refugees denied refugee status, but arrived in Thailand from 1996 to 2002, at over 230,000. Sunai Phasuk, a Thai academic and consultant for Human Rights Watch (HRW) said, “These people are not just fleeing war, but also forced labor, executions, mass relocations and systematic rape;” and Thailand is “violating international law” for denying basic humanitarian assistance to the Shan. An HRW report documents the murder, rape, enslavement and brutal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians during the Tatmadaw’s long-running assault on Karen insurgents: 650,000 made homeless in eastern Burma alone. It’s pointless to discuss who suffers more, Karen or Shan; Mon I met in Rangoon, and Burmese in Pagan, also told stories of murder and mayhem by “governmental authorities.”

The UN World Food Program is supplying rice and cereal grains to Wa and Kokang ex-poppy farmers, particularly in Kokang, Panghsang and Lashio and to some of the other many needy in the potentially wealthy country, but also reports inflation. A million ‘Internally Displaced Persons’, 42% in eastern areas and on the run from “scorched earth” policies Human Rights Watch calls ethnic cleansing… 140,000+ are in refugee camps along the western Thai border, many for 20 years now. Political reform and better economic management are more needed than charity; Burma lacks intelligent logistics, not rice.
Yangon isn’t the capital anymore (although Than Shwe doesn’t stay in the mysterious new place), and neither is there really a junta now. Than Shwe has become “father of the country”, and wants control of the Chinese border, for which purpose divisions among the frequently-feuding Wa would come in handy. China’s stake in the relocation program is unclear, but it has provided much towards the huge costs of Wa relocations to the southern border of Shan State. Chinese authorities may want tribal people who show no propensity towards assimilation as Chinese to relocate from Yunnan to a place where they may serve some political purpose. Wa leaders want to use their areas in the north for resettling Wa villagers from China… but the world, it seems, is more interested in profits and oil.
Meanwhile, displaced populations bring to the generally porous border a huge increase in dangerous disease: pneumonia, dysentery, hepatitis, malaria, dengue, smallpox, TB, typhoid, typhus, cholera, yaws, polio, yellow fever, blackwater fever, influenza, scabies, meningitis, leprosy and even humans infected with anthrax! One with anthrax was a Chinese “Wa” leader - hospitalized in Tachilek. Despite Thai law, tea pickers and other laborers daily cross the border, and traders and even big businessmen do regular, though often officially unsanctioned, cross-border commerce. The environment is being ruined, individuals lose integrity through involvement in drugs, others lose all sense of propriety through systematic rape (certainly not helpful for containing HIV), cultures crumble - all for the sake of egotism among the small-minded wealthy and powerful. Ideals may seem anachronistic, and political involvement suspect; one becomes tempted to turn ones back to quietly just tend ones own garden, but meanwhile immune deficiency offers germs and viruses chance to rapidly develop new forms... The most popular of Taksin’s populist policies, his 30 baht health scheme, has resulted in long hospital queues for pain-killers and antibiotics. The rampant, almost indiscriminant usage of antibiotics exacerbates the potential plague menace, and not just because doctors haven’t time to seriously investigate complaints or suggest behavior modifications: germs not only gain immunity to poisons, but both pain-killers and antibiotics weaken immune systems.
Burma has never known good governance, and drug trade and genocide in Shan State won’t stop without it. The government of China doesn’t care about genocide or cultural extinction(s); it’s become focused (like the West) on exploitation and profit. Many Chinese, though, recognize massive errors in their governance. Of Southeast Asian countries, the best-governed is semi-feudal Malaysia, where ethnic Malays get two votes while ethnic Chinese citizens only one. Modern, autocratic Singapore doesn’t mind if neighbors to the north receive drug flow; newly autocratic USA has lost moral legitimacy through inequitable “free trade” pacts, gross over-consumption, pollution, refusal to deal with global warming, and, of course, gross failure in regard to ‘terrorism’ and Iraq (illegal, inept invasion after mass-murder of innocents first through supplying Saddam Hussain then through ill-conceived sanctions). Mainland countries east of India and south of China can hardly pretend to honest, transparent governance, and are coming increasingly under the sway of Chinese… North America will fall further and faster if it doesn’t clean up its act by taking real interest in justice, human rights, environmental preservation, good governance and corporate restraint, instead of media manipulation, crowd-control weaponry, and ‘regime change’ - which should be the business only of the UN and local populations. Is there even an ‘international community’ to respond to genocide anymore? Why are there so few people like Guy Horton, documenting problems and making varieties of important information (such as the boom in “crowd control” weaponry) readily accessible, in organized fashion, through the news media or on the Net?
Nowadays druggies and some of the young set like to go to Laos to stay with poor people and try drugs, but anyone with even a shred of pretension to integrity will notice the negative effect doing that has on local communities visited. Unconstructive over-indulgence gets a stamp of approval from people of enviable position; greed and avarice are rewarded while dignity mislaid. Dope, while natural remains fairly innocent, but commercialized becomes a tool of exploitative greed, used against the already oppressed. Mess with it, and sooner or later, and more likely sooner, you will be, and feel, betrayed. One doesn’t really get to choose to join a mafia, or other secret organization; one must already be in place, before one even knows it… It’s not only other people who often aren’t what they seem, but sometimes also even you own self can suddenly seem quite different, changed or revealed… Remember, you can’t buy respect, or trust, or love.
Into the 70's, in rural Thailand, many households had a small ganja field; bai kratom (Mitragyna speciosa, an alkaloid), pretty poppies and opium were common, and older people still used betel… Then big money took over the world, promoting ‘heroin chic’ (sheek), expensive alcohol, corporate control… When Taksin started his first drug war, a billion methamphetamine pills were sold annually in Thailand; over 3 million people took them (perhaps only 300,000 were drug dependent). But the drugs war is also a race war. Border minorities were targeted for brutal police action; there was torture, and the number of dead vastly exceeded the body counts quoted. Thailand's poorest suffered, also people threatening to the powerful: over 400,000 people 'surrendered' themselves for treatment, some of whom surely had little or no involvement, but ended up on corporate-management style target lists police still can’t ignore. With marketing and market expansion dominant forces of control, stimulants have utility, and can still be purchased - expensively - in the country’s urban center; meanwhile arts and entertainment are losing out to golf and fine dining. Self-congratulations far more satisfying than facing truth, values that generated society, as well as society’s future, become seen as irrelevant. A task force of salaried scientists and engineers, in politicos dreams, will surely overcome all problems! Some believe development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be necessary for a world at peace. I don’t.

HoMong early in 1996

HoMong morning market

Shan at business

Toh deer mask

kinaree

Language, global and local, personal with Some words of local language

2010-06-27T18:20:00.000-07:00

ChiangHai Internet Magazine Issue #4

Interview with a Shaman
The Yao, or Eu-Mien, a couple million people who live mostly in Kwangsi Chuang (Guangxi Zhuangzu) autonomous region of China (between Yunnan and Kwangtung), with smaller numbers in Hunan, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangtung provinces, northern Vietnam, north and western Laos, and northern Thailand, speak closely related Sino-Tibetan dialects, but the widely dispersed groups have developed in different directions, adjusting their ways to the environments in which they live. Their religion fuses ancestor worship, animism and Taoism; tribal political structures don’t extend above village chiefs.
My wife’s people, the Lahu-na, prefer to not become bothered in affairs not directly important to their individual lives, and it was only with difficulty that I got her to go along on my interview with a Yao shaman. To her, I was being a busybody, sticking my nose where it had no real business being. Of course, she has a point, but my interest in the Yao pre-dates my interest in her; I have written about them before, and collected their art and handicrafts. And my interest in shamanism predates my knowledge of the Yao.

In the event, it was fortunate that I brought her along, as I eventually needed her help to get the gist of some of my questions across – I simply do not speak Thai like a Thai. My tones are bad, the sentence structures that I choose are often closer to what I would use in English than what a Thai would use, and there are other conceptual and vocabulary problems. My wife can understand what I am trying to say, and I could understand what she said to the shaman, but by the time we were two-thirds of the way through, her help was becoming essential!

The best I can do to present this as an interview is to paraphrase; I had a list of questions written out in English, and mostly was able to follow them, but conversation did wander a bit, and I won’t try to follow all that.

Q. Is there a network of Eu-Mien shamans?
A. Yes, insofar as for getting them to villages which don’t have one in residence.

Q. Do most of them farm too?
A. Yes. Almost all – when they don’t have duties as a shaman, they will tend crops.

Q. Do yao people travel much for ceremonies?
A. No. A shaman will travel, but villagers mostly stay put. A shaman travels when requested to do so.

Q. Is the Chinese spoken by Yao and that spoken by Lahu and Haw Chinese mutually intelligible?
A. Mostly Iu-Mien are multi-lingual, and where there are Lahu people, many will speak Lahu. Yao will learn local language wherever they are, but Chinese has many dialects, and with the Haw, often use of writing is better.

Q. Would a Yao, like a Lahu, utilize the services of a Haw shaman?
A. No. Must be Iu-Mien.

Q. Are there Eu-Mien fortune tellers?
A. Only books about birthdays. And coins for divination.

He showed me the coins – the same ones used for throwing I-Ching (I-Ching, or Yijing, the Book of Changes, is an ancient divination Chinese text; it first explains each line of possible hexagrams separately, then gives an overall interpretation of a whole unit - in cryptic, thought-provoking language). The book the Yao use, which comes from Hong Kong, the shaman said, brought in and sold only during New years celebrations, gives somewhat similar (I’m sure) analyses of possible combinations of 5 thrown coins.
One first holds the coins to one’s forehead and prays, then tosses out the coins one at a time. On the “khwam” side are two very ancient Chinese figures, not pictograms – looking to me slightly Arabic. On the “nai” side are 4 characters looking to me like modern Chinese. The coins, though, are about a century old (round with a square hole in the middle, called cash). All “khwam” is no good, all “nai”, good.

Q. Are some Iu-Mien shaman more animist, others more Taoist?
A. Certainly. But above all, they respect and revere our ancestors.First comes our original ancestor, Pan Hu, then the Three Pure Ones.

Q. Many who revere the Goddess of Mercy Jao Meh Kwan Im won’t eat beans, garlic, onions, beef… and might be completely vegetarian. Do some Yao do that?
A. Not especially, we just respect what is there already, and can ask her for help.

Q. At Ban Pa-duah, up above MaeSaliong Nigh, there’s a Yao shrine at a mountain spring. Do Yao believe in “Jao Tii” spirits of the land?
A. Because people lived where Yao came to, before we arrived, we must respect those buried wherever we are. But these don’t travel with us if we go elsewhere, as our ancestors do.

Q. How much, and how well, do young Yao still honor and respect, and observe, their traditions?
A. Quite well, but it depends on the parents, how much they observe the traditions.

Q. How do Yao feel about Farang NGOs?
A. Pay no attention.

Q. Is there much pressure to assimilate and be more like the Thai?
A. Only so-so. Students must wear school uniforms, but are still Yao at heart.

Q. Can some people tell what village a piece of Yao cross-stitching comes from?
(It's claimed this could be done with Laotian weavings, but I've not verified that)
A. No.

Q. Do the Christian yao still cross-stitch?
A. No.

Q. What makes a shaman? Is it just by choice? How does one become one?
A. Every year, once, two villages get together and sacrifice a big pig, and invite the ancestors to eat, and drink pure rice wine. We burn paper money (etc) and a Great Teacher will see who is interested to learn. Our Great Teacher comes from Ban Po Ba Kaem. He only speaks Yao, and the ancient special language, or dialect, of our shamans. Mostly it is up to success in study, but can also depend on personality.

By this time, my wife had bought a piece of the shaman’s wife’s cross-stitch, our boy Eugene (sounds like Thai for “live in China”) was finished munching on chips, and it was time to go, so I expressed my thanks, was invited to visit again, and told how useful my wife had been in facilitating communication!

To initiated Taoist priests, the many gods are manifestations of the one Dao. Ritually trained to know the names, ranks, and powers of important spirits, and to ritually direct them through meditation and visualization, educated believers know a complex theological system. Communal rituals has two levels: a priestly level, guided by meditation and observed by major patrons, and a public, theatrical level, performed by lower ranked assistants. Meaning is portrayed through visible action, i.e. climbing sword ladders or releasing floating lanterns. A ritual has subtle metaphysical-mystical structure for theologians, and visible dramatic structure for lay viewers. A shaman is often seen as having both magical or prophetic powers, indicative of spiritual attainment. They are believed able to heal, restore vitality, predict the future, read men's souls, and act as stewards of a system of moral retribution. Often non-conformists who embody different values and life-styles, their strict sense of moral retribution yet reinforces social values.
To the Yao, powerful forces, emotional states and roles or forms of success not only work through us, but in a way create us. In another way, they dream themselves, through us. These kinds of archetypes vary from society to society, creating tensions, potentials, tendencies and self concepts. For the Yao, gatekeepers, sheriffs, judges, bailiffs, guards, jesters, magistrates and department heads – bureaucratic forms most villagers have little experience of – formed a heavenly hierarchy while informing about a wider extent of social roles.
If it all sounds naïve and childish, primitive or like a role-playing game (Dungeons and Dragons), well, you’re partially right. But I will submit that none of us are wiser, or more advanced, than the Tao de Jing, or even understand it all that well, and any method of gaining a better approach to its wisdom has advantages. The Yao may not study the primer of Tao, but the seem to me to do better, by living its teachings, and not re-creating an image of their heavenly bureaucracy here in their Earthly lives. Thus maybe doing a little better than the rest of us.

A very few Yao words:
Yes tzèy-nyeh
No my tzèy
Thank you lent zing
Excuse me taw
How are you? May yem long nye
Good long
How much for it? Bòa tsèer

Pan Hu

The Three Pure (or Pelucid) Ones

Cross-stitch from a pair of Yao women's pants

It’s unnecessary to tout the importance English language has attained, but in presenting some local vocabulary which may well become all but forgotten within my young son’s lifetime, I wish to supply some context.
Many mourn loss of linguistic diversity - in the manner of mourning loss of biological diversity, and there is reason to that. But surely linguistic diversity is less important than biological, and even more difficult, to retain. Still, it’s a shame that the various lingos of the Golden Triangle area remain so inaccessible (as do so many others). Surely native speakers would be more likely to retain their unique way of speaking, and seeing the world, if at least some others would take interest in using it too, besides for trying to convert them to Christianity? I’ve met a few Farang speakers of the Thai northern dialect (Pasa Neua, or Kham Muang), and a couple who speak Akha. But T’ai Leu, Lisu, Yao? No. I’ve read that some CIA operatives spoke Hmong, but surely it wasn’t many; I doubt even 20.

Mandarin Chinese, spoken in all of China north of the Yangtze River, and much of the rest of China, too, is the native language of about 870,000 people. The Wu variety of Chinese, spoken by about 100 million, mostly in Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces, is the language of Shanghai, the commercial hub of the country, and T'ai-chou, Ning-po, Soochow and Wen-chou. Cantonese, or Yüeh, the Chinese spoken in Kwangtung and southern Kwangsi provinces (including Canton, Hong Kong and Macau), has retained more features of Ancient Chinese than other forms. A majority of Chinese emigrants may be from areas where Cantonese is spoken, particularly central and western Kwangtung, and these about 80 million Cantonese speakers may control as much money as do Japanese speakers (127 million), but that extent of power is certainly no longer what it once was. And the relative ethnic homogeneity prevailing in Kwangtung stands in contrast to its great diversity of dialects: there’s considerable linguistic variety around Canton, with eight major dialects from the population center alone. Hakka dialect predominates in the north and northeast of Kwangtung, and Min-nan (or south Fukien dialect) is spoken along an eastern coastal area around Swatow. In addition to these Han dialects, there’re languages and dialects of several ethnic minorities, including Yao.

English may be spoken by over 500 million people, more than any other language than Mandarin. Not only do English speakers control more money than do Mandarin speakers, they control global transportation and communication, banking and finance, and the majority of important journals and institutions of science and technology. But let's not forget, behind every great fortune lies a great crime (and all)...
The next most important languages, Spanish and Hindi, trail behind with somewhere in the neighborhood of 400 million speakers each.
Spanish is spoken by well over a quarter billion people - in Spain, the Americas, and Africa; thus, just it’s a bit more important than Bahasa Indonesia/Malay and related lingos of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan, outlying parts of Madagascar, and the Palau and the Mariana Islands of western Micronesia. Its core area is Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, but Indonesia has over 250 distinct languages. Most of the people are Malay, and speak languages of a Malayo-Polynesian base; Bahasa Indonesia evolved from a Malay dialect and has much in common with other Malay dialects, and so long served as regional lingua franca. A relatively simple trade language, not associated with a dominant ethnic group, Bahasa Indonesia has been a strong force in national unification, and is now learned by all children in school (local languages are the medium of instruction for the first two years, then Bahasa Indonesia is used for the remaining years). In 1972 a uniform revised spelling was agreed to between Indonesia and Malaysia, to improve communications ad so that literature could be more freely exchanged between the two countries. Indonesia’s population over 230,000,000; Malaysia’s about 27,500,000, and Burnei’s about 350,000; so, not quite as many speakers as Spanish.

Next in importance (in my estimation) comes Arabic (over 200 million speakers), then Russian (maybe 150,000 speakers), and French (130 million). These days, with but eight languages, one could do quite well, almost anywhere!

It was amazing to find (googling language speakers population) that only between 20 and 30 million Thais should be considered native speakers. There may be no more than 45 million fluent Thai speakers! The rest speak Lao, Khmer, Pasa Neua, Malay or Yawi, T'ai Leu or other tribal languages, Mon, Burmese or Chinese, particularly the Teh Chew dialect. This may be a big part of the problem the Bangkok-centric government is having...

Part of the reason smaller languages are disappearing is their lessening utility; a language used by hunters refers to game, its consumption, and patterns of nature now subject to as great change as has access to game. The protective specialization which gave rise to them offers significantly less survival advantage. But flexibility, fluidity and adaptability are advantageous, and dialectical aptitude can certainly have advantages.

With apologies for lack of any particular order, some local words:
Some Lahu-na (once the lingua franca of the area):

Nice to meet you Ahwiipah chay sahlah (to an older male)
Oh nii pah chay sahlah (to a younger male)
Ah wiimah chay sahlah (to an older woman)
Oh niimah chay sahlay (to a younger woman)
Ah pu joh chay sahlah (to an old man)
Ah pii joh chay sahlah(to an old woman)
How are you? Che sa lah (or lay, for ‘red’ lahu-nyi)
Are you tired? huh jah leh
Thank you O bon ooh jah
Help Nah a suu gah lah
Make a joke da ku-ku way
Sing a song lay koh ka!
The border (at Burma) mii tzu
Restaurant a tzu haw guh
Eat ja!
Insect pu hah (gu)
Not feeling well mah chay sha
Name oh meh
What is this chi a toh ma lay
I don’t know ma shi
I want to know suu ga way
Stop, wait tii kuh jay
No problem fah ta! suh
Problem gah jo way
Love ha!
Angry gee-it, or, buut ja
Li hat ya; hat vey
Hurt nah-ja!
Can pay aw layah
How much tao dai cama-lay
Tea lah
Dark na! geh na-hu
Fire a mii tu way
Hot ho ja!
Spicy ah pii peh ya
Clothes ah po!
Road ya! kaw
Go ha! gay!
Stay cho! kah chay
Have joh way
Here cho! gah
Midnight day chin knee
Day nèe
Water ee-gah
Boiled water booh vey eek-cah
Cold liit' jah
Slippery chat-yah
Dirty cha! cha-eh
Old oh-pii
Baby yah-ae
Lover choh-ha
Lost the way may-oh; may po
Walk yuu-way
Alcohol zzuh (falling tone)
Sleep zzuh' (rising)
Blanket ah-bu!
Danger a lot chi mah-na
Happy ha-lay-ja
A lot chi mah-na!
Yes yo
No ma
Thank you oh bon ooh jah
Excuse me oh bon tay-lay
Cannot (day) mah peh!
Where co ga lay
I don’t understand chaw ngà mah sheè
What is your name no toh mah meh veh lay
What a too mah lay
Altar toh mah lay
Wash (face) (meh!fuh)suuh!peh tu guh
This way tchay day djah
That way oh day djah
Headman ka-tche
Tomorrow so-pò
Food jah-do
Thirsty it!gah nam; it!gah muah
Headache oo-coo na vay
Pain na vay
I want to buy nga vuh vei
Want huh-gah
Far uu-jah
Near chu fu neh
When koh tah laay
Now (sa)tii-kuh
Good Da-jah
I can help Nga gah-vay
Rest room kay kuh yay
Village ka! koh
House yay
Good da! way
Come here cho gah lah
Go away chi fu fu geh
Battery tjit su mah hey
Telephone suu-tii (using Chinese)
Where can I find a restaurant a tzu awe pah! Aw-guh koh ga! joh lay

And some Kham Muang:

How are you? Pen yang dai pong, or, sabai dii goh
Nevermind bah bpen yahng
Thank you yindii
Help chuay gaam; chuai noi
Make a joke oo! len
Sing a song hong plaeng
The border (at Burma) lai na
Restaurant han ahaan
Eat kin gau
Insect maeng
Not feeling well meuy
Name ju
What is this an-yang nii
I want to know khai huu
Don’t know bah huu
Are you tired? It! goh
Fun meuan (falling tone)
True da-ta (rising tone)
How much tao dai
Much, many, a lot (f)jaht-(h)nuk
Do, make nyia
Can dai gah
Love yu nim-nim
Stop, wait yahng
Bed sa-lee
No problem bam ii ban ha
Angry gee-it
Flat tire yang hua
Have you got something? Mii an-yang goh
Now bah diao nii

These are things I’m only just begun in my explorations of; things unfortunately difficult to find the time and energy to get around to, but I do hope my efforts to familiarize myself might make the route easier for at least a few others.

But remember, knowing a person’s name may give you some power over them, but knowing, and using, their language poorly, might give them some power over you!

Just recently, parking my bike in front of a crowded e-mail shop and helping young Eugene off, I got a "Thai tattoo" on my leg when it touched the exhaust pipe. I won't provide a picture of that, but am posting some others:

some tattooing equipment

a protective tattoo

a power tattoo

a woman's prison-made tattoo

divination-structure rasami

and from a temple painting, a scene of Olden Times:

Issue #3

2010-06-12T19:28:00.000-07:00

Having become somewhat of an aficionado of the surreal, a young man of only 52, interested in art, architecture and old Bavarian mechanical clocks, learned of ChiangRai’s new clock tower. He considered going to see it, and became determined to do so when he learned that he could also witness lots of pre-feudal superstition, associated tattooing, and, better yet, photograph long, long lines of sweaty tri-shaw drivers pedaling dozens of rich tourists, seated uncomfortably, slowly around.
Having studied photography, journalism and cinamatology at university, and gotten work with UPI and some other three-initial groups involved in information gathering, and having put in 30 years, he felt free to do as he liked. Right nearby the extravagant clock-tower, replete with light-show, music and early evening crowds of eagerly expectant viewers, at the Stop-N-Seven convenience store, he noticed wives on sale, on the installment plan even. His job having demanded too much travel for any social stability, and internet dating never having seemed reasonable, he was interested to find that now, here, he could not only meet potential mates face-to-face, but bargain towards an agreement (while a bargaining-time meter ran, at a higher rate than internet connection, certainly, but still reasonable enough). One could even joke with others who were similarly bargaining! It was thus that he was told how, to many locals, buying a wife meant earning good karma, as it wasn’t just helping a poor person, but a whole family. At first all this was just a way, having seen the clock, to pass the time, but soon it became rather engaging, and then he got engaged.
It didn’t take long before he’d met a pretty lass who spoke English with an Italian accent. They didn’t find a lot to talk about; she had a pronounced tendency to ask, “Have you eaten yet?” and “Can I ask you (for) something?”… but the smiling at each other was easy. Finding ChiangRai to be low-stress, low-cost and locally oriented (and thus safe from much of globalization’s havoc), he’d begun to conclude that it might well be a safe retirement haven. It certainly seemed a place where achievement was hardly necessary, and never important. He figured he’d about a half-million US to expect from his pension, and so was in a pretty good bargaining position. There seemed to be plenty enough other people to talk with; mostly, he kept quiet about his past, except when drinking too much, and few took other drinkers’ personal claims very seriously, anyway. Low levels of consequence from past involvement seemed another really big plus, and so, before long he found a nice house and had a combination marriage and house-warming party.
Too keep busy, he first tried volunteer work and a fitness program, but quickly tired of them, and was soon back at the bars. His wife complained bitterly, commenting, “Tiao gaeng” – a fairly untranslatable phrase. “He sure knows how to go out and have fun” just can’t sufficiently denote the measure of distain forcefully implied in just those two words.
So he tried the churches, and then organic gardening, then the bars again, and beer with TV, then meditating in a temple cave, but nothing replaced the obligations of his earlier life.
Nothing, that is, until he re-found access to the surreal, in use of the internet all day.

Sangkalok (Sawankhalok) ware

Sukhothai potters learned from Chinese masters and began making beautiful glazed ceramics in the time of King Ramkamhaeng. Sangkalok style pale blue or off-white porcelain with designs of flowers, foliage and fish painted beneath the glaze, were made at Sukhothai’s sister city Si Satchanalai and later, Kampaeng Phet. Most were bowls and plates, but some sangkalok ware was used for architectural decoration; much was exported to countries throughout Asia (mostly to China, but even to Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia), making Sukhothai the center of a trade empire and perhaps the most important producer of ceramics in Southeast Asia for a time (up to the 16th century). Produced also were “Sangkhalok dolls” (statues that may have been toys), beautifully decorated storage jars, temple roof tiles, and religious sculptures.
The Khmer empire had begun to weaken after the death of its last great ruler, Jayavarman VII, around 1220. In 1238 T’ai princes seized Sukhothai and Si Satchanalai from the Khmer – one was Pha Müang/Sri Indraditya of Müang Rat (maybe near Uttaradit), who’d been a vassal of Angkor; the other, Bang Klang Hao of Müang Bang Yang (maybe near Sukhothai) had not submitted. Sukhothai was the region’s main Khmer outpost (established about 1150); these T’ai princes (whose ancestors may have lived around Sayaburi &/or further northeast) created a new polity on the fringes of the central plains, at the very end of the Himalayan foothills. Attacked at Tak by a T’ai prince of Mae Sot, a 19 year old grandson (son?) pushed through fleeing troops and defeated the attacking commander, thus becoming Rama the Bold, Ramkhamhaeng. When he became king in 1279, he controlled Sukhothai, Sawankhalok, Uttaradit, Kampaengphet and Tak. In 1253 the Mongols took Nanchao (the north of Yunnan), and in 1287 Pagan; T’ai and Lue/Lawa peoples ceased attacks on one another in order to resist Mongol incursions, and did so successfully. When Ramkamhaeng died in 1298, Sukhothai also controlled Phrae, Phayao, Nan and Luang Prabang. The plague which killed over half of China between 1331 and 1351 may have been the last straw for Angkor, but seems not to have reached Lanna or Sukhothai. Ayudhaya first invaded Sukhotai in 1374; in 1420 Sukhotai accepted vassalage; in 1431 Ayudhaya depopulated Angkor. Phayao soon passed to Lanna, which took Nan in 1449, then Phrae, and Si Satchanalai in 1459. In 1460 the ruler of Chaliang swore allegiance to Tilokaratcha (r. 1441- 1487), greatest of the kings of Lanna, and with him unsuccessfully attacked Pitsanulok and Kampaeng Phet, outposts of Ayudhaya. Almost 35 years of war between Ayudhaya and Lanna (1451 to 1486) weakened the area; Chaliang was taken by Ayudhaya in 1474; Sukhothai tried to retake Si Satchanalai that year, but failed. In 1765 the Burmese, with Shan troops and contingents from Lanna and Lan Sang, advanced through the area, taking all and destroying Ayudhaya in 1767. The kilns became forgotten, and Sukhothai just a small town until revived by tourism. Locals can become violently adamant in their assertion of the importance and extent of Ramkamhaeng’s conquests and importance, greatly exaggerated for purposes of political expediency in dealing with European colonialists.
At the height of commercial success (1400?), over 200 huge kilns lined the banks of the MaeNam Yom near Si Satchanalai. Several, at the Si Satchanalai Centre for Study & Preservation of Sangkhalok Kilns, have been excavated, and can be viewed Wed. – Sun., 9 – 4, admission B30.
A museum in Chaliang displays excavated pottery samples, as does Sawankha Woranayok National Museum (17 km/11mi south of Si Satchanalaitel 055-641571, open 8:30 – 4 Wed – Sun, admission B30). Si Satchanalai National Park covers 213 sq. km (82 sq.miles) and has many waterfalls, caves and good bird-watching. Sawankhalok town, 11 km south of the historical park and 35 K. north of Sukhothai (on Rt 101 near where Rts 1195 and 1048 intersect, at the western end of Rts 1180 and a rail line) offers hotels and guest houses, a riverside restaurant and night market, plus beautiful paa haaat siaw hand-woven textiles of the Thai Puan tribe.

Another business recommendation:
Just northwest of the ha-yaek Mangrai statue a sidewalk restaurant offers one of ChiangRai's best eating deals: inexpensive fried chicken, khao man gai and khao mok gai (like khao man gai, but with lightly spiced yellow rice), with a variety of home-made drinks.

Not much of a photographer, let along nature photographer, I yet believe that if one takes enough photos, one will surely get a few good ones, and in support of this theory, and as I enjoy trying to capture images of things that interest me, I present here some shots of nature in Chiang Rai:

noisy kids toy

dangerous catipiller

buk, reputed to be the world's biggest flower and good for containing ingested poisons

gink-gah

Remorseless, egotistical leaders with zero qualms about doing whatever it takes to get their own way have hardly been uncommon, and remain in quite plentiful supply. They’ve often inspired great loyalty, and have even, sometimes, well rewarded that loyalty – for some. For others, the reward has been death, dishonor or desperation. For little more, in return, than admiration of ability to act with both success and amorality, and maybe nurturance of a wish to be able to act that way one’s self, too.

In the early 1990s, Taksin Shinawatra rose from deep indebtedness to a net worth of $2 billion - on abnormal profits from a government-bestowed near-monopoly on mobile phones. He soon got involved in politics - to strengthen that monopoly. He bought elections, and from 2001 to 2005, his government changed laws and rules to boost the Taksin family business empire (which increased in market value by three times in those four years, to about 1% of the Thai GDP). Prior to 2001, he never showed any interest in the plight of the poor, or rural issues, but found those issues convenient for expanding a power base provided by Chamlong Srimaung. After gaining political power, he utilized extra-ordinary budget measures to centralize control over a fifth of his government’s budget, under his own executive authority, while otherwise also acting openly contemptuous of the democratic process.
Taksin’s policies, with endemic corruption and many conflicts of interest, resulted in increased inflation, trade deficits and massive consumer indebtedness – and thus, contrary to Red Shirt claims, hurt the Thai economy. His personal wealth, meanwhile, grew from a reported half a billion US$ equivalency, to several billion (some – well lots – having been placed in the care of servants and relatives before the assets declaration necessary upon entering politics).
Grandson of Princess Jantip na Chiang Mai, while growing up his family was one of the richest and most influential in Chiang Mai. In 1980, he married Pojaman Damapong, daughter of a powerful police general; within 2 years they were in debt to the tune of $2 million US, due to business failures. Then they entered into a pager and data networking service business, and began to make money, in about 1990 – soon expanding from computer rentals into mobile phones and satellite communications; before his election as Prime Minister, Thaksin's Shin Corp. had become the sole provider of satellite and cellular communications in Myanmar. As PM, he “helped” police intimidate store managers who sold anti-government publications.
In the first three months of his “drug war”, according to Human Rights Watch, 2,275 people were killed; his government claimed that only around 50 of the deaths were at the hands of the police, and took no action regarding those 50. The drug war eventually claimed, officially, some 2,500 lives. A later government’s investigation into the anti-drug campaign concluded that as many as 1400 of those 2500 killed had no link to drugs. Many others who were killed weren’t even counted, as they were hill-tribe people without citizenship (at least one was killed in every hill-tribe village). A figure of 2800 is commonly accepted, but doesn’t include many tortured, and many “disappeared”… And meanwhile, and throughout, sale of precursor chemicals for amphetamine production, from Thailand to Myanmar, continued.
Under Taksin, the Thai Army stormed a mosque (Krue Se Mosque) where protesters were holed up, and killed them all. Then, 84 peaceful Muslim demonstrators at Tak Bai died after the Army forced them, at gunpoint, to lie shackled and prone in trucks, stacked like cordwood. The trucks were delayed from moving; the 84, soon overheating, were crushed and asphyxiated. Taksin claimed to be sure of the death of Muslim lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit, who’d disappeared, allegedly abducted and killed by police for his role in defending alleged insurgents who claimed to have been tortured – but refused to explain why. No-one was prosecuted, let alone punished, for any of these things.
There is, of course, more – but these matters alone amount to much more than what the Red Shirts accuse PM Abhisit of – and so clearly portray a Red Shirt proclivity to hypocrisy.
Is human longing for heroes so strong that psychopathic megalomania is unimportant, when people are provided with hope?

Three single young men meet on a cheap red-eye flight to Bangkok from Dubai; it’s a first for each. Excited at the prospect of adventure, they compare notes and discover each has a room booked on Sukhumvit Road. One, a big Norwegian, has a room on Soi 15. Another, an even bigger Canadian, has one on Soi 11. The other, and Englishman, has one on Soi 10. They share a cab, and, noticing the Robinson McDonalds, agree to meet up there later, have some lunch and then go for drinks.
Each arrives on foot. They eat, go out front and ask a tuk-tuk driver to take them to a go-go bar. There’s only one in Bangkok open at that early hour, and it was only a short walk away, but the driver agrees, takes them up Soi 15, down Asoke, left on Sukhimvit to a legal u-turn, and then back onto Asoke, from where he turns into Soi Cowboy and parks.
“!50 baht,” he says. They each chip in 50, and the Brit asks, “Which place?” The driver points to Toy Bar, and they go in.
It’s dark but cool inside; no-one is dancing, but lots of girls are sitting around. There are no other Farang. “Great,” says the Norwegian. “Yeah, way cool, hey,” replies the Canadian.
The Norwegian orders 3 beers and 3 chasers, and sits down to drink them, while the Canadian is joined to each side by a lady. When they reply in the negative to his inquiry as to whether they might tell him where to buy some ganja, he calls over two more, and asks their names. They ask for cokes, he acquiesces, then proceeds to make the same inquiry all over again.
The Brit, meanwhile, at first expecting that they’d be going rounds and that the Norwegian had bought the first one, has started to scowl, and is thus ignored. He finally orders a beer, slowly sips at it, and finally, in frustration at the Norwegian ordering another 3 beers and 3 shots, and the Canadian moving on to ask two more girls about ganja, asks his erstwhile companions, “Well, what do you guys want to do? Don’t you want to find someone to fight?”

Links to an interesting blog about a recent bicycle trip throuth Chiang Rai:
http://blog.bikermanscafe.com/?paged=33
http://blog.bikermanscafe.com/?paged=31
http://blog.bikermanscafe.com/?paged=30
http://blog.bikermanscafe.com/?paged=29
http://blog.bikermanscafe.com/?paged=28
http://blog.bikermanscafe.com/?paged=27

2010-06-07T19:37:00.000-07:00

Issue #2

There may be no connection, in fact most likely isn’t, but it was interesting to see a New York Times article disparaging blogs come out (June 4, 2010, “The Public Editor, Other Voices: What Exactly Is a Blog?”), right after it became perfectly clear to all concerned how completely off the mark was almost all international media reportage of this Spring’s Bangkok turmoil. Democracy protests and class conflict indeed. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the current Thai government, Thai income disparity as world's greatest (outside of India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma and only a few score others… “The haves in Thailand have a lot — the country has one of the most inequitable income distributions in Asia, a wider gap between rich and poor than in China, Malaysia, the Philippines or Vietnam, according to a World Bank report.”). And preparations for warfare in Bangkok’s ubiquitous kiddie-sex zones was even reported (see “What Happens to Thailand's Sex Tourism During the Riots? It takes a lot of violence to drive the sexpats away” by Jessica Olien, June 3, 2010; or perhaps better, don’t), with Pattaya deserted and revolting peasants. Ah well – all that playing at writing must have been fun. White isn’t black, but divides up into a rainbow of all colors, and black is all colors, mixed, so they’re pretty much the same, no? Bath was a town in England before soap as we know it came into being; now it’s various kinds of liquid soap. Some things change, but not that no blame or aspersions will be cast on the incessant promotion of materialism coming from the USA, for over half a century. Nor will mainstream media discuss vote-buying! Nope. They’ll just act to justify pre-held opinions, and to propagate fear, as per usual. Like the bar-girl who lied to a customer (see 1st issue) – just doing a job.

The Lahu

The Lahu, or Musur (Burmese for ‘hunter’) tribe of the central Far East Golden Triangle area, an independent people for whom honor and integrity are integral to society, speak dialects of the Yi/Lolo branch of the Tibetan-Burmese linguistic group, make musical instruments and jewelry, weave and garden, traditionally weeding but little and rarely writing (Lahu written language, related to Burmese, is used mostly for religious purposes – animist religion, until the last century). Lahus link health with purity, prayers, and a great spirit with some control over other spirits, G’ui Sha (who created the heavens), and Ai Ma, his wife, (the Great Mother who created Earth). Lesser deities include house spirits, spirits of mountains and valleys, water spirits and ancestors. Believing G’ui Sha brought the first man and woman out of a gourd, they endeavor to please him with music from gourd pipes, called naw, which they tune to the pentatonic scale. Many Lahu men play the naw, made by putting holes into a dried gourd and adding five bamboo pipes set in with beeswax. They use the naw to “talk to each other” during courting – especially at New Years. Lahu also play stringed instruments and drums, and are famous for their knowledge of magic and herbs; they love entertainment and the easy life.
For a Lahu, to believe words while ignoring opposite action is not only a height of shame, but an absurd hilarity. To a Lahu, ambition is crude, shallow and puerile (I was going to use unsophisticated, but that crudely abused term – arising from an early Greek term with strong connotations of "false", used for prostitution, perversion, mystification, and specious nonsense – could be as misleading as most have found the term 'Sophisticated Lady'). Life is to be enjoyed, and not by having, or ordering, or controlling, but by sharing, participating, and observing. The Lahu exhibit scarce little in the way of pomposity (or even manners; they rarely express hello, good-bye, thanks, please or excuse me), but they can be quite regal, nevertheless.
A short Lahu-na fable: Long, long ago, people had wings but no hands (or, at least, no opposable thumbs), and ate only fruit. They could fly but had no fire. They slept in trees; in the rainy season they were often cold; at night, they just couldn’t stay warm! But a kind of jungle animal, a nocturnal raccoon-like squirrel (in Lahu, fahsu), back then had 5-finger hands, and could make fire. But it wanted to be able to fly up to fruit in trees too. The squirrel used fire he made from hitting rocks together to keep warm, but envying wings, finally a trade was arranged. Mankind became able to make fire, and flying squirrels got to eat fruit.
The moral, that all is a trade, that for everything one gets, one also loses something, might help us all to better understand some of our modern predicament. We’ve been trading away some which we might ought to have wanted to keep.

cartoon on Ban Mae Moh school wall

a great place to be a kid

Acceptance into Thai society

To simply understand, let alone enter into, Thai society, one must understand at least some about Thai power relationships, (and words like pii-nong, kraing-jai, pu-yai, khwam neptue, tam-naeng, nah-tii) and the importance of emphasizing positive feelings. One can learn much by studying up on all the many, various terms utilizing “jai” (heart, as in mind or soul); much less about the many various kinds of smiles in the Land of Smiles. But both are important, and necessary. This is not to suggest that people differ between here and elsewhere, but only that familiarity with the Thai view can be important for getting along with Thais.
Acceptance into Thai society for non-Asians, or maybe better put, people for whom eating doesn’t mean eating rice, is usually quite problematic, and difficult to accomplish at all, even with good Thai language skills. OK, you may say, I’m not interested in society – meaning high society, meaning realms of achievement and recognition, meaning membership in organizations of the polite, upper classes. But one’s always interested in being accepted, at least, by somebody, and anyway, here, for a Farang, that’s usually easy… as a provider, who must only achieve recognition of capacity to perform. The Westerner often comes with pre-conceived ideas of love and respect, of “winning hearts”, but here, as in many an elsewhere, it’s anticipated future contribution which really counts. One doesn’t get to rest on laurels from a big victory for long, not if one doesn’t get out there and “ruam muh” – join hands in the work to be done.
So, a retiree finding a wife on the internet gets introduced to an ever-expanding family, and to ever-expanding needs! A friend of ours has a wife of tribal origins, and hired two others from her tribe to look after their baby - while they fought to acquire the necessary paperwork to get the baby to Europe. “They only used soap in the village, why do they need shampoo now?” he asked. Well, they do – in Rome one must do as Romans do, or suffer being looked down upon and despised. Not good for anyone!
With media barrage, education (well… publicly financed indoctrination?), exposure to others’ recent acquisitions and generally increasing expectations, one can suddenly find need to be quite the innovator, finding work, school placement and even fashion-accessories for people one never anticipated taking under one’s wing… at least not when first contemplating taking up residence here! But it must be gracefully accomplished, or not only is one not popular, but things start to disappear… one’s position, such as it was or might have been, starts to become undermined, and then one certainly will begin to have doubts! Then grave reservations, misgivings, and serious losses.
Without getting into arranged marriage vs. romantic love, let’s just say that part of the glory of mating is the anticipation of gaining something. A gift that keeps on giving! A symbol of success! Hopefully, a relationship that will grow, flowering into a beneficial sharing for all concerned. Which isn’t to say you can’t come and stay here if you don’t take a mate (but you can’t really hope to fit in at all if you don’t).
Who you are here is determined largely by who you support, unless someone is supporting you – and that position is problematical too. A tourist comes and everyone seems happy to make acquaintance; hospitality is extended by beaming strangers and these ideas occur… hey, I have something to offer here! I’m actually even liked here, way more than at home… I can do this. This is what I want.
But does it want you? It’s an old, ancient society, no matter what anyone says about lack of ruins and institutions of great antiquity. Arrangements have been fought out at great expense of suffering and capitulation. Not all is to anyone’s liking… all would like more. Quite as usual. Kind of like home! And best to look at it that way. Yes, you might have something to offer, but no, you’re not the bearer of Western Culture and all that it represents, nor would that mean as much as you might like to think, even were it so. Are our toilets and kitchens really so superior? Is our way of life even as sustainable, affordable, friendly, fun, adjusted to local realities (weather, availabilities, power-structurings, insect and mould life, disease probabilities) or even common emotional needs? I submit, not. Nope – the local ways are tried and true; innovations too often prove problematic in the long run. Sometimes dangerously problematic…
Oh yes, it’s fun to feel a sense of being a savior, a provider, idea-man (or woman). But that, like so much, is just illusion, and temporary. If you really want to stay, you must learn, more than teach. Are you ready for that? If you want to stay, think seriously:
How much can you offer respect, how much do you really have, beyond the desire to exploit? Think seriously about it, for, as you will surely find, you too will be exploited, quite as much as you exploit! Live with it, and learn, and you may well be glad you did, and even come to smile about it!

There are lots and lots of words for smile in Thailand, despite dictionaries sometimes only giving things like roi-yim (yim-yaam, and others, including yim-raraeng, rawy yim, yim-yoh!, prai-yim, yim-kram, yim-prai, yim-ka-ria-ka-raad, yim-jaeng, yim pen, yim-yong, yim lamai, yim haeng-haeng, yim huei huei, om-yim – my dictionary with the most listings had 13, but that’s 16 beyond the basic yim, a verb, regardless of how less than rigorous Thai grammar might be seen as…). Lao and Pasa Neua (Kam Muang) have similar words, and one could also count to include Thailand’s many languages of over 50,000 speakers: Yawi, Karen, Mon, Burmese, Khmer, Mandarin, Teh-chiu Cantonese, Lahu (Musur), Lisu, Akha, Hmong and Yao (Iu-Mien) – certainly adding a dozen more terms! The Suai people, Sea-gypsies, Lawa, Kamu, Htin and Mlabri Pi’i Tong Luang People of the Yellow Leaves, Farang and Japanese, Korean and Indians add even more, but well, never-mind that.

The smile is perceived in Thailand as being just about the most appropriate reaction to any possible situation. It's used to show happiness, embarrassment, fear, tension, resignation, remorse etc...What the smile means depends on the 'type' being used - out of many possibilities, including:
Yim suan - a joyful, laughing, merry, jolly smile;
Yim taenn nam-tah - an “I’ve just won the lottery” real happiness smile;
Yim-yong - to smile joyfully
Yim prai - to smile radiantly;
Yim-krim and yim-chaeng - beaming happily;
Yim-yaem or yim chaeng - to grin, beam, or smile broadly and cheerfully;
Yim lamai - to smile pleasantly;
Yim tak-tai - a polite smile used with people you barely know or strangers;
Yim cheun-chom - for when you’re impressed, or find admiration for someone;
Yim hai gamlang jai - the smile of thanks or encouragement;
Yim cheuat-cheun - the smile of a winner for a losing rival;
Yim tak-taan - for “I’m sorry, but you’re wrong and I’m right!”
Feun-yim - to force an “I’m smiling even though I don’t want to” smile;
Yim kuh - to simper, smirk, smile wryly or sheepishly, smile to hide embarrassment at unfulfilled expectations;
Yim ye-ah ye-ah – also to smile wryly and/or sheepishly, but more for apologizing and reducing anger, or smoothing over awkward or embarrassing situations;
Saeng yim, yim yang mai jing-jai – a pretend smile, smirk; a simpering;
Yim sai - used in attempt to mask sadness and unhappy feelings;
Yim sao - to smile sorrowfully, with sad face;
Yim mai awk - a smile that doesn’t really come out, despite attempt to make it do so;
Yim haeng - a ‘dry smile’ for placating, as when apologizing for lost luggage, or stepping on someone’s foot; also, to smile mirthlessly;
Yim mii lai-nai - used to conceal evil ideas or feelings, like “I’m going to rip you off and you don’t even suspect it”:
Yim-yoh - used to mock, taunt or laugh at someone;
Yim duai bpak or yim yuh, to behave insultingly;
Yim yi-yuan, yim yuan or yim yua – to smile provokingly;
Yim karia-karaat, and yim yee-yee, to smile wryly and sheepishly, with embarrassment and confusion;
Yim-soo, for situations so bad one might just as well smile as anything;
Prai-yim, a trace of a smile
and
Om-yim, to smile knowingly, in a mildly amused and patronizing manner, without parting lips.
There should be another for youth sitting in front of the driver of a moving motorcycle – that big smile isn’t really the smile for strangers, and isn’t just for pleasure, but seems to be a smile for meeting the world, a smile to be seen in, seen wearing… a smile to express a pure heart.
One shouldn’t just assume that someone smiling is happy or being friendly; there are many less pleasant reasons for them to do so. But people smiling if you happen to trip up might not actually be laughing at you (yim yoh), but just giving you a yim ye-ah ye-ah to try and stop you feeling embarrassed.

Lanna's Sacred Mountains

Asians, indigenous peoples and Taoists generally revere sacred mountains – places of refuge, where gods and heroes come from; symbols of power and strength, eternal landmarks, and repositories of nature, which provide a kind of encyclopedic reference.
The world is dotted with ‘sacred mountains’ - and northern Thailand has its share. Sacred mountains offer potential connectedness to a sense of source, to tradition, history and legend, and to mysterious power. Mountains are believed to harbor guardian spirits, and inspire respect and reverence. Caves, springs, waterfalls, mountain-tops and great heights all carry an aspect of the spiritual, as can ancient trees and lagoons. Buddha relics are frequently claimed ensconced in ancient jedis (no, not masters of the “Force”, but pagodas, stupas – bell-shaped religious memorials), often located atop high places, places where hermits lived, and powerful animals (representative of forces of nature). Pre-T’ai legendary figures and supernatural beings are remembered in folklore which became incorporated into Buddhism and local chronicles; the mountains give real place to go with story, and resist change more than other geographical features. As Bangkok has no mountains, one was built – PuKhao Tong – the Golden Mount.
Doi Tung is the most famous and visited sacred mountain in Chiang Rai, with royal residence, gardens, zoo, restaurants and tribal villages in addition to temples. My personal favorites are Doi Khao Quai at the south-west edge of ChiangRai City, and Doi Klong Khao (the khao in the first name khao refers to a white buffalo with crystal horns, this second means rice, in rice-box), west of town just south of the river (and the prison). We’ve two Doi Luangs – one with national park and nine-tiered PuKaeng waterfall (10 km. south of Phan), the other between ChiangRung and ChiangSaen, near the Kok River (a mountainous ‘tambon’ administrative region, with highest point in the province). Sleeping Lady Mountain and Lagoon, 7 or 8 kilometers south of Mae Sai, has many shrines in the area, including an interesting new one dedicated to woman’s suffering (near Taam Luang, the province’s biggest cave, and some other caves with other shrines; one has a devil depiction). Doi JomTong, the hill where Mengrai set the original base for his new nation, has a large physical map of the Buddhist universe, and a variety of shrines – some unusual. The hill across the Kok north of Pattaya Noi beach not only has a Buddha cave but a Chinese temple and wonderful natural ambience, great for a wander around. Just west of Mae Sai is a Meditation Point graced by elegant natural beauty and tradition, and along Rt 1129 southeast of Chiang Saen, at K. 49 just south of the Kong River (Mekong) at Ban Sob Cam, are some old temples including Wat Prataat PraNgao with PraBoromTaat and PraTaat JomJan, and Wat PraTaat SongPiNong. What may be the oldest religious memorial in Chiangrai is near Wiang Chai, towards the Kok, in Wat Boran; there is no hill there.
Chiang Mai has Doi Inthanon, with the highest elevation in the country, Chiang Dao (great caves) and Doi Suthep, one of the nation’s most revered sacred mountains. But for mountain lovers, Loei Province is best: PuLuang, Pu Rua, PuKradung and Khao Yot Chi. PuKradung National Park has a beautiful mountain and interesting wildlife; the area reminds me of better aspects of West Virginia. PuRua National Park, bordering Laos, has mountains of sandstone and granite, numerous streams and broad-leafed evergreen forests; climbing this “boat mountain” takes about two and a half hours. On the summit are meadows, pine stands, rock gardens, a view of the Mekong and a Buddha image popular as a pilgrimage site. Sunrises there are spectacular, and to facilitate viewing them, tents available for rent (beware, there’s tigers and bears!).
Malaysia once had much natural splendor; now it has many rubber plantations with dominant modern materialism grafted onto medieval Islam. Thailand’s lush forests and exotic wildlife is almost all gone as well, and the burning in the north distressing. This gets blamed on hill-tribe scapegoats, but it’s really almost everybody is to blame. Cigarettes carelessly thrown from cars, trash burning, brush clearing, a perceived need to limit vermin (naturally dealt with by predators now gone), and materialism over quality of life (as purportedly communist Chinese leader Deng Shau Ping said, “To be rich is glorious”), all contribute. Results include flooding, changing weather patterns, landslides, chemical dependency (fertilizer, pesticides) and water shortages. The tourists who used to flock to the hills to do drugs in hill-tribe villages now go to Laos, but eco-tourism and outdoor adventure remain viable (though yet poorly promoted or supported. Cement is used with gleeful abandon as if a cosmetic, the climate heats up, and what? People learn of consequences?

For a quick approach to some understanding of the teachings of the Buddha, some good advice from the Dhammapada may help: "To speak no ill, to do no harm, to practice restraint according to the fundamental precepts, to be moderate in eating, to live in seclusion, to devote oneself to higher consciousness, this is the Teaching of the Buddhas."
Note that last word. As with other religions, Buddhism has amalgamated teachings from more than one source. No single version of the life of the Buddha is accepted by all Buddhist traditions. That Gautama Buddha is reputed to have attained enlightenment under a fig tree (protected by the serpent king who came to spread his hood above the Buddha and thus shelter him from storms) may be as significant as that Jesus is reputed to have been born of a virgin (like many deities before him). The fig fruit is enclosed (in an inflorescence or synconium, an urn-like structure lined on the inside with the fig's tiny flowers); its unique pollination system involves tiny, highly specific fig wasps, which enter into the hidden flowers, and both pollinate and lay their own eggs. Fig fruits provide both food and traditional medicine; they contain laxative substances, flavinoids, sugars, vitamins and enzymes. However, the sap is a serious eye irritant. The fig is thought of as fruit, but is actually, the flowers and seeds grow together, in a closed receptacle with many small flowers arranged on the inner surface; thus the actual flowers are unseen unless the fig is cut open. Because the flower is hidden, a legend developed to explain its absence; thus, in Buddhist mythology, the flower has been said to bloom only once every 3,000 years. It thus symbolizes events of very rare occurrence, but not a unique one. Buddha had many incarnations, as told in Jataka tales. But the cycle of rebirth, or samsara (literally “wandering”), is relegated to a domain of suffering; the ultimate goal of Buddhist practice is to escape that suffering, which Gautama is reputed finally to have done, becoming “thus gone, worthy, fully and completely awakened, accomplished in knowledge and virtuous conduct, well gone, knower of worlds, unsurpassed guide for those who need restraint, teacher of gods and humans, awakened, fortunate.”
How much all that pertains to Thailand, though, depends much on how one wishes to see things, and it may be quite important to recognize that prayer and magic (religious chanting and incantations for sorcery) utilize the same root syllable, mon, as in wet-mon (magic spells) and suwet-mon (recitation of prayers).

photo by Elayne Warren

Here’s a link to an interesting article on Thai bananas:
G:\The banana, and its many uses.mht

More business recommendations:

Rung Ruang Service (auto-body repair), east out Paw Khun Road from the Mangrai statue at the Ha-yeak, almost to Central Park and the bridge to the airport, on the north side at 90/1 Mu 12, Tambon Ropwiang; tel 053-742592 or 081-5959626. Owner Khun Udom has little English, but provides excellent service, with speed, honesty, good price and always the right advice.

Lawyers: as experience of each and every one I have not, perhaps I shouldn’t say, but my experience if those with offices near the courthouse has not been good. As with water system installers (next), there are always some who clearly have simply too little facility with the work they try to do. Mr. Pairote Boonprasert, just northeast of the Ha-yaek at 126/1 Paholyotin Road, tel. 053-718907 or 081-7248931 (e-mail pairotelaw@hotmail.com) is not the cheapest, but he speaks some English, and can understand more.

Water systems – one doesn’t need to be an engineer to understand the water systems used here for homes without access to the municipal supply, but it might help. Electric pumps, a tower and holding tank, cleaning maintenance, on-off switching systems and quite a lot of attention to detail are all quite necessary, and results can be much less than satisfactory. I recommend S.B. Water Filter (kruang krong nam), 129/1 Mu 1, Ban Du, about 300 meters south of Makro. 053-703889, 081-0263979 or 081-4723799.

Northern Farm: great frozen salmon and hamburger patties, good cheese and pork chops, and a distinct Farang orientation (but a quite limited, and stagnant, product line). Cashiers often have but little English, but that usually isn’t a problem. On Soi Wat Pranon, well behind the Ha-yaek Bangkok Bank, at 863/6 Pahonyothin Rd., Tambon Wiang, Chiangrai 57000. Tel 053-716618 e-mail nip@loxinfo.co.th

Munic Supply computers and computer repair: 836/16 Pahonyothin Rd., Tambon Wiang CR 57000, tel. 053-718000 - just south of the Ha-yaek, on the east side of the Superhighway.

And the people who got us into our beautiful new home:
"Sawaddee Chiang Rai" - The Northest Pride Realty
Property & Realty service on Chiang Rai
Contact: Khun Toms Duang-Jai Khum Mon-Thrien
( คุณดวงใจ คำมณเฑียร - คุณต้อม )
address: 77/16 PraToo ChiangMai Rd.
Tambon Wiang, Meung District
Chiang Rai 57000
Mobile phone: 086-1903219, 086-6701053
fax: 053-744086
E-mail: dng-jai@hotmail.com
Website: www.sawaddee-chiangrai.com

and

"The Hill-side Design" archetictural service
service to - Property planing
- Building Design
- Construction Drawing
- Building Consualtant

contact: Mr.Sushine Uraives
( คุณสุชาย )
same address as above
Mobile phone: 081-3871145
E-mail: sushn@hotmail.com

The Enlightment Tree of ChiangRai’s Main Downtown Intersection

2010-05-31T18:05:00.000-07:00

ChiangRai’s central intersection was named for the sacred fig, but now, somehow, the sign commemorating the ancient gate uses สรี (‘glory’) instead; originally the intersection name (important as intersections have traditionally been considered better landmarks than stretches of road) was สะหลี (sah-li), an old Lanna language term for the Bo tree. Perhaps someone from Bangkok changed it to สรี… The old northern language uses no ‘r’ sound (nor, consequently, has a letter for it). Bo trees are rare here, but almost all Thai temples have one. There are two at the east side of Wat Pra Singh, another at Wat Pra Kaeo, several at and around Wat Jet Yod, and more in Mae Sai… anyway, let’s hope roots aren’t completely forgotten, and that the past doesn’t become just another fairy tale!
The northern dialect (pasa neua in Central Thai) was referred to as Lao a century ago; its written language, which antedates Thai, has resemblances to Burmese and Lao that Thai does not. Common greetings are, Kin khao lao bo yang (have you eaten yet) or Bpai nai (where are you going). Sawat-dii ka and swastika sound alike because they have the same derivation; the terminology came here from ancient India. The ancient language of the north, though, does not share in use of terms from Pali, Sanskrit or even Khmer (at least not much). High and low tones are a bit higher and lower, and the language is even more monosyllabic.
As ‘r’ sounds do not exist, a school is a hong hien, not a rong-rien; and despite how it is marked, the town’s main intersection, si-yaek pratu sri, is pronounced by locals as si-yaek pratu sali (pronounced with a short ‘a’ sound and no rising inflection at the end, as opposed to the sali, meaning round pears from China, with short ‘a’ and rising inflection at the end. Sa-lee, here, is an old Lanna term for the Bodhi, or Bo, tree (the ‘sacred fig’) under which the Buddha is reputed to have achieved enlightenment. The Bo tree has heart-shaped, prominently displayed leaves, and takes hundreds, if not thousands, of years to fully grow. It has always had major significance in Buddhism, and is greatly revered. There’s no ‘sri’ in Lanna dialect (kham muang), and young people seem to not even know where the intersection name comes from… especially as that tree is now known as “Don po”!

Give a Fig

Figs, one of two trees sacred to Islam, are also sacred to Hindus and Jains; they’re of great cultural importance both in the tropics and elsewhere. The importance of fig trees, and a taboo against cutting them down, is shown in the ancient Hindu Ramayana epic, where Ravana exclaims, “I haven’t cut down any fig tree…Why then does this calamity befall me?” Genesis 3:7 has Adam and Eve covering their nakedness with fig leaves of the common fig (Ficus carica).
An interesting fact about them is that they utilize a wasp species (fig wasps) for pollination. Among the first, and perhaps the very first, plant species bred for agriculture (in the Middle East, over 11,000 years ago), there are many kinds. The Peepul, Bodhi, Bo or Po (as in Wat Po; Ficus religiosa) and the Banyan, which grows in cracks and crevices of host trees, are regarded as sacred by hundreds of millions of Asians; the Bo symbolizes happiness, prosperity, longevity and good luck. One or more, sometimes of considerable size, can be found in or near most Buddhist monasteries and temple compounds. They’re easily recognized by its heart-shaped leaves which descend into long points, and tremble in breezes, making a fluttering sound.
In Chiang Mai there’s an old one by the Moon Muang Road moat. It’s not native to Thailand, but the related Ficus benjamina (in Thai ton sai) is, and can get as large; the largest is a couple km. from the Khmer ruins at Prasat Hin Phimai (in Khorat). Northern Thailand’s most famous Bo tree is about 20 km. southwest of Lampang, at Wat Phrathat Lampang Luang, one of the country's oldest and more impressive temples. The gnarled old giant has branches propped up by poles, and is decorated with strips of silver and gold paper. It’s said to come from a cutting of the famous Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi of Anaradhapura in Sri Lanka - the oldest living plant of known planting date (288 BCE, by King Tissa), and said also to come from a cutting from the very tree under which the Buddha attained enlightenment (thus giving it the name ‘enlightenment’ tree).

Bo tree at Wat Pra kaeo, ChiangRai

Bo tree at Wat PraSing, ChiangRai

A Nam Lad occupation

Nam Lad means where the river takes a short-cut when it floods. There’s a bend in the Kok River, and a lot of stones have accumulated. Just downstream the riverbed diverges into separate channels; not long ago this separation into channels was much more so, and created Dusit Island and Goh Loi (Floating Island). Koh Loi is a small flood plain, and the river there was shallow, wide and correspondingly slow-moving – so it didn’t carry anything heavy, and deposited silt.
The Kok River banks at Nam Lat, as high as 3 meters, are now shored up with stone and strong wire mesh; flooding from it doesn’t happen anymore. For much of the year it’s shallow enough to allow gathering small stones to sell, labor which generally nets workers over B500 for a day’s work. The guys who do this work are some of the last of the genuinely independent operators.
In the morning a couple men will go out in an uncovered long-tail boat – just a long, empty vessel with motor and long propeller shaft. The men know the river well, and have their work spaces delineated. For hours they will gather tiny and small rocks in scoops – either like ones often used as dust-pans, or, more often, half a strong plastic bucket rimmed where it was cut with thick wire, to strengthen it and create handles. They wash dirt from the rocks, and then pour them into the middle of the long boat. Reddish or whitish stones will be piled separately, as convenient, from darker brown or black ones, although the price they sell for is often the same. Before long the boat is low in the water, and it’s time to head in with the load.
Each boat has its own bamboo dock, to which the workers laboriously, but skillfully, maneuver their craft. Then it may be time for a brief rest, before using the scoops to toss rocks up onto the little bamboo pier, where a special kind of wheelbarrow will have been placed, and sometimes family members wait to help. The wheelbarrow is up considerably higher than the boat, so it takes real strength to toss the rocks into them. But it can be, and is, done. When the wheelbarrow’s full, it’s pulled by hand or motorbike from the riverbank, to a place nearby, alongside a small road going parallel to the river, and dumped. Later a big 6-wheel truck will come and the tossing of rocks take place anew, at first with a side of the truck lowered.
The rocks are occasionally used decoratively, and in ponds for raising fish, so some are sold for more. But they’re mostly used in construction. At other places along the river, sand is dredged, to be used for making cement. ChiangRai is growing, and this is where much of the construction material used to build comes from. But although the Kok runs down from Burma, not China, and so isn’t affected by the many new Chinese dams, precipitation patterns have been changing, and maybe Himalayan snow melt has lessened; at any rate, the Kok doesn’t carry as much as it used to.

Which brings us to a story of great philosophical import, which I ran into at MyStrangeStories.com:

Head In the Sand, by 20 CMR

Once upon a time there was an ostrich. The ostrich had no concerns and was content to while away its days with its head in the sand. It would awaken that way in the mornings and drift to sleep that way at night. During the day it would seek out new sand to enjoy. It was at peace with itself and the world around it.
Then one day a man walked by and saw the ostrich with its head in the sand.
“Ostrich,” he said, “Why do you spend your days in such a state, idle and purposeless with your head in the sand?”
“Why shouldn’t I” said the ostrich. “It’s what I enjoy. I can think of nothing I would rather be doing.”
“Nonsense,” said the man. “There’s plenty to be done. One must always aspire to fruitful endeavor, take charge of his own fate, and bring about true happiness for himself and others. Life is meaningless with out aspirations to attend to. What will be your measure when time is done with you? Will you have brought about change and glory to the world, or will your passing be as forgettable as the wind? What legacy will you leave when you’re gone? Or are these grains of desert sand all that you will touch in this life?”
When the ostrich failed to reply, he went on, “Come with me ostrich! Together we will move mountains. Together we can change the world, reshape it to the betterment of all. We’ll live on forever in the hearts of all who come after, and in the history we shall forge. We will achieve such heights as never have even been dreamt before!”
At first the ostrich demurred. He’d no interests in the doings, and hubris, of others. But the man persisted and eventually convinced him to his way of thinking.
So, the ostrich left the desert, and journeyed into distant lands. He became a teacher and a prophet, and inventor and innovator. He gained numerous titles and degrees despite his physical disadvantages. Together he and the man won Nobel prizes and awards. They ended world hunger, cured diseases, and brought peace to the world. They built cities on land, in the air, and in the sea, and even moved mountains.
The world had entered a golden era. None had ever accomplished so much. Yet deep in the ostrich’s soul there was always a yearning for the sand.
The ostrich and the man grew old from their labors, and one day the ostrich went to see him.
“Man,” he said. “I feel I have accomplished much in this life, just as you said we could. Together we have changed the world, reshaped it to the betterment of all, and even moved a mountain or two. There is nothing left for me to do, our work is finished and I’m returning home to the sand.
”But Ostrich,” said the man. “There is no more sand!”
“What?”
“Don’t you remember? We used it all to make concrete. We built cities, bridges, and schools with it. Those mountains we moved needed new foundations, not to mention damming up the Pacific Ocean for hydroelectric power.” The man continued, telling of all the great things they’d built. He talked of saving California, cloning sea turtles, and the worlds biggest half pipe, but the ostrich didn’t hear him.
The only thing he could think was, “Damn, I can’t believe I wasted all that good sand.”

Advice to new Expat Residents of Thailand faced with Legal Issues

By Joel Barlow

When investing here, building, starting a business or just leasing something, as also with marital or criminal issues, make legal caution a top priority. One good lawyer may well not be enough. Good advice from a variety of sources can save grief!
Think, for example, of tax code problems. Do you do your taxes yourself? Likely not, if they’re at all complicated! Officials, especially in the USA, often interpret the tax code, and other laws, differently. With many legal matters here in Thailand, as elsewhere, precedent and traditional procedure may be more important, in some ways, than the actual wording of a law, and it is best to expect that there may be different interpretations.
A good example is building a home here: a cheap lawyer, and expensive lawyer, a municipal official and a village headman are unlikely to give one the same advice as to how to proceed. This is not necessarily a problem of efficiency, or education, or language… it’s just the way it is. Similarly, experience applying for visas at Thai consulates and Thai embassies will differ, as will service in different countries.
Bureaucracy the world over has gotten out of control, growing, spreading and propagating itself like a cancer more dangerous than rabbits newly introduced to Australia or kudzu to the USA. It’s been a public headache and major social problem for as far back as we have records, but we have yet to learn how to control it, reign in its inefficiencies or even much limit its expensive waste. Motor Vehicle Bureaus and the ChiangMai USA consulate don’t any longer require all the waiting they used to, but absurdities remain. To apply for a retirement visa I wanted two documents notarized – and for less than a minute’s more work, my cost was doubled from B1020 (for one document) to B2040. I’d have done better to combine the two, and get a certified translation made… but more to the point: in this computer age, our waste of paper yet increases; numbers of bureaucrats rise faster than the population (in pubic companies, private companies, government, lawyers, accountants; one can’t help but participate some, doing bookkeeping for taxes, or whatever).
It’s become as expensive as health care, and often similarly unnecessary. As a doctor is redundant to those who take care of themselves, much paperwork would be unnecessary if we’d only take sufficient responsibility for our corporations and governments. A computer-chip ID wouldn’t be a notion of terror to so many if we were successfully, and sufficiently, organized to control bureaucracy – but we aren’t (although the legislature of Virginia state passed a bill in Feb., 2010, to protect citizens from being forced to have microchips planted in their bodies, amid concern chips could be a “mark of the beast” used by the Antichrist … or, at least, that chip implants might replace employee ID badges in offices. Microchip implants can store medical data… or establish “a National Health ID/Debit card with Smart chip/RFID technology, linked to Bank accounts for the purpose of ID verification as well as patient info, along with instant debit from” one’s accounts… Four USA states have passed bills saying their people cannot be forced to take chip implants, but they remain in use to track pets through radio frequency identification, and would be great for Alzheimer patients - so that nursing home staff can track them down when they go wondering).
Communist states failed not because of the ideology, which was never instituted anyway, and which I hardly mean to defend, but rather because of bureaucratic inefficiency, waste and failure to meet real needs. That we (humans), as individuals, abdicate much too much responsibility, is a big, big problem. Not that I wouldn’t worry about a chip implant’s safety, but I could certainly stand the assist in record keeping!
But enough of all that. The point is, it serves no purpose to find fault with the local system, to complain and get all worked up (perhaps to the point of ulcers). It’s our responsibility to gather information, be as prepared as possible, and to then make appropriate arrangements. To delegate responsibility too much, and rely too much on others, is to insure that important issues will not be fully addressed, and needs not completely fulfilled. To lose much anticipated, which would have been available with proper care. Sure, there are only so many hours in a day, and navigating bureaucracy in a strange, difficult language is especially hazardous, but ChiangHai Magazine is now here to help.

Some Thai laws that resident expats should know:

Buying a vehicle and registering it is easy if you have a non-immigrant visa and either a work permit or a proof of address form. You’ll need copies of your passport main page and visa page, and (usually) a letter from immigration. If you have a tourist visa you cannot own a vehicle in your own name. License plates (แผ่นป้ายทะเบียนรถม หมายเลขทะเบียนรถ or simply ทะเบียนรถ), required by law, display the name of the province where the vehicle is registered. Owners register in the province they live; this isn’t necessarily that of official residency (as shown on a house registration). If a car is sold or given to someone else (permanently), and the new owner is living in a different province, the number usually changes. You get a license plate with two Thai consonants, 1 to 4 numbers (from 1 to 9999) and the name of the province where it was registered. Some consonant combinations aren’t used as they form negative words: for example, "จน" means poor, "ตก" means fail or fall, and "ศพ" means corpse. Eight different types of vehicles are officially recognized, and show differences in plate types; some have only one consonant, others another number in different style, and there are diplomatic plates, but unless you’re really into vanity plates &/or lucky numbers, you really needn’t worry your pretty head about all that.
When you buy a car, the dealer arranges paperwork to register the vehicle, for you. You provide signed copies of your Passport, Visa, and Work Permit or proof of residency (including the house registration – tambian ban – of your landlord). If you don’t have a work permit, take your rental contract (or home ownership papers) to the Immigration Office (you’re supposed to register your address there anyway) and get a proof-of-address document; the fee is B500. If you decide to buy a car in Pattaya or Bangkok but live in ChiangRai, you need to obtain a letter from MaeSai Immigration before you change the papers stating you live in ChiangRai. To get this, take in your passport, 2 photos and a lease or other papers proving your local domicile address. There’s no charge for this letter, which they will usually provide right away.
The Vehicle Registration Office of the Department of Transport must see your original documents, but, rather than let them out of your hands, you take copies and the originals to the Registration Office, where they stamp and certify the copies. These certified copies are all the dealer needs to complete the registration. The annual vehicle registration fee is governed by the engine size and the type of vehicle, and both the vehicle registration sticker, issued by the vehicle registration office (which shows the year of expiry in large figures) must be displayed on the left hand side of the windscreen.
When a new car is registered, you will be given red license plates until your registration is complete – normally about one or two months. When they’re ready, go back to the dealer to have the permanent plates fitted and collect the registration book. Some dealers can be slow providing new plates. As strictly according to the law, you may not drive at night or outside your home province on temporary plates
If you’re buying a car through payments, the lender will hold the registration book until you finish paying, at which time they’ll transfer to your name; but you may need to re-provide all that paperwork. And, to obtain car finance, you’ll need a Thai guarantor.
Some suggestions: Be wary about buying a car other than through a reputable manufacturer’s dealer or a second hand dealer of note. Maybe buy a used pick up first – they’re cheaper as tax on them is lower. The driving style here can take some getting used to, you might want to teach someone else (i.e. spouse or lover) to driver, and there’s a definite chance of it getting banged up at bit. Buy a popular make Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi), as it’s easier getting service for them. Automatics are harder to find, but a lot easier to teach someone how to drive! Go for a small engine - most likely most of your driving will be in town or on the highway – you don’t need lots of horsepower, or to race kids from KrungThep. Save on gas. Consider LPG – it’s WAY cheaper.
Insurance: There are two types of insurance in Thailand, the Government mandatory 3rd party insurance and the comprehensive insurance which is not mandatory but highly recommended. Both insurance types are arranged by an insurance company and there are many such companies with offices in Phuket and agents everywhere! At first, or for the first year with a nice car, you might want a high level of insurance. After a year without any claims, your rates will go down (maybe 30% less). The mandatory liability insurance costs only about 1-2,000 baht. If you sell your vehicle before the insurance expires, there’s no refund - the insurance is carried forward to the new owner. It is unwise to drive without adequate insurance; if you have an accident without insurance, there’s no limit to your liability. There can also be a fine for driving without insurance (up to B10,000). After a year, don’t forget to renew! All that applies to motorcycles, too, except that no comprehensive insurance is available in Thailand for motorcycles. You must, though, have the mandatory government insurance.

Leasing Land/house in Thailand:
This is a good alternative to buying a house, but a lease should be done properly by a reliable lawyer. They charge about 5000 -10000 baht. You take the lease to the Amphur together with the nor sor sam or Kanut and register it; they then stamp the document on the back. The land cannot then be sold unless the lease is cancelled. A lease without doing this is totally useless. The lawyer would take the title deed to the Amphur and get it legalized. The wife or owner should then sign another 30 year lease dated from the end of the first one (you can renew a 30 year lease). Most wives would agree to these procedures by explaining to them that if they died, they would not want their husbands thrown out! At the end of the thirty year lease, all you have to do is get a lawyer to take it to the amphur again. A virtual 60 year lease should cover most peoples lifetime and the wife can leave the property in her will to the children; if you die the lease could be terminated and the property go to your children.

For foreigners who wish to retire in Thailand:
Initially you must get a nonimmigrant visa from a Thai Embassy or consulate, before you enter the country. Most visas are for one year, but permission to stay is for only 90 days, renewable upon leaving and re-entering the country (often done by walking into a neighboring country; a final 90 days can be taken just before the end of the year after the visa is issued).
There are two types of visa options for individuals who are interested in retiring in Thailand. The first option is an O-A Retirement visa which is obtained in your home country before entering Thailand. The second, and most common is the extension of stay based on retirement which is processed at immigration inside Thailand. issued to applicants aged 50 years, with no criminal record in Thailand and over who wish to stay in Thailand for a period of not exceeding 1 year without the intention of working, who have a non-immigrant type visa and B800,000 in a Thai bank account, or a verified income/pension of 65,000 baht per month (or a combination of savings and income). Note: You have a much better interest rate on a FIXED Term Deposit, which is also acceptable. Bua Luang, mutual funds or money market accounts are not.
Retirement visa requirements: application form T.M.72, copy of passport or substitute document, two 4 x 6 cm photos, proof of financial sufficiency, and a B1900 application fee. If the applicant is 60 years or older, income must be not less than 200,000 baht per year (or 20,000 baht per month – sorry if that confuses…). For applicants over 55 years old, proof of 800,000 baht in a Thai bank OR an income of not less than 35,000 baht per month (I’ve read 65,000, but think that not correct) must be presented. The B800,000 must be deposited for a minimum of 3 months before you first apply, and for 2 months every time you renew. A personal income tax return with receipt, proof of pension, proof of interest from bank account deposit or proof of other income from authorities concerned can be used to demonstrate income.
If you’re married to a Thai, you need only 400,000 baht on deposit, and proof of income. For a marriage visa, extensions are less: B40,000/month for a male Farang with B400,000 in a Thai Bank. You’ll need a family photo, and your spouse along to sign documents. The bank account can be in your spouse’s name. Total income of not less than B40,000 per month, except for aliens who entered the Kingdom before Oct. 1988, and were granted a permit to stay in the Kingdom, must be shown (again, this doesn’t seem to be hard and fast, especially due to quickly varying exchange rates).
Documents Required:
- Passport with validity of not less than 18 months, with copies of front page, visa, last entry stamp and the TM6 arrival/departure card.
- 3 copies of completed visa application form TM7 (available from www.immigration.go.th).
- 2 passport-sized photos (4 x 6 cm) of the applicant taken within the past 6 months.
- A personal data form and a hand drawn map to your residence.
- 2 copies of quite recent bank statements, showing a deposit of not less than B800,000, or an income certificate (original copy) showing a monthly income of not less than B65,000, or a deposit account plus a monthly income totaling not less than B800,000. For example if you have proof of 32,500 baht per month in income then you would need to also show proof of 400,000 baht deposited in a Thai bank. To show more than the minimum amount can be a big help in getting your retirement extension or “O-A” visa approved. The bank statement must be accompanied by a letter from your bank showing that the money came from outside Thailand (2 copies, too). To show an income or pension of B65,000 per month, you must obtain a certified ‘affidavit of income’ from a consulate or embassy. Various embassies have different requirements for issuing this document, so it is recommended you supply additional ‘evidence of funds’ to the immigration officer (they are aware that some embassies do not ask for supporting documentation when issuing the income affidavit). Pensioners arriving before Oct 1998 with unbroken records while living here only need 200,000 baht in a Thai Bank when they apply for an extension. Those arriving in Oct 1998 or after, who have obtained a permit to stay on the basis of having 200,000 baht in a Thai Bank, must increase that amount to 800,000 baht before applying for an annual extension.
With your bank deposit books you’ll need the following:
- two photocopies of the passbook page showing your name & account number
- two photocopies of the passbook page showing the current balance
- two copies of a guarantee letter from the bank (your bank may charge for this, but not much)
- a medical certificate issued from the country where the application is submitted, showing no prohibitive diseases as indicated in the Ministerial Regulation No.14 (B.E. 2535) (certificate shall be valid for not more than three months and should be notarized by notary organs or the applicant’s diplomatic or consular mission), or, a medical certificate (health exam administered by doctor at first class hospital) issued in the last 30 days, certifying that the applicant is “not a person of physical infirmity, incompetent, mental infirmity”, with no prohibited disease, including leprosy, tuberculosis, alcohol or drug addiction, filariasis (a tropical parasitic disease which causes elephantiasis; sometimes syphilis is included; the law is the Ministerial Regulation No. 14, B.E. 2535).
If the alien is ill, or has weak health and is sensitive to colder climates or has resided in Thailand for a long period, and is 55-59 years old, special circumstances may be given. Applicant must have no criminal record in Thailand (and the country of the applicant’s nationality or residence), and supply proof that he/she is not a wanted criminal back home (an affidavit from a home country consulate attesting to that suffices).
If married, or with children under 20 (who must live with you), you’ll need papers proving that, and signed copies (including of your spouse’s ‘bat prachachon’ ID card and ‘tambian ban’ household registration). A Thai parent, over 50, can also be a dependent who can help you get a good visa. Proof of Thai nationality for the parent must be provided, with signed copies.
Your Thailand Retirement Visa expires when your Extension of Stay does. You will need to renew your stay in Thailand before your extension of stay expires. This can be done in Thailand. If you cannot obtain your extension inside Thailand, you will have to get a new non-immigrant visa from a Thai Embassy or Consulate abroad. Failure to notify Immigration every 90 days, or in event of change of address, can result in a fine of B2000, or B4000 if you are arrested, plus B200/day until your complied. Notification can be by registered mail, within 7 days before or after the period of 90 days expires. A self-addressed envelop with B5 stamp affixed must be enclosed. Send to ChiangrAI Immigration Office (Visa Extension Section), Tambon WiengPangKham, Amphoe MaeSai, CHiangRai 57130 (tel 053-731008 or 9, ext 23), or your appropriate office.
www.maesaiimm.com might be of assistance, but it is in Thai. MaeSai Immigration’s phone is 053-731008 (or 731009); Phayao residents use that office also, much as the ChiangMai office can (I’m pretty sure) be used by residents of MaeHongSon.

If you want to own a business in Thailand, you can, but don’t have to, set up a company (you’d need Thai partners; 4 oof them, I think it is). Depending on your needs, you can form a Limited Partnership, with a Thai. You should obtain a non immigrant “B” visa before you enter the country, then apply for a work permit here (at least if you are going to do more than just be “owner”). It’s illegal to work in Thailand unless you possess a current work permit - even NGO work or volunteer work (although this is often ignored). It’s wise to check with a lawyer and play it safe!

Editorial for 1st issue:

ChiangHai Magazine is intended to work toward keeping Chiang Rai tourism a calm, clean and serene business, without the myriad problems which have beset so many favored travel destinations. There are plenty of other places for theme parks, 'All Terrain Vehicles', jet skis, bungee jumping, and other noisy, disruptive, insensitive and ecologically dangerous activities, and Chiang Rai certainly does not need them. Why should people be encouraged to come half-way around the world to do what’s possible close to home? It’s wasteful, it’s exploitative, and it’s not even convenient! There are plenty of other things worth coming here for, though, things which it is our intention to promote increasing awareness of. Chiang Rai's great the way it is; while recognizing the inevitability of change, and that change can be for the good, we hope to do our part to keep quality of life there high.
So, while we’ll have features on entertainment, we’ll also have others on culture and the environment, and put a human interest slant into our advertising (and maybe even include useful listings, coupons and valuable legal advice).

A few local businesses we recommend:

It’s amazing how many farang Westerners one sees at Big C, Makro, Tesco and Saha Pibun – clearly people in residence here for at least a while. While around the main market, one sees mostly locals and tourists. Of course, we also occasionally frequent (if you’ll excuse the absurd verbal juxtaposition) the Western-style places, but being price-conscious and interested in fresh and wholesome food, shop more regularly at local markets. The intention here, though, is to point out that the area of the central market offers lots of good quality merchandise at low prices, with considerable convenience and a friendly atmosphere providing a quite viable alternative to the globalized corporatocracy which seems to be gobbling us up. Electronic equipment, shoes, hardware, sporting goods, pet food, dried foods, household goods, stationary and, of course, food, can all be found at the best price, right in the center of town, sold by independent businesspeople in the spirit of ‘sufficiency economy’. Banks and the post office are right there, there are clocks and watches for almost nothing, key copying shops, hand-phone shops, ridiculously cheap clothes, and Saha Tawikeet, with lower prices than other chains on most items they offer. Drug stores are usually cheaper too (although our favorite is at the mouth of the Night Bazaar soi, on Pahonyothin; they also wholesale). Parking isn’t difficult, one doesn’t need to walk more than at other places (but hey, look what not walking has done to so many Farang, particularly from the USA…), and a wide variety of other businesses are quite close by. Tanalai Road has opticians, gold shops, tea shops, discount shops… 5 Star Chicken (Kai Ha Dao) has a place to the west of the main market – best chicken prices in town, if you don’t mind frozen, with KFC-type taste and inhumanity to the animals involved (according to some, a root of bird flu). True, it’s nice to see Chiang Rai modernizing, and the big chains are brighter and cleaner (and Boots certainly does have helpful staff), but the pie place by the market’s main entrance is wonderful, and, once again, why travel all the way here to engage in life just like at home? Better to investigate viable alternatives, no?

Orn’s Book Shop, in the city’s center on JetYod Soi 1 (Soi Boon Bun Dan), just north-east of Boon Bun Dan Guest House. Here for 5 years and listed in Lonely Planet, Orn’s is a friendly shop, in the proprietor’s home, with over 3500 used books on offer (2000 plus in English, over 100 each in German, French, Dutch, Swedish, Finish, Italian and Spanish (a few other languages are represented as well). Hours: 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. daily, except on rare occasion, when announced on the front gate. Books accepted for trade, at a very good rate, but not purchased for cash.
Nice Kitchen, IMF Café, Lotus Family Bakery, Nakorn Pathom restaurant, Ban Chewit Mai bakery, PawJai khao soi shop (behind the WangKom Hotel, on Jet Yod, serving the world’s best northern noodles), Yok-loh noodles (out PawKhun Road a ways), Tuk Taeng down Pahonyothin Road (with traditional Lanna music, live), Ran Nai Inn bookstore and the handicrafts place next door, Ran Bai ?, Pai Massage… we’ll be increasing listings as time passes, promise.

ChiangSaen Wetlands
By Joel J. Barlow

Beset by ecological decay, especially manifest in loss of rainforest and wetlands, Thailand isn’t losing only biodiversity, but could, quite possible and before very long, lose access to good nutrition, and thereby perhaps suffer even more of the confused and disoriented behavior currently besetting our world. ChiangRai, bordered by “backwards” Burma and Laos, stands to weather the coming environmental storm better than most places, but gone are the large wild animals and most of the large, old hardwood trees. Going, like elsewhere, seem to be many of our bees. But ChiangRai, hospitable and agreeable as it may be, remains far from fully domesticated. Just as ChiangRai has much cultural diversity, it retains much ecological diversity too.
On GoogleEarth you can see that Thailand’s neighbors remain green, while Thailand has become mostly brown. In Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, Tak and Nan provinces, though, nature still thrives. ChiangRai has more national park than any other province; one of its most interesting natural areas, though, the ChiangSaen Lake, isn’t among them.
The 830 sq. km. ChiangSaen Basin extends from the Golden Triangle along the Mekong River 29.5 km. to Ban Suan Dok (below the confluence of the Nam Mae Kok), and for about 18 km. southwest from Chiang Saen, encompassing Nong Wiang, ChiangSaen and MaeChan Districts, then along the Kok River for 15 km. “Old clearing” in hilly areas covers 15%, mixed deciduous forest on surrounding hills 10%, new cash crops over 6%, and other land use categories occupy about 5% each. Water bodies cover only 6 %. The area, at altitude 350 to 400 meters, is mostly open and deforested, with rice paddy (2 crops a year), rubber, coconut and pineapple groves interspersed by patches of seasonally flooded grassland, grazing marshes, small rivers, pools and reservoirs.
The Mekong River here is over half a km. wide, with sand banks and small islands. The depth of the Mekong River fluctuates greatly; the river is at its deepest in November to December and reaches its lowest depth in April. There’s little or no overspill from the banks, and flooded areas inland are confined to the basin of Nong Wiang, about 330 sq. km. in size, within the ChiangSaen basin. The Mehong’s Laotian shore is still largely wooded, while paddy covers about half of the area on the Thai side. River banks are often cultivated right up to the water margins, although patches of dense scrub remain. Nine exotic fish species have been introduced, the most serious of which is the giant snake-head fish (Channa micropeltes), and, over the last 30 or so years, Mimosa pigra, an exotic floating plant species brought to the area, has become predominant in the drawdown zone. There are at least 46 fish species from 17 families, with 17 species of important economic value, and five threatened species. The famous but endangered Mekong Giant Catfish (Pla Buk, or Pangasianodon gigas) live both in the Mekong and in its tributary, the Kok; the Department of Fisheries collaborates with local fishermen to obtain eggs and sperm from them, in order to rear fry to be released. An annual ceremony to propitiate Jao Paw Pla Beuk, that fish’s ‘guardian spirit’, is held annually at Wat Had Krai, in Chiang Khong district, in April – the time when people fish for it.
Nong Bong Khai, a.k.a. Chiang Saen Lake or the Yonok Wetlands, effectively divides the ChiangSaen wetlands into northern and southern sections. It’s an area of freshwater marshes, with bog, reed-beds, woodland and drainage channels along a river valley bisected by a causeway. In Pa Sak and Yo Nok Sub-districts, about 5 km. from the Mekong River, it’s in a natural depression surrounded by a small 16.6 sq. km catchment, and low deforested mountains and hills, cultivated in parts. There’s fairly high human population density, with many houses throughout drier parts. The lake bed averages 2 meters in depth (4.5 m. at its very deepest); the level subsides about 1 to1.5 m. in dry seasons. It’s fed by surface run-off from rainwater; seepage goes underground and excess flows into downstream tributaries. Much more would be lost but for a short cement weir which keeps the water from flowing to the Mae Nam Kam (a stream leading into the Kok River). Current out-take for domestic consumption, agriculture and fishponds is just barely sustainable.
The lake provides winter (November-February) habitat for migratory water birds. including egrets, bitterns, crakes, rails, herons, waders and warblers, which rest in the wetlands and feed on paddy grain in downstream areas. Visitors can watch other wetland birds too: species rare or new species to Thailand are sometimes found – sightings include nesting Gras Owls, Swinhoe's Snipe and Comb Duck. Yonok Wetlands holds the largest harrier roost in the country, with over 200 birds in mid winter. There are Eastern Marsh, Western Marsh, Pied and Hen Harriers; other raptors include the Oriental Honey-buzzard, Crested Goshawk, Northern Goshawk and Grey-faced Buzzard. About 225 bird species visit the area, including 79 migratory species, 23 resident breeders, 23 migratory and resident breeders, and 11 species of duck. Of these, 219 are listed as protected species; 19 of them are internationally threatened. Over 10,000 migratory birds visit or stay in the area, annually. Scrub on river sand banks support some small wintering flocks; freshwater marshes and paddies others.
Surrounding land belongs to private individuals, and the lake’s boundary, which fluctuates between wet and dry seasons, in accord with the amount of regional rain, isn’t clearly demarcated; government officials and local people understand the periphery of the non-hunting area to be the water’s edge, so hunting still occurs. Increasing tourism brought guest bungalows, restaurants and other facilities to the lake shore, as well as along the Mekong, and hunting, fishing, especially gill-net use and electrocution, and run-off from fertilizers and pesticides, have greatly reduced the area’s wildlife. In the water catchment area, deforested land under cultivation has taken over most of the area, but newly adopted cash crops like coffee and fruits became less popular when detrimental aspects of orange growing became clear to locals. Similarly, while there were once more than 10 resorts around the lake, there are now only two (with a couple others nearby).
In 1985, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives made Nong Bong Kai a Non-Hunting Area. Long an intermittent floodplain, it’s been suggested that a large lake was there in the time of King Mangrai, but that receded. Maybe about 1200 years ago water from a large lake above Keng Tung, relocated by a big earthquake, came down here, and created a natural barrier King Mangrai found useful for helping avoid subjugation by the Mongols, but details aren’t clear. After the British clear-cut teak from the area, things dried up; then, about 50 years ago, a dirt weir was built, to store water for agricultural uses. Birds returned to the artificial lake, now of 3.5 sq. km.; the dirt weir was replaced by a cement one after a little over 10 years. The birds returned, and the area became an important tourist attraction for ChiangRai. 15 species of fish seasonally migrate between Nong Bong Kai and nearby rivers, but migration has been reduced due to lack of interconnectivity in the hydrological system. Fish lay eggs and raise their young at the east end of the lake because that area is protected, with fish habitat still in good condition. Locals are allowed to do some fishing, but that too has become adequately constrained, and it’s now planned for trees to grow tall all around the lake.
Near the weir ancient ruins have been found, mostly in the bog-land: housing foundations, brick and an ancient wat. But it’s not known how old they are, nor quite how much the courses of the Kok and Mekong have fluctuated.

Effective and productive natural systems are complicated, with many interdependent, inter-working parts. To remove a component of the system is to remove much of its value. Most teak was removed from the Lanna area a century or so ago, and dry seasons started getting drier. The huge ChiangSaen Lake dwindled into a boggy marsh, and dried up. Waterfoul had to relocate to Nong Luang, and fewer nutrients entered the bending Mae Nam Kong (Mekong). After the weir was built to retain rainfall runoff, the lake revived, as did the area’s population, and agriculture. Were there more rains in winter, though, water coming into the lake would be continuous, and water could be allowed to run out, through an old-fashioned weir of wood and rock, helping alleviate accumulation of toxins in the lake while aerating water leaving it, generally enriching everything. There’d be more food for fish, more beautiful birds, and, of course, the missing trees, if there, would help keep everything temperate, most certainly, anyway, much cooler in the hot season.
The abbots of nearby Wat Pa Mak No and Wat Yonok assisted in conservation efforts, and the Yonok Wetland project "Friends of Yonok Wetlands" got significant support from one of Northern Thailand's most followed monks, Khru Ba Boun Chum, who was given land adjacent to the wetlands for a meditation centre.
As Yongyut Trisurat of Kasetsart University has explained, “Large areas of freshwater wetlands and mangrove forest in Thailand were converted to agriculture and shrimp farms during the 19th and 20th centuries, such that few now remain in a natural state. Some of these areas are threatened despite the fact that they are vital to the daily life of local people, who have relied on them for generations. Planning for wetland management is hampered by limited budget and lack of commitment by government agencies, low levels of acceptance by local communities and the absence of any monitoring.” He believes it essential to strengthen community organizations and local administrations to promote conservation and wise use of wetlands, especially through community participation and multi-stakeholder networking, and explains, “community-based conservation intentionally includes a range of activities and practices that directly or indirectly affect biodiversity conservation, and there is no one definition. However, it has two broadly recognized objectives: 1) to enhance wildlife/biodiversity conservation; and 2) to provide incentives, normally economic, to local people. Community-based conservation has three essential characteristics: 1) indigenous peoples and local communities are concerned about the relevant ecosystems that are related to them culturally and / or for livelihood; 2) they are the major players in decision making and the implementation of decisions; and 3) management decisions and efforts towards conservation of biodiversity are voluntary.” (“Community-based Wetland Management in Northern Thailand”, published in the International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, Vol. 2, Number 1, by Common Ground Publishing, Melbourne, Australia, 2006).
Although the circuit off Highway 1 going from MaeChan to ChiangSaen, Ban Sop Ruak at the Golden Triangle Confluence, and Mae Sai, is being widened, and there are extensive swathes of gambling resorts across the Golden Triangle Confluence now, commercialization’s reach hasn’t yet gripped all, and a lot of local businesses look quite slow. The lake, as yet, has no internet shops, bakeries, coffee shops, home-stay or even “agro-toursim”… although when the tourists start to come back, that could certainly change.

First view of the lake, from the hardtop road

View from the far side

Disabled bird that couldn't fly and lived on the lake shore a decade ago

The resorts

The weir

A Fair E-tale.

Once upon a time in a lost shire-like place of rivers and streams and a high dry plateau, lived a hobbit-like people, who didn’t have big hairy feet. In some ways they were more like fairies; they had small wood boats, and wood and grass houses raised off the ground.
These hobbit-fairies worshipped nature and fun, and didn’t progress as the rest of the world did, building cities of stone, cement and steel, conquering nature and fun. To catch up, outsiders were invited in, to play on water-slides, swing on vines and get therapeutic massage. Soon the little wood boats were replaced by nuclear-powered space-pods directed through dashboard TV monitors. No-one worried about spent fuel; they were used to ignoring problems, for in this shire lived three huge animals no-one ever talked about: a 3-headed elephant named Erehwon, an 800 pound gorilla and a giant bull. The three great animals did what they wanted, and were fed by the little folk.
But as the great antiseptic cities of the outside world became both over-populated and sterile, and more and more came to visit in the shire, space began to dwindle there too, and the great beasts to feel confined. One day they went on a rampage, and all the water-slides were destroyed. The outsiders stopped coming, fuel for the space-pods ran out, and the 3-headed elephant grew tired and confused enough to think his name was Nowhere. The 800 lb. gorilla had babies, and paid attention to little else. But the bull, Gaur, ran rampant. The people again built boats, and fled to islands, while Gaur ruled on the great plateau.
On their islands, people grew bananas, which they fed Erehwon and the gorilla family, while those still on the great plain learned to make red cloth to distract the bull (often at great sacrifice).
As the cities outside stagnated, reporters came to gather stories of the playful nature-worshippers. They exaggerated their problems without ever learning of the three great animals no-one ever mentioned to them. But eventually the gorilla babies reached full size. At about that time, though, the outside world collapsed; briefly, Gaur ran rampant at will, through China shops, until the young gorillas decided to co-operate, just briefly, but long enough to forge chains from some of the old space-pods.

A great philosophy to get one through life

We live in world of illusion; every sense of our body gives us false messages, all the time. We're consumed by never-ending hungers for food, sex and pride. We’ve confused priorities, like putting fun over happiness, and ego before stability. It almost seems like this is inescapable, and that the only thing we can do is to carry on with
life as a farmer who walks through his garden admiring the beauty there. He must attempt to limit weeds and other pests once in a while, and water the plants when needed, but can finally sit quietly under a big tree and contemplate thoughts, feelings, appetites, or possible futures. This is what Voltaire recommended, a quarter of a millennium ago, through his Dr. Pangloss, in Candide. Simply get everyone to just tend their own garden, and our lives should be fine. If only there weren’t things we produced more than we need of, which can be traded for things we don’t have, but have use for… or at least sometimes think we do!

art by Alex Andreyev of Saint Petersburg, Russia

A friend thinks Thailand’s "People Power" revolution could lead the world into a new era of social justice. This is but reveling in an intoxicated feeling resultant of accepting being lied to as as valid as anything else. Thai being a highly ambiguous language, well suited for seeming to say opposite things simultaneously, it involves tremendous capacity for deception, as well as for very polite manners (and yes, there is a very definite close relation there).
Are Thai oppressed masses really demanding freedom from an evil dictator? I think not. The “protestors” (or paid agitators) are victims, certainly, but mostly of their own gullibility. Unused to reading, doing even simple math, and blithely unaware of most geography, history and economic theory, they at least have been unwilling to follow the un-elected leaders of their “democracy movement” – although at great social cost, and cost, even to their own health (in particular, from breathing smoke from tires they lit on fire). They know Taksin wasn’t “democratically elected” – they got paid to vote for him! But that’s OK, they tell themselves; even the Democrats have bought votes.
Weather there are actual facts, or only opinions, it is wise to accept that there are consequences to actions, or non-actions, and to act in accordance with what is likely to result from one’s decisions. The Red Shirts have not done that, primarily because they have become intoxicated with hope, and because they refuse to see that replacing the devil they know with a new silver-tongued devil full of glib promises is hardly overthrowing a system, let alone working for social justice.
Traditionally, different Thai powers have had differing concepts on justice, duty and method, and no singular vision ever became paramount. Clergy, armed services, tax collectors and other bureaucrats, various Chinese groups (merchant and other societies), other foreigners and internal rivals among these various powerful groups have long exerted veiled, but extensive, influence. Privilege was protected, nurtured, cherished and fought for – and Thai politics has generally been a delicate diplomatic juggling show. Much of Thai social structuring has always been a balancing act, keeping peasant farmers and Chinese merchants, border tribes and central bureaucrats, army and police, the powerful and the powerless, able to interact with less friction than has been the norm through much of recorded history, throughout the globe.
Thai courts have often been accused of corruption, as also have army, police, and bureaucracy, as well as other government divisions (the electricity generating monopoly, state railroad department, customs and port authority, immigration and the border patrol); even the Sangha Buddhist clergy officialdom has, too. But as often as not, perhaps, this “corruption” might be said to exist primarily in the eye of the beholder. It’s often been simply the way things are, or were, done, and Thailand has usually exhibited an incredible extent of tolerance.
Telecommunications-tycoon turned Prime Minister Taksin’s years of success (coming after many business failures and then selling questionable walkie-talkies to the police force he was an officer of) involved quiet deal-making that eventually consolidated over a fifth of the national budget under his personal executive authority; he toured the country dishing this out (usually as loans, with interest), thus becoming more important in patronage than long-powerful local MPs, and creating a challenge to the old power system. Taksin's main challenge to the power structure involved assault on the long-standing but compromised relationship between authoritarian privilege and mercantilism. The poor wanted a champion, and he pretended to be one for them, gaining power while traveling to India and Burma on public funds to do personal business. While proclaiming support for all, he acted primarily for his own benefit, winning accolades as a mover and shaker, as one who knew how to achieve results.
But much of what he did was based on the work of Chuan Leekpai (especially the much touted, but painfully inefficient, 30 baht public health “scheme”). He did all he could to overthrow checks and balances, and to insure continuation of his power. He was no champion of democracy. The parliamentary process by which the current Democrat coalition came to power is the same process used in Britain; the parliament that voted in this government consists entirely of democratically elected members.
The fanciful, self-serving demands of the “red shirts” have had little to do with “social justice” – they don’t even say what they hope new elections will bring. They could, and should, talk about decentralization, and some have; they could, and should, decry corruption, but in doing so, must also show willingness to share in the burdens a re-making of the social contract would require.
In Bangladesh, “micro-economic” support-groups have helped revive an almost comatose economy, much as overseas Koreans have used the power of the group to finance many small, but nonetheless successful, businesses. Has “community radio” called for that kind of thing here? I think not.
The Isaan poor engage as much in “kicking dogs” as other people; they complain of being looked down on, but meanwhile look down on others. Not only is there a problem of lack of individual initiative, but one of integrity, honesty, and understanding of principles. That Isaan’s history has been lost has contributed to this, but despite an interesting tradition of separatism, the fiery self-respecting bravery of which I most certainly respect, it is absurd not to acknowledge the problems of Balkanization, and how the ethnic armies of Myanmar undercut themselves through their refusal to effectively unite. Privilege without responsibility is hardly privilege at all. The truth of the matter is that Abhisit is more likely to be of assistance to the tire-burners and other under-privileged Thais than Taksin, or his surrogates, would ever be, as is clear to anyone looking at the situation without hope of personal gain. That the “red shirt” leaders are merely self-serving should be obvious, but the human capacity for self-deception is immense.
Thai social hierarchy is built from commoners up through the lower bureaucracy to high officials; there has never been even pretense of egalitarianism. Thai democracy, such as it is, is a system purportedly responsive to people’s needs and aspirations, but leaders are supposed to act toward members of society as fathers toward children, concerned for their well being while stern in discipline. A consequent attitude that those in authority need not explain difficult matters to their lessers, brought problems with accountability, consistency and transparency – problems which still hamper Thai efforts to successfully compete in the modern global economy.
Since World War II, Bangkok’s rapid growth has caused many problems: with transportation, communication, housing, water supply, drainage and pollution (which Thai language thus had to invent a word for). Tourism rose in importance during the Vietnam War; the city became a popular destination for U.S. military personnel. In the 1980s, nightclubs and sex trade were the world’s wildest. Although prostitution is formally illegal and the number of prostitutes per capita is lower in Thailand than in some other Asian countries, sea-side resorts pander to foreign sex-tourists. To combat gross abuse, underage prostitution and a growing ‘image problem’ the government stiffened penalties in the late 1990s, and problems with “sex-slavery” have been greatly reduced. Amazingly, though, despite a lack of foreign spending during the Red Shirt occupation of central Bangkok, prostitute earnings are reported to have quadrupled during that period. It isn’t hard to guess where the money for that came from, or why.
While their men were disporting themselves, women and children were being told they were in danger of falling into the hands of murderous oppressors, and children were used as “human shields”, told they needn’t be afraid, must be brave for the “cause” – their presence justified to reporters by their parents’ purported desire to "entertain and thrill" them. Paranoia, delusions of grandeur, incessant noisy diversions, and a perverse justification of violence as expression of one’s feelings undermined what otherwise might have become a propagandistic media victory; I doubt the Red Shirt faction can any longer win a national election. Still, the international press has failed to comprehend the issues involved, and seems determined to help destroy what democracy exists here, in the name of democracy – much like the Tea-baggers in the good ol’ USA.
It is foolish to forget that Taksin has been supportive of despots, that the Argentine Juan Peron’s populism didn’t work, that concentration of wealth is sometimes almost accidental (is it merely coincidence that the richest man in the world is currently a Mexican telecommunications tycoon, that fabulously wealthy Italian PM Berscolinni is also accused of corrupting democratic values, that the “too big to fail” businesses are ruining the world economy?); if media doesn’t correct its conceptual and contextual framework, we might even end up living in a world of urban terrorism not unlike what’s been depicted in Hollywood movies based on Philip K. Dick stories, but in all likelihood, media predictions of continuing violence are greatly exaggerated.
Did red shirt “leaders” (orators?) make suspiciously expensive purchases this year, as has been claimed? Were followers promised financial reward they didn’t receive? How much has resumption of peace resulted from asset freezing? Was Central World well insured and operating at a loss? Was another party involved, and directing (and paying for) paramilitary snipers dressed in black? Is there a significant chance of these questions being satisfactorily answered? Will misguided reporters, and their publishers, make retractions and corrections? As for the last two questions – I doubt it, while at the same time suspecting that real resolution depends at least somewhat on that happening (at least somewhat). More likely, we’ll hear more about projected unrest, unrest due to globalization, governmental ineptitude, and the good side of certain scoundrels.

10 ways to tell if you’re a backpacker:
1. You believe banana pancakes are the traditional food of the country you are in.
2. You believe "cheapest" and "best value for money" are the same.
3. In conversations, you tell of the cheap¬est flight with the dodgiest airline, the most uncomfort¬able bus/train journey, and the best unspoiled beaches (regardless of any personal experience), and like to give your most dramatic bowel-movement story. None need be true.
4. You bargain with fervor to save even a penny or cent: it's the principle that matters!
5. You dress in "ethnic" style clothing: martial arts pants, bracelets with bangles, earrings and facial jewelry, with tattoos and dreadlocks - to impress the locals and give the right impression to policemen and airport officials.
6. You defend local people and cultures in front of other trav¬elers, except when refused entry due to your appearance, or when a victim of two-tier pricing... After all, how can a devel¬oping nation progress unless it broadens its horizons?
7. You learn some important terms of local languages, especially, how to say "how much is your cheapest room?" and "That's too expensive."
8. You are an expert on malaria pills.
9. You call yourself an independent traveler but seldom make any decision without consulting your guidebook, whose word is gospel.
10. You are NEVER a tourist.

Chiangrai 10 best – and worst – list(s):
1) Best climate in the country, with usually good air
2) Excellent cost of living per quality and value ratio
3) Low crime, low stress
4) Cheap fresh food from open, honest farmers (a bit slow in their pickups)
5) Doi Khao Quai – groovy abbot, great views, cool legend and ambience
6) Old Airport – friendly, free, healthy, convenient
7) Border proximity and cultural variety
8) Good beer availability (relative to elsewhere)
9) Beautiful girls
10) Big C, convenience, especially for seeing them!)

10) It’s a colony of Bangkok, with little self-direction/self-determination
9) Out of control Farang embarrassingly under-socialized, pretentious drunks
8) Stateless people (and government not even giving appearance to trying to live up to legal obligations)
7) Poverty and resultant love-for-hire (and people thinking money will suffice)
6) Missionaries – misguided wannabes
5) Fragile egos (both Farang and Thais with money)
4) Education – wouldn’t want my kids competing for university entrance or in the job market based on what they can get here
3) Entertainment – as limited as education
2) The Wet Season flooding and dangerous roads
1) Big cargo-less SUVs in tiny sois.

You know you’re adapted to CR when:
1. You’ve met anyone who’s ever stayed at “Boring Guess How”
2. You can’t get enough prick kii-nu
3. You easily use a squat loo without t.p., and your dinner napkins come from inside a t.p. roll
4. You automatically reach for your wallet when a traffic cop pulls you over
5. You can sleep without air-conditioning or ear-plugs
6. You recognize when an r sound will become an h instead of an l (‘lak Chiang-hai’)
7. You no longer wonder how someone making but B10,000/mo can own a D-Max truck
8. You give directions using intersection names, not street names
9. You understand that male, female and katoey aren’t the only possibilities
10. You own a lady bike, a rice cooker, and a katik nam-ron (and call it that)
11. You expect, and get, change – using public transportation
12. You’re not surprised when your semi-fluent Thai doesn’t get what you ordered in a restaurant

And you really know you’ve overstayed when you get a trailer for the lady-bike!

Why do native English speakers feel so supreme, not simply superior, but supreme?

Why are Thai people so slim, when they eat 5 meals per day, and why are Farangs not, when they eat only 2-3 meals per day?
Why can´t I drop crumbs onto the floor when eating a biscuit and not have time to pick them up without my wife immediately seeing this and nagging at me for making a mess?
Why does my wife criticize me for not washing up... then also criticize me when I do wash up - for stacking the plates wrongly... and then wonder why I won´t wash up again...???
Why must you give up asking "why" in Thailand?
Why can’t I believe a politician any more?
Why are girls in uniforms more beautiful?
Why do English daily newspapers like Bangkok Post have ads (sometimes full page) entirely in Thai?
Why can you only find toilet paper on restaurant tables, but not in their rest rooms?
Why do parking attendants and security guards constantly blow those whistles?
Why do we become so brave, righteous and impatient as soon as we get behind the wheel of a car?

A love-struck Farang having an argument with a bar-girl exclaimed, “You lied to me!”
“That’s my job,” she replied, with perfectly straight face…

ChiangRai may rival ChiangMai when it comes to restaurants, but world class it certainly isn’t. We have the world’s best khao soi gai (at Ran Paw Jai, on Jet Yod Road behind the Wang Kom Hotel), and about that the world doesn’t know what it’s missing. Otherwise, we don’t have much truly spectacular.

Except, that is, for Ran-ahaan Tomato (Restaurant Tomato), which, despite its rather plain, if not peculiar, name, is as good as any, anywhere. They even have steaks, and the Hamburg Steak is to be very highly recommended. The wasabi horseradish paste for sushi is simply splendid, the fish excellent, and they even offer the wonderful Asahi beer at a reduced price of but B59 for a big bottle (and a better deal can’t be had).

The décor is nice – semi-Japanese style, but comfortable, and the service good and quick. The help is even considerate enough to repeat your order, to insure that all is right (a habit others would do well to emulate). My wife, baby and I ate until stuffed for B680, including a locally hefty almost 10% tip.

If you’re not familiar with Japanese, Korean or Vietnamese cuisine, don’t be intimidated. Everything tastes simply heavenly, and you’re sure to find yourself wanting to return for more.

There’s sashimi (raw fish with vegetables), teriyaki, tempura, oyster nabe and make; miso, seaweed soup and mushroom soup; potato salad, baked potato and bacon potato and potato au gratin, salmon, oyster nabe, maki shrimp; sake, green tea hot or cold, and wine.

Open 10 a.m. to 11 p.m. (last order 10:30 p.m.), 7 days a week, at 81/4 Paholyothin Road, about half-way from the Ha-yaek to the bridge to MaeSai, on the Ban Rai (east) side, right by Sahamit Road (which leads to the Sports Stadium). Phone and Fax: 053-719028.